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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The thesis is an investigation of the relation between generic indeterminacy, 
narrative time and figuration through a comparative analysis of three generically 
ambiguous texts: Vladimir Nabokov’s Speak, Memory (1951/1966), Georges Perec’s W 
or the Memory of Childhood (1975) and Javier Marías’s Dark Back of Time (1998). Those 
issues will be examined with the help (or the hindrance) of a metaphor — the 
“curiosity”.  Although it was initially employed by Brian Richardson to describe the 
non-mimetic temporal structure of Speak, Memory, the figure is used here not only in 
relation to narrative time but also as an alternative way of exploring the critical 
debates around the definition of autobiography as a literary genre.  
The “curiosity” metaphor is first considered in relation to other figures of 
definition and indefinition employed in critical discourses about autobiography. The 
metaphor articulates the tensions between boundary-based definitional models 
(such as Philippe Lejeune’s), hybrid “renaming” approaches (as evidenced in 
portmanteau tags such as ‘autobiografiction’ or ‘autofiction’) and anti -models such 
as Paul De Man’s, suspicious about the possibility of containing, defining or naming 
autobiography (highlighted by their use of temporally impossible or paradoxical 
figures). Through the curiosity (a figure of generic oddity defined against a norm it 
disturbs), the thesis explores the problematic nature of boundary-based definitional 
approaches and argues that it is only by an explicit and immersive mirroring of the 
circular and seemingly paralysing nature of autobiography (and its definition) that 
the genre can be described and kept alive. 
The thesis’s “curious” approach to autobiography involves a joint study of the 
metaphor not only in relation to genre but also to questions of narrative time and 
temporal indeterminacy (the “origin” of the figure). It seeks to explore this twinned 
process of indefinition through the medium of figurative mirrors— in particular, 
through self-referential and paradoxical devices such as mise en abyme. The 
procedure for this study involves a series of obsessive and patient readings of three 
“curiosities”: Speak, Memory, W or the Memory of Childhood, and Dark Back of Time. 
Their use of mise en abyme devices will be examined in parallel to their generic 
indefinition and their temporal structure. Narrative time will be analysed both 
through classical narratological models (such as the fabula and sjuzhet distinction) 
and “fuzzier” approaches to narrative temporality (as David Herman’s concept of 
polychrony). The thesis thus seeks to gather together a series of ambiguous figural 
and temporal motifs in the three texts (some of them left “uncollected” by previous 
critical approaches) in order to determine whether it might be possible to approach 
autobiography through less confining frames than those of the 
frontier/boundary/hybrid models. 
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On forays and curiosities: an introduction 
 
2. See, for example, Christian Moraru’s insightful analysis of the temporal 
curiosities of Nabokov’s autobiography, Speak, Memory 
Brian Richardson, ‘Beyond Story and Discourse’ in Narrative Dynamics: 
Essays on Time, Plot, Closure and Frames
1 
 
 
Perhaps I should start with a footnote to the footnote. The above epigraph comes 
from Brian Richardson’s ‘Beyond Story and Discourse: Narrative Time in 
Postmodern and Non-Mimetic Fiction’, his contribution to Narrative Dynamics, an 
anthology of narrative theory. Richardson’s chapter focuses on the limitations of the 
traditional narratological distinction between fabula and sjuzhet, or story and 
discourse, particularly when applied to late modernist and postmodernist texts, as  
those categories ‘are predicated on distinctions that experimental writers are 
determined to preclude, deny or confound — and this is also true of some post-
modern forays into non-fiction’.2 The note appears at the end of that sentence and 
provides an example of one of those ‘forays’: Vladimir Nabokov’s Speak, Memory 
(1951/1966). 
Speak, Memory will indeed be one of the three texts examined in this study, 
but my choice of that note as an introduction to the main purposes of this thesis —
                                                          
1
 Brian Richardson, ‘Beyond Story and Discourse: Narrative Time in Postmodern and Nonmimetic Fiction’, in Narrative 
Dynamics: Essays on Time, Plot, Closure and Frames, ed. by Brian Richardson (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 2002), 
pp.47-63 (p. 59). Richardson is referring to Christian Moraru’s article ‘Time, Writing and Ecstasy in Speak, Memory: 
Dramatising the Proustian Project’, Nabokov Studies, 2.1 (1995), 173-190. 
2
 Richardson, ‘Beyond Story and Discourse’, pp. 47-63 (p. 47). 
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and the questions it explores — is not based on their coincident subject matter. 
Neither is it motivated by Richardson’s apparent banishment of Speak, Memory to a 
peripheral position in his study of what he calls ‘non-mimetic’ narrative temporal 
structures (narratives that cannot be described by the fabula/sjuzhet distinction).3  
Despite the fact that one of the purposes of this thesis is to redress the critical 
imbalance towards fictional texts in studies of narrative time — particularly in 
relation to so-called “experimental” narrative techniques — Richardson’s note 
should not be read as proof of a critical tendency to sideline (and perhaps over-
simplify) autobiography and its narrative structure. The chapter and the anthology 
are, after all, just dedicated to fiction: there is no particularly need for him to 
consider non-fictional examples. Reading the note as evidence of a conspiracy 
against autobiography might seem paranoid and excessive, like questioning the 
absence of Roman coins or porcelain cats in a stamp collection. No, what really 
motivates my choice of this note as an epigraph is a particular phrase, ‘temporal 
curiosities’:  a phrase which deserves a far better fate than being tucked away in its 
drawer-like note — a prime mantelpiece position, perhaps. 
The metaphor that Richardson chooses to display in his article to refer to 
structurally awkward non-fictional texts, however, is that of the ‘foray’.  Even 
though he does not need to, Richardson does acknowledge non-fictional texts in 
relation to mimetic models of narrative temporality — perhaps out of a desire for 
critical thoroughness, or even out of politeness. He affirms that the ‘general mimetic 
                                                          
3
 Richardson, ‘Beyond Story and Discourse’, pp. 47-63 (p.47). 
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assumptions’ of models such as Genette’s allow ‘the theory to attempt to cover both 
fictional and nonfictional examples’.4 Fabula/sjuzhet models are ‘generally adequate 
to describe the temporality of most nonfictional narratives’. 5   The non-mimetic 
temporal models he describes in the essay (such as circular or contradictory 
temporalities) ‘insofar as they engage in logical contradictions [...] are usually only 
possible in works of fiction’. 6  Richardson’s generalizations about non-fictional 
narratives could indeed be read as proof of the over-simplification of non-fictional 
texts, but his use of adverbs such as ‘usually’ or ‘generally’ (or the verb ‘attempt’) 
signal his openness to consider exceptions, and perhaps a certain uneasiness with his 
own generalizations. 
The use of ‘foray’ to describe texts such as Speak, Memory is related to those 
previous statements. Although Richardson seems wary of the identification of the 
non-fictional with mimesis and logic, ‘foray’ somehow implies that those examples 
might have made an incursion into a territory where they do not properly belong: 
they are violent disturbances of the norm.  From ‘foray’, we can infer that there is a 
frontier between fiction and non-fiction, but one which might not be impenetrable or 
stable. However, as we have seen in the epigraph, Richardson employs a very 
different metaphor when he gives an example of such forays — the ‘curiosity’. 
Although the word still highlights the freakish character of such examples, it depicts 
their exceptionality in a more positive light, as perhaps something which adds to 
their charm and makes them collectable. Even if ‘curiosity’ still implies that there is a 
                                                          
4
 Richardson, ‘Beyond Story and Discourse’, pp. 47-63 (p.47). 
5
 Richardson, ‘Beyond Story and Discourse’, pp. 47-63 (p. 47). 
6
 Richardson, ‘Beyond Story and Discourse’, pp. 47-63 (p. 48). 
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typical narrative form for autobiography, it does not establish it around the idea of a 
rigid frontier transgressed by those texts: those examples might be not aggressive 
attacks or malicious trespasses, but simply odd. 
The difference between describing certain texts such as Speak, Memory as 
forays or as curiosities might seem unimportant — the change of metaphors might 
be nothing more than an instance of elegant variation.   However, in the light of the 
critical debates about the definition of autobiography, the metaphors could be read 
as emblems of two very different approaches.  Much of the theory of autobiography 
has made use of spatial metaphors such as the foray and — above all — the 
borderline to define the genre. The most important exponent of this approach is 
perhaps Philippe Lejeune, originator of a much commented (and frowned-upon) 
definition of the genre, which will be examined in more detail in Chapter One. The 
parameter-based approach to autobiography, however, is not exclusive to Lejeune: 
many attempts to redefine the genre (from Stephen Reynolds’ forgotten attempt at 
the beginning of the twentieth century — autobiografiction — to Serge 
Doubrovsky’s much more successful “invention” of autofiction) also rely on spatial 
metaphors such as frontiers and forays. 
The best-known exception to this approach to autobiography is that of Paul 
De Man, who on in his 1979 article ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’ argued against 
attempts to define the genre. For him ‘empirically as well as theoretically, 
autobiography lends itself poorly to generic definition; each specific instance seems 
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to be an exception to the norm’.7 His approach is thus perhaps closer to the metaphor 
of the curiosity: autobiography as something that cannot be categorised, but only 
collected. Although the metaphor itself is an over-simplification of De Man’s 
arguments (it implies there is a norm which makes the curiosity “curious”), it is far 
closer to them than the foray ― which presumes that autobiography occupies a 
stable territory where it either stays or from which it strays. In this essay, De Man 
explicitly questions one such example of spatial figural language:  Genette’s 
metaphor of the revolving door, which implies that certain texts move around in 
circles from fiction to autobiography and vice versa. De Man contests this model by 
remarking that   
As anyone who has been caught in a revolving door [...] can testify, it is 
certainly most uncomfortable, and all the more so in this case since this 
whirligig is capable of infinite acceleration and is [...] not successive 
but simultaneous.8 
 
De Man’s play with Genette’s metaphor will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 
One, but for the moment I merely wish to point out that the extra turn De Man gives 
here to the figure of the revolving door signals a move away from the use of spatial 
models to describe the process of reading and identifying autobiography. De Man 
chooses instead a temporal model, and one that — unlike chronological time —
cannot be conceptualised as a stable line: an impossible or illogical temporality. 
Although the metaphor of the curiosity is perhaps too meek (even euphemistic), it 
                                                          
7
 Paul De Man, ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, in Autobiography: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies, ed. by 
Trev Lynn Broughton (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), I, pp. 264-274 (p. 265), (first publ. in MLN, 94 (1979), 919-930). 
8
 De Man, ‘Autobiography ’, I, pp. 264-274 (p. 266). 
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somehow manages — imperfectly — to convey De Man’s conclusions about the 
indefinable quality of autobiography and its figural structure. 
Richardson’s use of the word, nonetheless, probably did not have this debate 
on the generic status of autobiography in mind. The phrase ‘temporal curiosity’ is 
not referring at all to questions of genre or figuration but rather to narrative itself. It 
should be read as a sort of (pseudo) synonym for the kind of temporal narrative 
structures that he calls on other occasions (using a far more aggressive metaphor) 
‘violations of realistic temporality’.9 It is difficult to fathom why Richardson changed 
metaphors to refer to the narrative structure of Speak, Memory — or rather to describe 
it as described by Christian Moraru. 
The reason why this article might have caught Richardson’s attention as an 
explanation of how ‘unnatural’ or non-mimetic structures function in an 
autobiographical text might be due to Moraru’s account of certain episodes in Speak, 
Memory. Moraru argues that ‘Nabokovian (re)writing “fractures” time, segments its 
contingent continuity (and contingency altogether), and effects [...] an ontological 
breakthrough aesthetically’. He then offers a couple of examples to illustrate this 
process, such as the account of the composition of Nabokov’s first poem in Chapter 
Eleven or the butterfly hunt that closes Chapter Six.10 Richardson probably had those 
episodes in mind when he referred to the ‘temporal curiosities’ of Speak, Memory: 
instances which defy or escape the fabula/sjuzhet distinction, but — as it may be 
                                                          
9
 Richardson, ‘Beyond Story and Discourse´, pp. 47-73 (p. 48). 
10
 Moraru, 173-190 (p. 182). Moraru’s article, however, only deals with narrative temporal structure as a side issue: it is 
primarily a comparison between Proust and Nabokov’s approach to time, timelessness and literary creation, focused on 
their respective philosophical and aesthetic stances rather than on narrative technique. 
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inferred by the change of term — which perhaps do so in a unique way which has 
nothing to do with the “battle” between fiction and non-fiction. 
The aim of this thesis is to display these curiosities with all the care and 
attention they deserve. Through the curious nature of these examples, it will seek to 
explore both the debate on the nature of autobiography as a genre and the 
discussion around what critics have termed ‘fuzzy’, ‘indeterminate’ or ‘anti-mimetic’ 
temporalities in the hope that the intersection of these two questions might provide a 
new angle with which to approach autobiography — in particular,  a group of texts 
that have tended been included under ill-fitting, pinching categories such as  
“postmodern autobiography” or “autofiction”. 11  The curiosities (generic and 
temporal) under examination here include Speak, Memory — appropriately described 
by its author as ‘a unique freak as autobiographies go’ — and other two equally 
freakish texts, Georges Perec’s W or the Memory of Childhood (1975), a centaur-like 
combination of fiction and autobiography, and Javier Marías’s Dark Back of Time 
(1998), one of very few specimens — if not the only one — of the ‘false novel’ genre.12  
These three examples combine generic uniqueness with narrative temporal 
curiosities of various sorts. 
It might be wise at this point to offer a sample of the wares under 
consideration, if only to ascertain if they are truly deserving of being described as 
‘curiosities’. Let us consider, for instance, one of the episodes Moraru refers to and 
                                                          
11
 Sources of these categories are David Herman, Emma Kalafenos and Brian Richardson. See David Herman, Story Logic: 
Problems and Possibilities of Narrative (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), pp. 212-213, Emma Kalafenos, 
‘Toward a Typology of Indeterminacy in Postmodern Narrative’, Comparative Literature, 44.4, (1992), 380-408, and Brian 
Richardson, ‘Beyond Story and Discourse’, pp. 47-73. 
12
 Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited (London: Everyman’s Library, 1999), p. 247. 
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which might have prompted Richardson to come up with the ‘curiosity’ metaphor — 
the butterfly hunt.13 In this episode, Nabokov recounts a childhood expedition to the 
marshes adjoining his parents’ country estate: as he walks along towards the end of 
the bog, the flora and the fauna change to those of the Rocky Mountains in Colorado, 
where Nabokov would hunt Lepidoptera as an adult in his American exile. At first 
sight, the passage seems an instance of prolepsis: an episode from Nabokov’s adult 
life is narrated out of sequence, before its due place in the story. The fabula of events 
seems easy to reconstruct — and hence not a particularly good example of a 
‘temporal curiosity’. Michael Wood, however, has pointed out that ‘what feels 
magical in the boy’s adventure in the marsh is that the boy himself emerges in 
America, since as far as the prose tells us it’s still 1910, no time has passed’.14 The 
paragraph employs the past tense all the way through, creating the illusion of time 
travel: a sleight-of-hand trick which is never concealed from the reader. Nabokov 
admits that he likes ‘to fold [his] magic carpet, after use, in such a way as to 
superimpose one part of the pattern upon another’.15 
Why is this sample of narrative showmanship selected as an example of an 
‘ontological breakthrough’ outside of time? Moraru’s choice of the episode as ‘a form 
of the Greek kairos, the instant that disrupts the ordinary chronos to impose the 
absoluteness of aesthetic time’ (no less) is justified not so much by the passage itself 
but by the commentary that follows it.16 Nabokov starts by “confessing” that he does 
                                                          
13
 Moraru, 173-190 (p. 187). 
14
 Michael Wood, The Magician’s Doubts: Nabokov and the Risks of Fiction (London: Pimlico, 1995), p. 84. 
15
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 10. 
16
 Moraru, 173-190 (p. 187). 
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not ‘believe in time’ and then goes on to remark that ‘the highest enjoyment of 
timelessness — in a landscape selected at random — is when I stand among rare 
butterflies and their food plants’.17 The act of butterfly hunting itself stands outside 
of time, out of the fabula and the sjuzhet. The scene should not be read as being “set” 
in 1910 or in 1947: its purpose is to question the idea of temporal “setting” — hence 
the dashed comment about ‘a landscape selected at random’, as if the background 
(Russia or America) was some kind of revolving screen prop.18 When read alongside 
Nabokov’s own commentary of the scene, the passage becomes more mysterious: it 
presents a moment belonging to a timeless realm, a curiosity as rare as the butterflies 
themselves. This example — as we will see in Chapter Two — is by no means the 
most curious of all of Speak, Memory’s ‘temporal curiosities’. The overtness with 
which the passage points out its peculiarity mars some of its rarity, paradoxically 
cutting short the reader’s own obsessive hunt for the narrative equivalent of rare 
Lepidoptera. The narrative tactics of Speak, Memory (like Lepidoptera) combine self-
conscious display and camouflage, articulating a paradoxical desire for collection 
and concealment. 
The “sample” from Perec’s W or the Memory of Childhood, on the other hand, is 
a good example of the “hidden” curiosity. It can be found in Part Two of the book, in 
the section in which Perec recounts his childhood experiences as a war refugee in the 
Alps, where he had fled with his paternal aunt and her family to escape the Nazi 
occupation of Paris. The six-year old boy is enrolled in a Catholic boarding school, 
                                                          
17
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 106. 
18
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 106. 
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the College Turenne, in order to hide him. In Chapter Twenty-one, Perec refers to a 
visit from his aunt Esther. The chapter, however, is not an account of the visit, but 
rather a description of a photograph taken during it (dated ‘1943’ at the back) in the 
form of an inventory of its contents. He describes his physical appearance, including 
the clothes he was wearing: ‘a “cowboy” check shirt with short sleeves (undoubtedly 
one of those I shall mention again later)’.19 The parenthesis breaks the monotonous 
rhythm of the list and singles out the shirt as having a story of its own, which is 
delivered (as promised) in chapter Twenty-three. We find out that the shirt was a 
Christmas present from his aunt, a rather disappointing one: he remembers getting 
up in the middle of the night and observing with great pleasure ‘a big rectangular 
box’ near his shoes — later revealed to contain only two itchy cowboy shirts.20 
What makes this anecdote worthy of being labelled a temporal curiosity is the 
fact that the story of how he got the cowboy shirts is not a flashback, as one would 
expect: the two anecdotes are narrated in chronological order. Perec dates the 
Christmas present anecdote at the end of 1943 and does it ‘very definitely’, which 
means that, in the photograph, he is wearing the shirts before he receives them as a 
present.21 The first thing a reader might do when faced with this logical impossibility 
is to try to explain it by a possible misdating of either the photograph or the shirt 
episode. Or perhaps his aunt could have also given him cowboy shirts as a present 
the previous Christmas, that of 1942 — even the whole Christmas episode might be 
                                                          
19
 Georges Perec, W or the Memory of Childhood, trans. by David Bellos (London: Harvill), p. 104. I have modified Bellos’s 
translation slightly, as he translates the original ‘sans doute’ as ‘probably’, instead of ‘undoubtedly’ or ‘for sure’. See Perec, 
W ou le souvenir d’enfance (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), p. 140. 
20
 Perec, W, p. 116. 
21
 Perec, W, p. 114. 
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completely imaginary. But Perec is certain that the shirt in the photograph is the 
same one that he will talk about later, and that it was the Christmas of 1943. The 
memory of that night — he remarks — ‘has lodged and been frozen in my mind: a 
petrified image, unchangeable’.22 
The authorial interventions thus emphatically hinder any possible logical 
explanation or ordering of the two episodes: it is impossible to reconstruct a fabula 
from the sjuzhet; or rather it can only be done by putting in doubt the veracity of 
Perec’s words (and if so, of which ones?). Because the episode is found in the 
autobiographical arm of the book (and not in the fictional one, which would 
accommodate such ambiguities better), a faulty or misleading memory seems the 
only possible explanation, and yet it is far from being satisfactory.  One could also 
argue that the story of the shirt should be read in relation to the death of Perec’s 
mother in a Nazi concentration camp, but even the background cannot provide a full 
explanation. The effect of this episode is very different to Nabokov’s experience of 
the timeless butterfly hunt, and far more disconcerting. It is not only harder to 
discover, but it is even harder to classify once discovered, generating a (probably 
unending) readerly whirlpool of obsession. It recalls distinctly the ordeal of De 
Man’s revolving door, where one cannot even remain in ambiguity. 
In comparison to the anxiety created by Perec’s temporal curiosity, Marías’s 
example might seem frivolous to the nth degree. Dark Back of Time (1998) — a ‘falsa 
novela’ (a false or a fake novel) — is a rambling account of a series of increasingly 
                                                          
22
 Perec, W, p. 116. 
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zany events resulting from the publication of a novel called All Souls (1989) — a true 
one this time — published by Marías himself, who is also the narrator of Dark Back of 
Time. Leaving aside for the time being the ambiguities around the book’s genre and 
the identity of the narrator, the book is also traversed by another ambiguity of a 
different kind, far more imperceptible and indeed far more curious than the contents 
of the book itself. It concerns the temporal location within Marías’s narrative (that is, 
the location of an event in the fabula within the sjuzhet) of the most astonishing of all 
the events it narrates: the fact that writing All Souls led to his author to become the 
King of Redonda. 
I will describe this kingdom, its legend and its significance in more detail in 
Chapter Four: for the time being, it is sufficient to know that Redonda is nothing 
more (and nothing less) than a make-believe realm located in a tiny uninhabited 
island in the Caribbean, which might have been created either as a folie de grandeur, 
an advertising gimmick or a joke. John Gawsworth, a 1930s poet and Fitzrovian 
literary personality, inherited the title from the first king, M.P. Shiel in 1947: 
however, at the time of his death in the nineteen-seventies, Gawsworth was 
homeless and forgotten as a poet, a real-life curiosity, his early promise marred by 
alcoholism. The story of Gawsworth and Redonda was first retold in All Souls and 
reprised eight years later in Dark Back of Time, adding more information and stories, 
including those of other equally obscure writers peripherally related to Gawsworth. 
Only at the end of the book does the narrator reveal that he has become the new king 
of Redonda, after Gawsworth’s successor Jon Wynne-Tyson abdicated in his favour, 
in gratitude for his diffusion of the Redonda legend in All Souls. 
13 
 
This is indeed the very curious “plot” of Dark Back of Time — a plot that 
nonetheless has tended to get ignored in most critical approaches to the book, which 
have paid more attention to the narrator’s musings on writing, language and chance. 
Its narrative structure has also attracted a fair amount of critical interest, but the 
mechanisms of that structure have not been explored in full. The reason is that, at 
first sight, the book does not seem to have a plot at all: it consists of a series of 
anecdotes and digressions strung together by haphazard links. For instance, the 
narrative moves from a description of the streetlamps outside the narrator’s window 
to a biography of novelist Wilfrid Ewart, then to an account of the narrator’s last 
encounter with writer Juan Benet or with his mother, then back to Ewart, and so on. 
It seems a clear example of an anachronous narrative — however, when considered 
in terms of the fabula/sjuzhet distinction, it is in fact straightforwardly linear, almost 
diary-like.23 
The disordered discourse has been read by critics such as Alexis Grohmann as 
a reflection of the intrinsically disordered state of the narrator’s mind and of life 
itself. 24 The book’s structure is haphazard, but not deliberately so — it is merely 
copying life. This explanation seems justified by the narrator’s own self-
commentary: right at the start of the book he explains that 
                                                          
23
 It might helpful to recall here a point Mark Currie made about the temporal structure of Mrs Dalloway : ‘the narration of 
a memory is not strictly an anachrony, since the event of recalling might belong in the temporal chain of the first narrative 
[...] In Virginia Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway [...] the events of a single day are narrated according to rigorous linearity’. See Mark 
Currie, About Time: Narrative, Fiction and the Philosophy of Time (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), p. 36. 
24
 Alexis Grohmann, Literatura y Errabundia (Javier Marías, Antonio Muñoz Molina y Rosa Montero) (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2001), pp. 75-77. 
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The elements of the story I am now embarking upon are entirely 
capricious, determined by chance, merely episodic and cumulative [...] 
because in the end no author is guiding them, though I am relating 
them; they correspond to no blueprint, they are steered by no compass, 
most of them are external in origin and devoid of intention and 
therefore have no reason to make any kind of sense or to constitute an 
argument or plot or answer to some hidden harmony.25 
 
Seen in this way, the book’s temporal structure seems far from curious. The order in 
which the events appear is the order in which the narrator thinks of them or 
remembers them: the fabula and the sjuzhet do not differ. The Redonda story is just a 
contingent event amongst others. Readers over-excited by curiosities should not give 
it any undue importance. 
But, as in the case of Perec’s shirts, what seemed initially simple and 
straightforward is revealed to be complex and puzzling under the obsessive eye of 
the curiosity hunter (the narrator, like Nabokov, is also as a keen collector — of rare 
books and toy soldiers). The key lies again in a couple of unassuming dates. Halfway 
through Dark Back of Time, the narrator mentions he has obtained a copy of Wilfrid 
Ewart’s novel Way of Revelation signed by the author, and comments that ‘It is 
unsettling that today, November 8 1997, the ink that Wilfrid Ewart traced without 
much thought [...] is here in Madrid’.26 The date is probably given both to highlight 
the temporal abyss between Ewart’s signature and his own writing and to inscribe 
the book itself within a temporal continuum (as if the book was, effectively, a diary). 
At the end of the book, however, the narrator reveals that ‘since July 6 1997, I have 
                                                          
25
 Javier Marías, Dark Back of Time, trans. by Esther Allen (London: Vintage, 2004), p. 9. 
26
 Marías, Dark, p. 215. 
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been the fourth of those kings, King Xavier’.27 What this second date reveals is that at 
the time of writing about Ewart’s book, he knew he was the King of Redonda yet 
failed to mention it. This fact disturbs the idea that the book’s discourse is mirroring 
its story: the coronation is not narrated as it happened, it happened and was left 
unnarrated for many pages. Of the two temporal coordinates which constitute its 
fabula (6 July 1997 and 8 November 1997), only one of them — the second — can be 
located in the sjuzhet. We know that the narrator is the King of Redonda at the point 
of writing about Ewart’s signature, but what about before? The coronation has no 
stable position in the sjuzhet: it could have happened before he started to write the 
book or at some point after he starts writing about the consequences of All Souls. The 
location of the first date (6 July 1997) cannot be pointed to with any certainty in the 
214 pages that precede the second date. 
  Of course, it could be argued that this discovery does not make the coronation 
any less contingent. The ascension to a make-believe throne might not be an event 
worthy of serious consideration, but only the punch-line of a very long (and wildly 
digressive) meta-fictional joke. But the book is not a philosophical argument for 
contingency and chance, but rather a playful demonstration of the problems inherent 
in narrating the contingent. The author’s initial self-pronouncements might need to 
be read sceptically:  their deliberately serious and gloomy perspective could in fact 
be the mask for a secret and simultaneous fabula. The impossibility of locating the 
coronation is the springboard for a reflection on liminality (generic, temporal, and 
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 Marías, Dark, p. 303. 
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even existential) and the temporal structure of the confession. As a curiosity, it may 
be more frivolous than the other two examples, more self-consciously “curious”, but 
only if we can convince ourselves that the book is only about a make-believe realm 
and not about something else far more disturbing. 
Hopefully, this preview of these three absorbing examples of the temporal 
curiosity has justified the need for a more detailed discussion — an analysis which 
will consider these instances of indeterminacy in relation to the indeterminacy of 
autobiography itself. The purpose of this thesis will be to determine how (or if) these 
three samples of the temporal curiosity can throw a new light on the repetitive, 
seemingly unsolvable debate about the generic status of autobiography.  As the 
previous pages show, the three texts under consideration adopt different varieties of 
temporal fuzziness which resist being contained within the traditional categories of 
fabula and sjuzhet. This temporal indeterminacy is accompanied by a generic one: in 
very different ways, the three texts also resist any stable placement within a generic 
category, either that of autobiography or that of fiction. It is to this parallel blurring 
process (and its importance) that this thesis wishes to draw attention to. 
Although the problem of the generic definition of autobiography has been 
studied and examined in great detail (there are excellent studies of this debate, such 
as Laura Marcus’s, Max Saunders’s exploration of Modernist ‘autobiografiction’ or 
Philippe Gasparini’s overview of the ‘autofiction’ phenomenon), the study of 
temporal indeterminacy is more recent, and has been primarily confined to fictional 
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examples.28 Brian Richardson’s chapter, for instance, only deals with novels; and so it 
is the case with an earlier study of the temporal structure of postmodern narratives, 
Ursula Heise’s Chronoschisms. 29  Richardson is part of a scholarly movement 
concerned with the study of ‘unnatural narratology’, so-called in response to Monika 
Fludernik’s cognitive model of ‘natural narratology’, which considers literary 
narrative in relation to a narrative model based on oral conversational storytelling.30 
Although some of the scholars attached to the “unnatural” narratology movement 
have devoted some attention to non-fictional narratives (such as Stefan Iversen’s 
study of Holocaust testimonies), examples such as the ones this thesis deals with 
remain unexplored and uncategorised (if indeed they can be categorised).31 
Another interesting model for temporal indeterminacy is that of David 
Herman (another narratologist working within cognitive models), who has created 
the category of “polychrony” to account for events with no determinate position in 
the story or the discourse.32 Again, Herman only applies it to fiction: although the 
texts analysed in this thesis could be used as examples of polychrony in non-fictional 
narratives, we will see that even Herman’s flexible, elasticated model might not fully 
explain curiosities such as the story of the shirts or the mystery of the temporal 
location of the coronation. This thesis will try to discern how these approaches to 
                                                          
28
 See Laura Marcus, Auto/Biographical Discourses (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), Max Saunders, Self-
Impression: Life-Writing, Autobiografiction and the Forms of Modern Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) and 
Philippe Gasparini, Autofiction: une aventure du langage (Paris: Seuil, 2008). 
29
 See Ursula Heise, Time, Narrative and Postmodernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
30
 For a clear outline of the positions of natural and unnatural narratology, see Monika Fludernik, ‘How Natural is 
“Unnatural Narratology”; or What is Unnatural about Unnatural Narratology?’, Narrative,20.3 (2012), 357-370, and Jan 
Alber, Stefan Iversen, Henrik Skov Nielsen and Brian Richardson, ‘What is Unnatural about Unnatural Narratology?: A 
Response to Monika Fludernik’, Narrative, 20.3 (2012) 371-382. 
31
 Stefan Iversen, ‘ “In Flaming Flames”: Crises of Experientiality in Non-Fictional Narratives’, in Unnatural Narratives-
Unnatural Narratologies, ed. by Jan Alber and Rüdiger Heinze (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), pp. 89-103. 
32
 Herman, Story Logic, pp. 211-261. 
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problematic temporal structures can be applied to our examples, and the possible 
repercussion of such analyses in our understanding of autobiography as a genre. 
All these might be more than sufficient arguments to justify the approach of 
this thesis — and yet one cannot fail to mention a further selling point about one’s 
wares, perhaps the most intriguing of them all. There is indeed another feature of 
these three curiosities which may be equally revelatory about autobiography’s 
generic status and temporal structure. Critical literature around autobiography and 
fuzzy/indeterminate temporality has barely paid any attention to self-reflexivity: 
however, the three examples of temporally indeterminate moments I previously 
discussed are also intensely (almost dizzyingly) self-reflective ones.  Moraru does 
indeed acknowledge that for Nabokov butterfly-hunting is an ecstatic/aesthetic 
experience akin to writing, another experience outside of chronological time. Speak, 
Memory teems not only with self-reflexive moments such as the paragraph that 
concludes the butterfly hunt, but also with numerous examples of mise en abyme or 
mirror-images of the book. These devices illuminate and complicate the combination 
of time and timelessness in the book. In the case of Perec, the check shirts form part 
of another self-reflexive motif: that of the square or the grid, which he uses as a 
mirror for writing itself, for its solidity and its fragility — similar to that of the 
clearly remembered but logically impossible shirts. As well as the grid, W provides 
other examples of mise en abyme, such as a game of backgammon or the letters W, H 
or X, which are also reflections of its complex generic status. Dark Back of Time is also 
traversed by many narratives placed en abyme — from the Disney film The Three 
Caballeros to a story about a man and a woman waiting for a bus. All of these 
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narratives explore different liminal experiences (jumping into a film or a book, the 
beginning and the end of a love affair), reflecting the text’s own blurred and 
uncertain limits, either between temporal events or between genres themselves. 
The use of mise en abyme complicates even further the already complex 
temporal structure of the texts, creating new, doubled layers of indeterminacy. Self-
reflexivity in autobiography also remains under-examined in its critical literature. In 
the introduction to his influential anthology of autobiographical theory, 
Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical (1980), James Olney pointed out how 
‘autobiography is a self-reflexive, self-critical act [...] The autobiographer can discuss 
and analyse the autobiographical act as he performs it’ and ventured that ‘from St 
Augustine on a compiler could have put together a vast collection of critical, 
theoretical pieces drawn from and reflecting on autobiographies’. 33 The fact that — 
to my knowledge — such an anthology has not yet been compiled is a sign of the 
neglect of a feature which is somehow taken for granted in autobiographical texts.34 
Mise en abyme — in a sense the figure of self-reflexivity — thus remains largely 
unexplored in the context of autobiography.35 
This thesis will seek to approach this device in relation to De Man’s theories 
about the figural structure of autobiography and its impossible temporality. It will 
thus seek to examine mise en abyme as a figure of generic definition and to relate the 
                                                          
33
 James Olney, ‘Autobiography and the Cultural Moment’ in Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical, ed. by James 
Olney (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 3-27 (pp. 25-26). 
34
The closest thing to such an anthology might be David Shields’ Reality Hunger, which nonetheless chooses the rather 
unscholarly format of the mix-tape. See David Shields, Reality Hunger: A Manifesto (London: Penguin, 2011). 
35
 There are, of course, exceptions. Some of the articles that study mise en abyme in relation to autobiography include 
Michael A. Chaney, ‘Terrors of the Mirror and the Mise en Abyme of Graphic Novel Autobiography’, College Literature, 38.3 
(2011), 21-44 and Matthew Escobar, ‘X: Identity, Reflexivity and Potential Space in Perec’s W ou le souvenir d’enfance and 
Gide’s Les faux-monnayeurrs’, Romanic Review, 98.4 (2007), 413-433. 
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device to the problematic and paradoxical temporalities of the texts themselves, 
which the mirror-image replicates and displaces. By considering generic definition 
and indeterminate temporality in relation to mise en abyme, this thesis will seek to 
provide a new focus with which to consider both the over-examined issue of the 
generic status of autobiography and the under-examined one of the more 
paradoxical, contradictory and curious aspects of its temporal narrative structures. 
After all, the aim of this study might be simply to provide a little variation (elegant 
or inelegant) from a series of now rather tired and tiresome metaphors — such as the 
foray or the frontier — which misrepresent the complexity of the relations between 
autobiography and fiction, and ignore some of the more disturbing and paradoxical 
aspects of autobiography that De Man and other critics had pointed out. 
Autobiographical mise en abyme — a curiosity within a curiosity — is a peephole to 
the intricacies of genre and temporality in the three examples under consideration. 
The thesis will proceed through the three samples in chronological fashion, 
although its aim is not provide a narrative of generic evolution or dissolution. 
Although it engages with some of the issues that have come to be discussed under 
the umbrella of literary postmodernism and its historical context, the thesis does not 
seek to discuss the three case studies solely in relation to literary history, but also in 
relation to critical debates around narrative, reference and temporality. Also — 
primarily for reasons of space — it only refers in passing to other important texts 
that could have equally formed part of the collection, and which indeed could be 
excellent mantelpiece companions for the three texts under consideration, such as 
Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time),  Michel Leiris’s 
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La Règle du Jeu (a favourite of Perec) and Jacques Roubaud’s Le Grand Incendie de 
Londres (another multi-volume magnum opus) which shares Dark Back of Time’s 
digressive spirit and indeterminate generic status.36  However, a thesis is only a 
small display cabinet: in this case, our collecting obsession should certainly be 
curtailed. The study of autobiographical curiosities requires the roomy galleries of a 
book like Saunders’s Self-Impression: what this thesis seeks to do is to substitute 
completeness for an obsessive observation of its three specimens. The chapters thus 
tend to stay as close as possible to the temporal experience of reading and — above 
all — rereading these curiosities. Although recent studies of French autobiography 
such as Claire Boyle’s or Madalina Akli’s have paid some attention to the reception 
of autobiography from a cultural, ideological or cognitive point of view, the 
temporality of reception (especially of obsession-inducing texts such as the ones 
under consideration) remains underexplored.37 
The thesis thus commences with an examination of autobiography as a 
curiosity from several points of view. Chapter One examines the metaphor first in 
relation to the conflicting positions about the generic status of autobiography. As 
                                                          
36
  See Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, trans by C.K Scott Moncrieff, Terence Kilmartin and Andreas Mayor, rev. and 
ed. by D. J. Enright, 6 vols (London: Chatto &Windus, 1992), Michel Leiris, La règle du jeu, ed. by Denis Hollier, Nathalie 
Barberger et al. (Paris: Gallimard, 2003) and Jacques Roubaud, Le grand incendie de Londres (Paris: Seuil, 2009). I will refer 
to Proust’s novel as the Recherche in the rest of the thesis. It needs to be pointed out that whilst Nabokov and Perec 
actively engage with Proust and Leiris (respectively) in their works, the parallels between Roubaud and Marías are probably 
coincidental. Although the first volume of Le Grand Incendie dates from 1986, it was not translated into English until 1992, 
and remains untranslated into Spanish to this date.  As a curiosity, both Marías and Roubaud share an admiration for 
Hungarian novelist Miklos Szentkuthy, author of similarly digressive, erudite, fragmentary “novels”. One should also 
mention, even if just in a footnote, the works of W.G. Sebald. Sebald included homages to Speak, Memory in The Emigrants 
and to W in Austerlitz (Austerlitz’s mother buys the boy a Chaplin comic in the train station before sending him away to 
safety, like Perec’s mother did). See W.G. Sebald, The Emigrants, trans. by Michael Hulse (London: Harvill, 1996), p. 16 and 
Austerlitz, trans. by Anthea Bell (London: Penguin, 2001), p. 308.  Marías was an admirer of his work and made him a Duke 
of Redonda, the Duke of Vertigo. 
37
 See Claire Boyle, Consuming Autobiographies: Reading and Writing the Self in Post-War France (Leeds: Legenda, 2007) 
and Madalina Akli, Conventional and Original Metaphors in French Autobiography (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009). 
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well as a close analysis of two approaches that have come to be viewed as inimical —
that of Philippe Lejeune and that of Paul De Man — the chapter also examines what 
may be termed the redefining approach, exemplified by Stephen Reynolds’s coinage 
of ‘autobiografiction’ (which he used to describe a series of  contemporary 
uncategorisable curiosities) and Serge Doubrovsky’s invention of autofiction (again, 
a term created to “explain” his book Fils), as well as the more recent “remix” 
approach of David Shields. 
As well as this overview of the history and current state of life-writing theory, 
this chapter also seeks to investigate encounters between autobiography studies and 
narratology.  In particular, I would like to examine the influence of Paul Ricoeur’s 
ideas about narrative and temporality in relation to debates about the referential 
character of autobiography. The exploration of temporality also includes an 
examination of the discussions around “natural” and “unnatural” narratology and 
the redefinition of classical narratological categories in relation to questions of 
generic definition. This chapter concludes with an account of   mise en abyme, in order 
to discern how its complex temporal and figural structure impacts on the 
aforementioned approaches to autobiography. 
Chapter Two focuses on Vladimir Nabokov’s Speak, Memory. Despite having 
used Moraru’s example of ‘temporal curiosity’ in this introduction, this chapter will 
try to go beyond his rather simple opposition between time and timelessness — a 
distinction which smoothes out some of the more problematic aspects of time and 
writing. The book’s generic status will also be revealed to be equally complex — 
despite the seemingly unambiguous indexes presenting it as an autobiography. The 
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chapter examines how Nabokov’s use of mise en abyme devices destabilises both the 
book’s genre and its temporal structure. 
Chapter Three examines Perec’s W or the Memory of Childhood. One of the 
earliest examples of a self-consciously and overtly hybrid approach to 
autobiography, the book is nonetheless difficult to categorise as a fiction, an 
autobiography or even an autofiction. This uncertainty is echoed in the curious 
riddle of the shirts, which I will try to examine in relation to generic and temporal 
questions, particularly around autobiography, fiction and testimony, and to the 
book’s several self-representations en abyme.  It is in this chapter where I will 
consider in more detail the ethical dimensions and consequences of generic and 
temporal indeterminacy. 
Chapter Four deals with the most self-consciously “frivolous” member of the 
trio: Javier Marías’s Dark Back of Time. The chapter starts with a discussion of its 
paradoxical generic label (the “falsa novela” or false/fake novel) to move to an 
exploration of the enigma of the coronation in relation to genre, self-reflexivity and 
temporality. Marías’s use of metalepsis as a destabilising device will be given special 
consideration. The chapter concludes with a reading of the book’s extremely curious 
final twist, which has barely attracted any critical attention but which has central 
significance to the text’s treatment of several kinds of liminality, including that 
between life and death.38 
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Hopefully, the copy of this preamble-cum-catalogue has provided sufficient 
justification for the “purchase”of this study and its aims. And yet one is still tempted 
to offer a last-minute bonus gift, another product demonstration. The three texts also 
contain moments in which everyday objects, more or less unassuming, are suddenly 
transformed into curiosities of various sorts: some of them surprising, some of them 
poignant, some of them uncanny. These objects perhaps represent the three texts 
under consideration far better than the self-reflexive passages which tend to crop up 
in most critical approaches — and which would definitely be included in the 
anthology proposed by Olney (such as ‘I confess I do not believe in Time’, ‘writing is 
the memory of their death and the assertion of my life’, ‘I believe I’ve still never 
mistaken fiction for reality, though I have mixed them together more than once’).39 
Let us consider them briefly. 
 In Chapter Eight Nabokov tells us how his tutor Lenski used to take him and 
his brother to Alexandre’s, a ‘painfully bourgeois bric-à- brac’ shop in St Petersburg 
to show them ‘an expensive ceiling lamp’ he wanted to purchase. 40  Nabokov 
explains that 
Not wishing the store to suspect what object he coveted, Lenski said he 
would take us to see it only if we swore to use self-control and not 
attract unnecessary attention by direct contemplation. With all kinds of 
precautions, he brought us under a dreadful bronze octopus and his 
only indication that this was the longed-for article was a purring sigh.41 
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 The quotes are from Nabokov, Speak, p. 106; Perec, W, p. 42 and Marías, Dark, p. 7. They tend to be quoted in most 
critical articles and books on these books (this one included). 
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 Nabokov, Speak, p. 124. 
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 Nabokov, Speak, p. 124. 
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Nabokov’s charming metaphor here transforms a ‘dreadful’ lamp into the most 
wondrous of curiosities, an octopus incongruously suspended in the shop ceiling, as 
if levitating. No wonder Lenski coveted it. 
Perec, on the other hand, remembers how he received a framed photograph of 
his father as a present after the war. In a note (where else?) he then points out how 
‘[i]t’s because of this present [...] that I’ve always thought frames were precious 
objects. Even nowadays I stop to look at them in the windows of camera shops, and I 
am surprised every time I come across frames for five or ten francs in Prisunic chain 
stores’.42 Frames, even those of the cheapest kind, are here transformed into rather 
poignant and emblematic curiosities. 
In Javier Marías’s case, the book itself is self-consciously presented as a 
curiosity, a sticker album of writers from the lower-division leagues. 43 Amid the 
abundant treasure it contains, perhaps none is more intriguing than a toy soldier. 
Marías ends the first section of the book by providing an inventory of the objects in 
his room as a kind of memento mori. Amongst these we find a ‘Hindu aide-de-camp 
made of painted wood that I’ve just brought home with some hesitation, that 
figurine will also outlast me, or may’.44 Why the hesitation? Why the ‘may’?45 The 
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 Perec, W, p. 34. Prisunic are a French equivalent of Woolworth’s or British Home Stores. 
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 Marías has mentioned in several interviews and articles his fondness for football sticker albums, a possible source (not 
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26 
 
curiosity is squared: the aide-de-camp could be the narrator’s helper but he seems to 
doubt his loyalty. The figure is given an uncanny halo which extends like a fever 
across the whole — even though (or because) the figure is not mentioned again in the 
whole book. 
An octopus-lamp, a frame, a wooden Hindu aide-de-camp:  there might be no 
better emblems of what Nabokov, Perec and Marías do with autobiography — of 
how they transform, challenge, adapt or rearrange the form — than those  
sometimes unassuming, hidden, outlandish or mysterious curiosities. Hopefully by 
the end of the thesis, they would have abandoned the metaphorical drawers where 
they have remained in previous critical approaches to gain (or regain, rather) their 
rightful place in the shop window or the shelf. 
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Chapter One 
Autobiography as a curiosity 
 
 
1. [...]  Peut-être d’ailleurs faut-il rester dans ce tourniquet. 
Gérard Genette, ‘Métonymie chez Proust’
1
 
  
 
 
We should perhaps remain within this whirligig [tourniquet]. 
Gérard Genette, in Paul De Man’s translation in ‘Autobiography 
as De-Facement’
2
 
 
 
 
Tourniquet   
 
I.Appareil formé de une croix horizontale tournant autour d’un 
pivot,  place à l’entrée d’un chemin ou d’un edifice afin de livrer 
passage aux personnes chacun à son tour […]Porte à tambour […] 
Plateforme horizontale tournant sur un pivot servant de jeu de 
plein air pour les enfants 
II.[...]Cyllindre métalique à volets, tournant sur un pivot, et servant 
à présentoir […] 
 
 
( I. Contrivance composed of an horizontal cross turning  a 
vertical axis and placed at the entrance of a road or building 
with the purpose of  letting people in one at a time.[...] 
Revolving door [...] Horizontal platform spinning on an axis  
used in children’s playgrounds 
 II. Metal cylinder on an axis used as a presentation device. [...]) 
 
Le nouveau Petit Robert 
 
 
Whirligig 
 
 1. Name of various toys that are whirled, twirled or spun around 
spec. †(a) a top or teetotum [...] (b) a toy consisting of a small 
spindle turned by means of a string; (c) a toy with four arms like 
miniature windmill-sails, which whirl round when it is moved 
through the air. 
2. Applied to various mechanical contrivances having a whirling 
or rotatory movement spec. (a) an instrument of punishment 
formerly used, consisting of a large cage suspended so as to turn 
on a pivot; (b) a roundabout or merry-go-round. 
 
Oxford English Dictionary 
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2
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28 
 
The whirligig and the revolving door: on play and torture 
 
Business common-sense dictates that — before the seemingly exciting 
enterprise of introducing a new metaphor to the already rather crowded 
marketplace of autobiography studies — one must first proceed with a careful 
study of the alternatives currently on offer in order to ascertain that one is 
actually coming up with something new. That is the ostensible purpose of this 
first chapter: to provide a survey of the different critical approaches to 
autobiography — and their metaphors. 
The chapter itself is modelled after one of those metaphors, the 
tourniquet: it is the critical equivalent of a postcard or a tie spinning display 
device and the (revolving) entry point into the issues to be examined in 
relation to our curiosities. 3 This initial section provides an introduction (a 
turnstile) to the tourniquet itself. Through an analysis of the origin and 
evolution of this metaphor, it seeks to highlight some of the main issues at 
stake in critical discussions around the definition and indeed the very 
existence of autobiography. Let us proceed — if we can. 
As it was the case with the introduction, this chapter also opens with a 
footnote, albeit a better-known one than Richardson’s. It can be found in 
Genette’s ‘Metonymy in Proust’, and was removed from paratextual obscurity 
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 I am using the word here in French, primarily with the meaning of revolving door/spinning stand rather than in 
the surgical sense, which is common to both English and French. The French word appears in italics. 
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when De Man quoted it and translated it in ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’.4 
Genette’s note was appended to his analysis of an episode in the fourth 
volume in Proust’s Recherche, Sodome et Gomorrhe (Sodom and Gomorrah). In 
order to fully comprehend the metaphor, it is necessary to be acquainted with 
its origin. The scene in question takes place in the afternoon before a party. 
Our narrator decides to amuse himself by looking (behind the shutters of the 
staircase window) at some rare orchids that his neighbour, the Duchess of 
Guermantes, has left out in the courtyard to be pollinated. As he observes the 
promising arrival of a bumblebee, he spies on another scene: at the same time 
as the insect, an acquaintance of his, the Baron de Charlus,  also enters the 
courtyard — and, as the narrator observes in astonishment, starts flirting with 
Jupien, the owner of a tailor’s workshop in the same courtyard, who is 
standing outside his shop . This leads to a full sexual encounter inside which 
the narrator proceeds to eavesdrop on. The passage compares the two 
unexpected and simultaneous encounters of the two men and the insect and 
the flowers — as Genette points out, this analogy creates ‘a kind of secondary, 
and perhaps illusory, effect of right timing’.5 
The note follows on this sentence, and in it Genette wonders whether 
we should analyse the metaphor of the orchid and the bumblebee as the effect 
of an unplanned coincidence, imposed by a real-life referent (a ‘genetic 
causality’) or if we should consider the metaphor itself as the cause of the 
                                                          
4 This essay contains an analysis of Wordsworth’s ‘Essay upon Epitaphs’, which appeared as a footnote to The 
Excursion. De Man intriguingly calls this eccentric note an ‘exemplary autobiographical text’. See De Man, 
‘Autobiography ’, I, pp. 264-274 (p. 267). 
5 Genette, Figures III, p. 50. 
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coincidence, that is, as an artificial coincidence (a ‘teleological causality’).6 If 
we read the book as an autobiography, it would be the former; if we read it as 
a fiction, the latter: 
 
[I]l va de soi que chaque exemple peut soulever, à ce niveau, un 
débat infini entre une lecture de la Recherche comme fiction et 
une lecture de la Recherche comme autobiographie. Peut-être 
d’ailleurs faut-il rester dans ce tourniquet.7 
 
Or in De Man’s translation: 
 
It goes without saying, in the case of Proust, that each example 
taken from the Recherche can produce [...] an endless discussion 
between a reading of the novel as a fiction and a reading of the 
same novel as autobiography. We should perhaps remain within 
this whirligig [tourniquet].8 
 
 
By leaving the original in square brackets, De Man calls attention to his 
translation of Genette’s metaphor. The words designate different objects: a 
tourniquet usually refers to a revolving door or a turnstile, rather than to a 
spinning toy — or to an obscure instrument of torture. De Man does not 
disguise his idiosyncratic translation: in the next paragraph, he returns to the 
“correct” translation of the term to then turn the door on its head and make it  
first into a ‘wheel’ and finally back into a whirligig. 
 
As anyone who has been caught in a revolving door or a 
revolving wheel can testify, it is most uncomfortable, and all the 
                                                          
6 Genette, Figures III, p. 50. 
7 Genette, Figures III, p. 50. 
8 De Man, ‘Autobiography’, pp. 264-267 (p. 266). 
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more so in this case since this whirligig is capable of infinite 
acceleration and is, in fact, not successive but simultaneous.9 
 
The paragraph seems to be offering a performance or a demonstration of its 
own figures: the translation itself is spinning. Derrida has pointed out that the 
whirligig is used to introduce the ‘motif of infinite acceleration’.10 Éva Antal, 
remarking upon the translation, states that ‘the word tourniquet translated as 
“whirligig” [...] signifies not only a turning around, but also rolling over and 
over — stirring and returning endlessly.’ 11  The text translation-cum-
performance nonetheless belies Antal’s model of alternance between the two 
meanings. The translation itself gets stuck in the whirligig (now clearly a 
torture), paradoxically unable to move whilst spinning out of control. 
 As an answer to Genette’s metaphor, De Man’s sleight-of-hand 
translation of tourniquet provides a stark warning about the dangers of 
defining autobiography. Play with it, and you will get stuck. Readers are 
pulled out of a seemingly ordinary situation (Genette’s placid generic 
hesitation) into a nightmarish one — which they are ‘caught’ into imagining. 
‘Most uncomfortable’ is quite an understatement. The passage is a 
paradoxically cool-headed demonstration of the dangerous loss of control 
involved in defining autobiography. 
                                                          
9 De Man, ‘Autobiography’, I, pp.264-274 (p. 266). 
10 Jacques Derrida, Memoires for Paul De Man (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 23. 
11 Éva Antal, ‘The Ironical Allegory of Remembrance and Oblivion (In Memory of Paul De Man and Jacques 
Derrida)’, The AnaChronisT,11(2005), 233-252 (p.248).  Dorrit Cohn also quotes the Genette passage in The 
Distinction of Fiction and offers her own translation, ‘It may well be that one has to remain within this whirligig’. It 
changes the ‘we’ into a ‘one’ but coincides with De Man’s in the translation of “tourniquet”, although not on the 
generic status of autobiography. See Dorrit Cohn, The Distinction of Fiction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999), p. 69. 
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This chapter will seek to trace how this definition gave rise to such a 
nausea-inducing, quasi-apocalyptic metaphor — as well as the critical 
reactions De Man’s whirligig generated, both in the fields of autobiography 
theory and narratology. It will also examine the whirligig in relation to 
structures of figuration, particularly mise en abyme. However, before doing so, 
it might be advisable to experience what De Man had in mind when he 
translated an entry-point as an instrument of torture. I will examine two 
cases: the scene in Sodom and Gomorrah discussed by Genette, and an anecdote 
writer Philippe Vilain relates in his study of autofiction. 
Genette’s set of criteria for generic definition, as we saw, were based on 
the temporal order of figure and referent — on what came first, in other 
words. Genette does not plump for a specific ordering in this example, 
although perhaps his characterisation of the concomitance as ‘illusory’ might 
point out at a possible teleological — and thus fictional — reading of the 
scene. The concomitance might seem illusory because there is so much of it: the 
scene brims with coincidences. One cannot help discerning an authorial hand 
making bumblebees fly in at the right moment and placing a conveniently 
empty shop near Jupien’s (with an even more convenient combination of 
ladder and ventilator inside) in order to allow our narrator to eavesdrop not 
only on the Baron and Jupien’s amorous encounter but also on their 
conversation afterwards, in which they curiously happen to talk about the 
narrator himself — the perk of all fictional eavesdroppers.12 The accumulation 
                                                          
12 Indeed, the conversation between Charlus and Jupien seems to be far longer than their tryst. Our narrator is 
described by the Baron as ‘a strange little fellow, an intelligent little chit which shows with regard to myself a 
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and “definition” of those coincidences reinforces their illusory character. We 
might be out of the revolving door. 
 Or not. In this case, there is no ‘outside’ for Proust’s scene, and not just 
because his book lacks an unequivocal generic marker — even if it defined 
itself as an autobiography, the reader would still have no way of knowing 
whether the flowers and insects metaphor preceded the homosexual 
encounter. 13  We are stuck and have no other choice than to read the figures 
themselves, the illusion: a structure which is far less concomitant and 
“defined” than Genette makes it appear. Let us consider the main analogy 
itself: as Eve Sedgwick astutely pointed out, it is far from being coincident 
itself. 
 
The analogy opens gaping conceptual abysses when one tries [...] 
to compare any model of same-sex desire with the plight of the 
virginal orchid [...] No mapping of Jupien or Charlus as either 
the bee or the other orchid does anything to clarify or deepen a 
model of sexual inversion.14 
 
 
And yet this gap between figure and reference does not make the causal 
connection between them a ‘genetic’ one, or the book an autobiography. The 
metaphor can become perfect and “defined” again if we read it not in relation 
to Charlus and Jupien, but to the narrator himself. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
prodigious want of civility. He has absolutely no idea of the prodigious personage that I am and of the microscopic 
animalcule that he is in comparison’. His description as an ‘animalcule’ is particularly accurate, as we will see. See 
Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, Volume IV, Sodom and Gomorrah, trans. by C.K. Scott Moncrieff and 
Terence Kilmartin, rev. by D.J. Enright (London: Chatto&Windus, 1992), p. 14. 
13 The best overview of the debates around the Recherche’s genre is the fourth chapter of Cohn’s The Distinction 
of Fiction. Even Cohn, usually an advocate of generic separation, cannot decide for one of the other option. See 
Cohn, Distinction, pp. 58-78. 
14 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 220. 
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The encounter between orchids and bee might be mirroring that 
between the lucky eavesdropper himself and the lovers, the real miracle and 
‘illusion’ in the passage. However — as the unpollinated orchids themselves 
— this is an analogy with no particular “seed” or “fruit”: it only generates 
endless self-reflections and multiple misreadings. De Man mentioned that the 
Recherche ‘narrates the flight of meaning, but this does not prevent its own 
meaning from being, incessantly, in flight’: there might not be a better 
illustration than our bumblebee.15 The “definition” of a generic definition like 
Genette’s is always blurred by the unsettled movements, the ‘flight’ of its 
base— figurative language. The concomitance Genette identifies is not itself 
illusory: what is illusory is the possibility of finding a “defining” origin which 
will settle this motion. 
 Our second example of a whirligig also concerns another surprising 
event, and is useful to place De Man’s metaphor in relation to that of the 
‘curiosity’. The curious and the coincident seem to pose a problem for generic 
definition, as Genette identified. They seem to be excluded not only from 
autobiography (particularly if there are too many of them), but also from 
fiction. For Philippe Vilain, ‘one of the functions of the novel is to efface, 
substract, remove, censor the more surreal, and hence implausible, elements 
of life’.16  As an illustration of this principle, Vilain recounts a real-life incident 
                                                          
15 Paul De Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1979), p. 78. De Man’s conclusion is part of a close reading of another passage from the first 
volume and does not refer to the bumblebee scene. 
16 Philippe Vilain, L’autofiction en théorie: suivi de deux entretiens avec Philippe Sollers and Philippe Lejeune 
(Chatou: Editions de la Transparence, 2009), p. 39. 
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he has recoiled to include in any of his novels or autofictions — which usually 
narrate, under no fictional name-mask, episodes from his private life. 
Vilain’s “secret” is that he was once held hostage in a bank robbery — 
an episode he cannot write about, not because it was traumatic but because it 
was ‘a cliché straight out [...] of a terrible crime novel’.17  For Vilain, this story 
only finds its place as a kind of parable or allegory of generic definition and of 
the ‘frontiers’ of the novel — or rather autofiction. 
 
Once narrated, it illustrates perhaps better than any theoretical 
argument the question of the frontiers of the novel, and the 
difficulty for a writer of autofictions, and indeed for any writer, 
of moving between the uncertain frontiers of reality and 
fiction.18 
 
The curious hold-up, however, does not really ‘illustrate’ the question of the 
‘frontier’ between autofiction or the novel and other genres at all. In fact, it 
only highlights the problematic nature of defining genre in relation to an 
exterior referent. The real-life “secrets” which form the content of Vilain’s 
novels are censoring the “secret” of the hold-up.19 The robbery has become 
unnarratable in a novel because it was itself a novel, only of the “wrong” 
kind. And yet, as a parable, it manages to hold the other novels hostage, 
exposing their apparent “truth”. The frontier is not just uncertain: it might not 
even be there at all. 
                                                          
17 Vilain, L’autofiction en théorie, p. 40.   
18 Vilain, L’autofiction en théorie, p. 41. 
19 Vilain’s novels have dealt with intimate episodes from his life such as his affair with the writer Annie Ernaux, 
the illness of his father or a paternity claim from a former lover. 
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Vilain’s parable will serve as a preamble for the concerns of the next 
section, which explores generic definitions of autobiography based on spatial 
models — similar to the ones Vilain uses — in relation to the figure of the 
curiosity. Amongst those spatial models, the frontier has become an enduring 
best-seller in the postcard spinner of autobiographical theory: the next section 
explores a particularly successful variant of a frontier-based model of 
definition — Philippe Lejeune’s ‘autobiographical pact’ — and two ‘curious’ 
challenges: that of ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’ (which will be considered 
in more detail) and that of Derrida’s ‘The Law of Genre’, which emphasise the 
paradoxical and unstable character of generic markers and definitions — 
which, as we have seen, can adopt the unlikely forms of a bumblebee or a 
bank robbery. 
  
 
37 
 
The frontier: the definition and indefinition of autobiography 
 
 
Any attempt to understand both the enduring popularity and the flaws of the 
‘frontier’ metaphor should start by exploring the challenges posed by the 
definition and description of autobiography as a literary genre. Approaches to 
this question from the second half of the twentieth century onwards have 
shared ‘a concern with definitions and boundaries’, as Trev Lynn Broughton 
has pointed out: metaphor and definition have gone hand in hand since 
Georges Gusdorf’s ‘Conditions and Limits of Autobiography’, considered as 
the pioneering modern approach to the genre.20 
And yet frontiers have also been approached with suspicion (as in the 
case of De Man and Derrida) or least with caution. This has given rise to a 
critical field in which (as Robert Smith aptly puts it) ‘there are not only many 
theories of autobiography, but [...] also a growing number of theories of those 
theories, and surveys [...] of autobiographical theories’.21 Survey-style meta-
theoretical studies (and this section is one of them) seek to take a step back 
from battles around frontiers in order to observe them from a distance. They 
                                                          
20 Trev Lynn Broughton, ‘Introduction’, in Autobiography: Critical Concepts in Literary and Cultural Studies (see 
Broughton, above), pp. 1-58 (p. 7).  See Georges Gusdorf, ‘Conditions and Limits of Autobiography’ (see 
Broughton, above), pp. 28-48 (first publ. in James Olney, ed., Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical (see 
Olney, above), trans. by J. Olney, pp. 28-48).  There are, of course, earlier examples than Gusdorf’s, such as those 
discussed by Laura Marcus, or the meta-autobiographical statements in autobiographies that Olney referred to. 
See Chapters One to Four in Marcus, Auto/biographical Discourses, pp. 11-178 and Olney, pp. 3-27 (pp. 25-26). 
21 Robert Smith, Derrida and Autobiography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 51. 
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attempt to become the postcard spinner itself rather than a particular postcard 
— a choice, however, not exempt of difficulties. 
Laura Marcus — author of the first book-length survey on 
autobiography theory — noticed the contrast between the ‘distinctive genre of 
autobiographical criticism’ and the undefined and unregulated nature of their 
object of study, autobiography.22 Broughton has also observed that there is ‘a 
fundamental — some would say defining — uncertainty about whether or not 
autobiography exists as a genre’.23   Marcus worries about the paralysing 
consequences of this indefinition, which makes even the study of studies 
difficult. Defining the object of study, or choosing a particular focus, might be 
problematic: 
  
 ‘Autobiography’ appears as an ideal type or form, which may 
bear little or no relation to individual autobiographies. [...] the 
singular collective noun may express a conceptual reification, 
assuming an essence before the chosen critical task of defining 
and consolidating resemblances has even begun. In other 
discussions, particular autobiographies become elected as 
paradigmatic texts, out of which a number of observations 
about the nature of the genre can be drawn.24 
 
 
Even a defiant stance against definition, such as that of Linda Anderson  — 
for her, definition is ‘a way of stamping [the literary critics’] academic 
                                                          
22
 Marcus, p. 1. 
23
 Broughton, ‘Introduction’, I,  pp. 1-58 (p.3) 
24
 Marcus, p. 7. 
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authority on an unruly and even slightly disreputable field’ — still needs a 
‘field’ to defend against critical attacks.25   
On the other side, critics sympathetic to definition — such as Lejeune 
— are assaulted by doubts: definition is ‘a kind of insoluble problem, a sort of 
vicious circle: impossible to study the object before having defined it, 
impossible to define it before having studied it’.26 Perhaps the best approach 
even for a survey is to renounce to its ‘distinctiveness’ (to use Marcus’s 
adjective). As Broughton points out, canons ‘circulate more freely in critical 
discourse as pretext than they do as consensus or doctrine’.27  For her, the 
canon of autobiography could be reconceptualized 
 
[L]ess as a body of authoritative texts than as landmarks on an 
intellectual battlefield on which inconsistencies, crossed 
purposes and equivocations integral to the autobiographical project 
itself are fought out.28 
 
The formulation of a canon is thus not necessarily linked to a rigid definition 
of the genre: it is rather a formulation of a cluster of problems inherent to any 
attempt at a definition of the genre. Critical discourse inevitably mirrors the 
‘inconsistencies, crossed purposes and equivocations’ of the object of study: it 
is as ‘unruly’ as the field it treads upon or defends from trespassers. 
Critics of autobiography and autobiographical theory might need to 
accept that they might not be able to bring this battle to a halt, but only make 
                                                          
25
 Linda Anderson, Autobiography, (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 2. 
26
 Philippe Lejeune, On Autobiography, ed. by Paul John Eakin, trans. by Katherine Leary (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1989),  p. 121. 
27
 Broughton, I, pp. 1-58 (p. 16). 
28
 Broughton, I, pp. 1-58(p. 17). 
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it worse. One can choose to take an aerial view of the battlefield — but with 
the full awareness that the only planes available to do so are fighter planes. 
The survey of the frontier and the battlefield metaphors that follows — whilst 
attempting to offer an overview of the different arguments for and against 
frontiers and definitions — cannot aspire to full neutrality: indeed, it will seek 
to relate those arguments to yet another cannon-like canon, that of our three 
curiosities. 
 
A survey of the battlefield 
 
Before entering into this battlefield, it is nonetheless necessary to mention that 
it is by no means the only conflict or even the “major” one. A focus on 
questions around definition and genre inevitably obscures other debates of 
importance about the idea of the subject or identity, the relation between 
autobiography and gender, sexuality or ideology, or the idea of authorship.29 
Another important thing to bear in mind is that it might not exactly be a 
raging, live battle — many recent approaches to autobiography (as we will in 
the section on narrative) even consider it extinguished. This section, however, 
assumes that it might not be possible to dismiss the conflict once it has been 
examined — and perhaps entered. 
                                                          
29 For an extended analysis of these issues, readers should turn to Laura Marcus’s Auto/Biographical Discourses,  
or to Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson’s excellent introduction Reading Autobiographies : A Guide for Interpreting 
Life-Narratives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001). 
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At the heyday of the debate, Smith divided the ‘field’ of 
autobiographical theory into ‘three enclosures’: the field-surveyors, those who 
doubt ‘whether autobiography can be theorised as a genre’ and the ‘positivist’ 
advocates of definition with their ‘quasi-existentialist claims about self-
knowledge’ which place ‘autobiography fairly within an ideology of 
individualism’. 30   Smith’s third category brings together (and perhaps 
simplifies) what Broughton calls the ‘founding statements’ of 
autobiographical theory in the 1950s and 1960s  (Georges Gusdorf or Roy 
Pascal, themselves inspired by the work of Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Misch 
at the turn of the twentieth century). Smith includes Lejeune in this group — 
the subject of the next section — although there are important differences 
between his work and that of previous critics. Lejeune’s critical work is not a 
side in the conflict but a microcosm of the battle, a deliberately non-neutral 
exploration of the ‘inconsistencies, crossed purposes and equivocations’ of 
autobiographical criticism. 
 
Philippe Lejeune 
 
 Lejeune’s critical work — and particularly his definition — tends to be not 
only the most frequent “door” of surveys of autobiographical criticism, but 
also the spark of many of its conflicts (Broughton calls it ‘the most often 
                                                          
30 Smith, pp. 55-56. 
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quoted and hotly debated in autobiographical criticism’).31 It has even been 
the source of internal conflict: years after formulating it, Lejeune though it ‘a 
“definition” of dogmatic appearance, with a rather uncertain theoretical 
status’. 32  This is the spark itself, found in his influential essay ‘The 
Autobiographical Pact’: 
 
Retrospective prose narrative written by a real person 
concerning his own existence, where the focus is his individual 
life, in particular the story of his personality.33 
 
The criteria for the definition are later broken down into their component 
parts later on: he distinguishes between categories that can be satisfied just in 
part (such as the narrative form (1b), the subject (2) and the retrospective 
point of view (4b)) and those which must be satisfied in toto (3 and 4a). 
 
1. Form of language 
a. Narrative 
b. In prose 
2. Subject treated: individual life, story of a personality. 
3. Situation of the author: the author (whose name refers to a real 
person) and the narrator are identical. 
4. Position of the narrator 
a.The narrator and the principal character are 
identical 
b.Retrospective point of view of the narrative.34 
 
 
                                                          
31 Broughton, I, pp. 1-58 (p. 15). 
32 Lejeune, On Autobiography, p. 120. 
33  Lejeune, On Autobiography,p. 120. Broughton comments on the fact that the definition’s ‘apparent 
assumptions about the nature of the ‘person’ as a self-determining, generically masculine individual’. See 
Broughton, pp. 1-58 (p.15). The masculine pronoun in it, however, is only present in the translation, as French 
possessives match the gender of the possessed and not of the possessor. 
34 Lejeune, On Autobiography,  p. 4. 
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In Lejeune’s breakdown of his definition, the emphasis changes from 
individualism and ‘personality’ to a series of pragmatic and reader-centred 
criteria. Autobiography is defined solely by ‘the series of oppositions between 
the different texts, which are available for reading’: his definition is a tool to 
distinguish an autobiography from a journal, an essay or a first-person 
narrative.35 
Partial criteria would explain the overlap between autobiography and 
other genres such as the memoir, the journal or the autobiography in verse. 36 
There is no overlap, however, between autobiography and the first person 
novel: the identity between author and narrator and protagonist are 
 
A question of all or nothing, and they are the conditions that 
oppose autobiography [...] to biography and the personal novel 
[...] An identity is, or is not [...] In order for there to be 
autobiography (and personal literature in general) the author, 
the narrator, and the protagonist must be identical.37 
 
 
Lejeune discards textual criteria in his definition: for him ‘there is no difference’  
‘on the level of analysis within the text’. 38 The identity between narrator and 
the author is established solely by the use of the proper name, by what he calls 
                                                          
35 Lejeune, On Autobiography,  p. 4. See Elizabeth W. Bruss, Autobiographical Acts : The Changing Situation of a 
Literary Genre (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977) for a different pragmatic approach to generic 
definition. 
36 Lejeune uses the term ‘memoir’ to characterise collective-focused portraits as opposed to individually-focused 
ones, but it has been used with other meanings by other critics and authors, sometimes to denote subjective 
criteria such as a light as opposed to a serious approach. There have been a lot less attempts to describe and 
define the memoir, and the terms are used interchangeably in many studies. Ian Jack, in an introduction to Diana 
Athill’s collected memoirs, reverses Lejeune’s use of the terms: memoirs are intimate and subjective, 
autobiographies, public and historically verifiable. See Ian Jack’s introduction to Diana Athill, Life Class: The 
Selected Memoirs of Diana Athill, (London: Granta, 2009), p. ix. 
37 Lejeune, On Autobiography, p. 5. 
38 Lejeune, On Autobiography, p.13. 
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the ‘autobiographical pact’: narrator and author must have the same name.  
He thus redefines his initial definition of autobiography: the genre is ‘a 
contract of identity [...] sealed by the proper name’.39 
This contract defines autobiography as a referential genre, as a text that 
claims to ‘to provide information about a “reality” exterior to the text’.40 
Referentiality is not defined, however, in terms of resemblance but solely on 
the promise of identity. An autobiography can be dishonest and still be an 
autobiography. For Michael Sheringham, this is ‘the great advantage’ of the 
pact: ‘it ties autobiography to reference, not resemblance; to the interaction 
between of textual ‘I’ and extratextual counterpart, but not to any specific 
kind of relationship between them’.41 
Lejeune’s definition is thus not as dogmatic as he believed it to be: even 
the pact is described as ‘a historically variable contractual effect’, which, as 
Broughton remarks, ‘leaves open the possibility of entirely different 
inflections of the medium-reader-producer relationship’.42  Although the pact 
allows him to draw a borderline between autobiography and fiction (the 
essay includes a chart of referential and fictional genres), the borderline itself 
is ultimately left in the hands of the readers, who might erase or redraw it if 
so they wished — as his very own theory demonstrates it. 
                                                          
39 Lejeune, On Autobiography, p. 6. 
40 Lejeune, On Autobiography, p. 6. 
41 Michael Sheringham, French Autobiography: Devices and Desires: Rousseau to Perec (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993), p. 20. 
42 Lejeune, On Autobiography, p. 30 and Broughton, I, pp. 1-58 (p. 15). 
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As the self-deprecating description of his definition shows, Lejeune is 
in fact a rather rebellious reader of his own theories. For instance, the very 
same essay which includes his definition (or definitions) also includes the 
definition’s indefinition, as it were: the quasi-doppelgänger of the 
autobiographical pact, the appropriately — and uncannily — named 
‘phantasmatic pact’. Lejeune proposed the idea of an ‘Autobiographical 
Space’ which spills out the neat borders ‘sealed’ by the proper name. He 
remarked that an author might wish for the whole of their oeuvre to be read 
autobiographically: 
 
[T]he reader is [...] invited to read novels not only as fictions 
referring to a truth of “human nature” but also as revealing 
phantasms of the individual. I will call this indirect form of the 
autobiographical pact the phantasmatic pact.43 
 
By letting this ghost in, the placid legal appearance of the pact is disturbed at 
its very birth. 
Later revisions of the 1973 essay only make this instability more 
explicit. Its first sequel, ‘The Autobiographical Pact (bis)’, falls head on into 
paradoxical and aporistic territory:  referentiality becomes a question of faith 
or desire. As in love or religion, doubts must be knowingly ignored in order 
for the genre to continue: 
 
Once this precaution has been taken, we go on as if we did not 
know it. Telling the truth about the self, constituting the self as a 
complete subject — it is a fantasy. In spite of the fact that 
                                                          
43 Lejeune, On Autobiography, p. 27. 
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autobiography is impossible, this in no way prevents it from 
existing. Perhaps in describing it, I in turn took my desire for 
reality; but what I had wanted to do, was to describe this desire 
in its reality, a reality shared by a great number of authors and 
readers.44 
 
 Not everybody reads this as an act of self-sabotage: for Paul John Eakin, this 
passage ‘dramatizes the operative force of the notion of the complete subject in 
the performance and reception of autobiography even as it contests it’. 45  
Lejeune’s performance, however, is anything but forceful: the ‘complete 
subject’ that autobiography defines and describes is the phantasm projected 
by an incomplete, divided and deliberately self-deluded subject. 
The potential of this confession to erase the neat frontiers of the 
definition may perhaps explain the reasons for Lejeune’s later regret at having 
openly voiced his doubts in this “middle” period of his theories. The second 
sequel to 'The Autobiographical Pact' (from 2001) returns to the position of 
the first essay: late Lejeune is a firm advocate of early Lejeune. However, as 
we have seen, Lejeune’s writings are never of one piece, and this late essay is 
no exception. For instance, he compares his theory of the pact to ‘the judicial 
idea of a contract’, but also to ‘a mystical or supernatural alliance — a “pact 
with the Devil’”. 46  It is this ambivalence that, according to him, ‘has 
guaranteed the success of the formula. I am not a revolutionary theorist, but 
only a copywriter with a good idea, like the one who came up with The 
                                                          
44 Lejeune,  On Autobiography, p. 132. 
45 Paul John Eakin, Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
p. 25. 
46 Philippe Lejeune, Signes de vie (Paris: Seuil, 2005), p. 15. 
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Laughing Cow’.47 The original definition of the pact also teetered between the 
legal and the uncanny, but the comparison to the popular processed cheese 
snack is far more intriguing: theory is turned into novelty, with no ultimate 
defining value. The secret to the pact’s endurance might have been its 
potential to be read and unread, to ignite conflict (even self-conflict) rather 
than to bring it into a conclusion. Or it might just have been catchy, or 
curious. 
The use of paradoxical solutions or the constant self-questioning in 
Lejeune belies his caricature as a rigid positivist: his theses ultimately propose 
and invoke a model of autobiography more open to debate and redefinition 
than it is usually acknowledged, as well as casting a doubt on the attempts 
(some his very own) of making the genre empirically observable and 
traceable. Returning to the crude metaphor of the battlefield, it is worth 
keeping these internal conflicts in mind when considering his counterpart in 
the enemy camp. 
 
Paul De Man 
 
‘Autobiography as De-Facement’ is the most widely debated example of what 
we may call the “suspicion” camp. As Timothy Dow Adams puts it, ‘by 1979, 
autobiographical criticism had reached such an impasse that Paul de Man 
                                                          
47 Lejeune, Signes de vie, p. 15. 
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described it as nearly pointless’.48   De Man tries to account for that impasse 
by examining its foundations: 
 
The theory of autobiography is plagued by a recurrent series of 
questions and approaches that are not simply false, in the sense 
that they are far-fetched or aberrant, but that they are confining, 
in that they take for granted assumptions about 
autobiographical discourse that are in fact highly problematic.49 
 
 The ‘confining’ assumptions that lead theorists into the whirligig of 
definition are the distinctions Lejeune’s pact sought to fix: the idea of 
autobiography as a literary genre (distinguishable by a reader) and the idea of 
autobiography as distinct from fiction. Both are problematic: as we saw in the 
introduction, anomaly is the all-pervasive, ever-present characteristic of all 
autobiographies: the terms ‘norm’ and ‘anomaly’ (and ‘curiosity’, of course) 
need to be interrogated.  
The frontier of autobiography and fiction is thus questioned, as well as 
its underlying assumptions (the possibility of reference, mimesis): 
 
We assume that life produces the autobiography as an act 
produces its consequences, but can we not suggest […] that the 
autobiographical project may itself produce and determine the 
life and that whatever the writer does is in fact governed by the 
technical demands of self-portraiture and thus determined [...] 
by the resources of his medium? And since the mimesis here 
assumed to be operative is one mode of figuration among 
others, does the referent determine the figure, or is it the other 
way round: is the illusion of reference not a correlation of the 
structure of the figure, that is to say no longer clearly and 
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simply a referent at all but something more akin to a fiction 
which then, however, in its own turn, acquires a degree of 
referential productivity? 50 
 
 
It is at this point that we encounter the tourniquet and the whirligig, his 
answer to Genette’s assumptions that we might be able to discern “signs” of 
fictionality or referentiality based on textual criteria (such as coincidence or 
non-coincidence) without questioning figurative language itself. 
Autobiography thus needs to be unmade: the conventional meaning of the 
word (a referential self-portrait) becomes a metaphor for a process which 
undoes its truth claims and makes its claims for generic uniqueness invalid.   
  
Autobiography is not a genre or a mode, but a figure of reading 
or of understanding that occurs, to some degree, in all texts. The 
autobiographical moment happens as an alignment between the 
two subjects involved in the process of reading in which they 
determine each other by mutually reflexive substitution. 51 
 
De Man seems to be making autobiography the standard bearer for 
language’s claims of referentiality in order to analyse how all of its troops fail 
in their endeavour. This undermines the legitimacy of its use as a descriptive 
term for certain texts: ‘But just as we seem to assert that all texts are 
autobiographical, we should say, by the same token, none of them is or can 
be’. 52 
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This paradox is based on two uses of ‘autobiographical’: his own 
metaphorical one and the conventional one, which he has nonetheless undone 
and undermined, but which he still uses to communicate his point. The 
double use of the word has been pointed by some critics such as John Paul 
Eakin as a theoretical flaw: according to Eakin, De Man 
 
[stresses] the fundamental instability of the categories 
associated with writing about the self, although it is worth 
noting that [he] proceeds to write about an entity called 
“autobiography”’.53 
 
Eakin seems to be ignoring here that De Man uses ‘autobiography’ in inverted 
commas, as a kind of “theoretical fiction”: the term remains necessary but its 
problematic truth claims cannot remain unseen any longer. 
De Man goes on to characterises this ‘autobiographical’ process of 
reading (which is, of course, autobiography itself) through another metaphor, 
that of the mirror, in order to emphasise the fundamental self-reflexivity of 
autobiography and language itself: 
 
The specular moment is not primarily a situation or an event 
that can be located in a history, but that it is the manifestation, 
on the level of the referent, of a linguistic structure. The 
specular moment that is part of all understanding reveals the 
tropological structure that underlies all cognitions, including 
knowledge of self. The interest of autobiography, then, is not 
that it reveals reliable self-knowledge — it does not — but that 
it demonstrates in a striking way the impossibility of closure 
and totalization [...] of all textual systems made of tropological 
substitutions.54 
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Autobiography’s interest thus lies on its very explicitness about how it fails in 
what it purportedly seeks to achieve, allowing for the idea of success or 
failure itself to be questioned. As Derrida explains, 
 
[F]ar from assuring any identification with the self [...], this 
specular structure reveals a tropological dislocation that 
precludes any anamnesic totalization of self.55 
 
 
De Man then moves on discuss Wordsworth’s ‘Essay upon Epitaphs’ 
and its figurations: particularly the epitaph, an example of prosopopeia, the 
trope on which autobiography’s illusions of presence are founded. 
 
[T]he fiction of an apostrophe to an absent, deceased or 
voiceless entity, which posits the possibility of the latter’s reply 
and confers upon it the power of speech [...] Prosopopeia is the 
trope of autobiography, by which one’s name [...] is made as 
intelligible and as memorable as a face.56 
 
De Man’s reading of the proper name as prosopopeia is not restricted to 
Wordsworth’s use of the term: in fact, it exposes the shaky foundations of 
pragmatic theories such as Lejeune’s. The pact itself — seemingly free of the 
taint of specularity because of its performative, legal aspect — nevertheless 
relies on such specular structures (as its phantasmatic sibling or Lejeune’s 
“confessional” articles disclosed). De Man reveals the covert whirligigs of 
Lejeune’s neat, straight delineations: for him, in Lejeune’s pact ‘[t]he specular 
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structure has been displaced but not overcome, and we reenter a system of 
tropes at the very moment we claim to escape from it’.57 The whirligig, he 
reminds us, is inescapable. 
‘Autobiography as De-Facement’ exposes the phantasmatic 
foundations of the autobiographical pact, undermining its pretensions to offer 
reference or stable ‘identity’. His assertion that ‘any book with a readable title-
page is [...] autobiographical’ is not an endorsement of Lejeune’s 
‘autobiographical space’ but an exposure of its paradoxes: all readings spaces 
are ‘autobiographical’ because none can be. The possibility of De Man’s 
theory to be misread is poignant when considered in the context of the 
posthumous revelation of De Man’s wartime journalism: as Laura Marcus 
points out   
It is certainly the case, rightly or wrongly, that it is now difficult 
not to read De Man ‘autobiographically’ [...] De Man’s writings 
contain very substantial reflections on the modes of 
autobiography, confession and apologia — reflections which 
assert their generic ‘impossibility’ or the bad faith they manifest 
[...]. These elements [...] now tend to be read either as veiled 
confessions or dissimulations.58 
 
 
Even critics sympathetic to De Man’s approach (such as Linda Anderson) end 
up reading him phantasmatically: 
 
In retrospect [...] the obsessive figures of falling, mutilation and 
drowning, which pervade his criticism, and which he offers as 
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figures for the defacement of writing by tropes, could also be 
read as more darkly personal images of anxiety and guilt.59 
 
Other “autobiographical” readings of De Man, like Shoshana Felman’s ‘Paul 
de Man’s Silence’ are, however, less naive. 60 Her article does not dismiss De 
Man’s ideas as signs of bad faith: instead, she puts them in relation to 
questions around testimony and silence — as Jacques Derrida will do in some 
of his writings which directly address ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’ 
(particularly Memoires for Paul De Man and Demeure). The concluding section 
of this chapter returns to De Man’s essay in order to explore figuration 
(particularly self-reflexive, mirror like models like mise en abyme) in relation to 
“defined” models like the frontier — a figure which was also the subject of 
another important contemporary intervention in generic studies:  Derrida’s 
‘The Law of Genre’ (1979). 
 
Jacques Derrida 
 
Although not immediately concerned with autobiography, Derrida’s essay 
has exerted an important influence in autobiographical theory and its battles:  
as Marcus points out, it interrogates concepts (such as the law or the generic 
tag) which are usually considered as ‘unproblematically indicative of generic 
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status or as codifications of an ‘autobiographical intention’ ’. 61 For Derrida, 
the generic marker is 
  
[T]his supplementary and distinctive trait, a mark of belonging 
or inclusion, does not properly pertain to any genre or class. 
The re-mark of belonging does not belong. It belongs without 
belonging, and the “without” (or the suffix “-less”) which 
relates belonging to non-belonging appears only in the timeless 
time of the blink of an eye [...] a text cannot belong to no genre, 
it cannot be without or less a genre. Every text participates in 
one or several genres; there is no genreless text; there is always 
genre and genres, yet such participation never amounts to 
belonging. And not because of an abundant overflowing or a 
free, anarchic, and unclassifiable productivity, but because of 
the trait of participation itself.62 
 
For Derrida, the generic tag is paradoxical and perplexing, calling into 
question the distinction between the inside and the outside of the text. 
Vilain’s parable of the hold-up is a case in point. The story supplements the 
generic definition of his other ‘novels’ or ‘autofictions’ whilst revealing what 
is excluded from them. The story is “invited” to form part of Vilain’s life-
writing project as other episodes had been, but the invitation is accompanied 
by the condition that it should be kept separate from the rest — like an 
eavesdropper. As Derrida puts it, the law of genre 
 
[I]s a taking part in without being part of, without having 
membership in a set [...]With the inevitable dividing of the trait 
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that marks membership, the boundary of the set comes to form 
[...] an internal pocket larger than the whole.63 
 
Derrida’s intervention in ‘The Law of Genre’ destabilises the neatness of the 
‘frontiers’ that Vilain wished to illuminate by the story of the bank robbery. 
This necessary but unwanted guest is neither in nor out of the line 
demarcating Vilain’s novels or autofictions: it becomes a haunting presence, 
both brief and timeless, which exposes the frontier as a paradoxical and 
illogical non-space. 
The ultimate “lesson” and irony of this parable is that it became a tag 
for a generic marker — autofiction — which was intended as a solution to 
autobiography’s indefinition: even a composite tag might not solve the 
problem of generic identity but might only multiply it. Some of the responses 
to ‘The Law of Genre’ have made use of Derrida’s fluid idea of genre as a 
defence strategy in the assertion of autobiography as a distinctive genre. 
Saunders, for instance, remarks that 
 
[T]he fact that a modernist author blurs generic boundaries does 
not invalidate the concept of genre. It may highlight the 
inevitable overlapping of genres, since genres are not pure 
entities. [...] As Derrida argued in ‘The Law of Genre’, texts 
‘participate’ in genres to which they cannot ‘belong’. So it is with 
autobiography and the novel.64 
 
 
A De Manian reply to Saunders’s use of Derrida would point out the 
problem of asserting that any mode of writing can choose to be fiction, or 
                                                          
63 Derrida, ‘The Law of Genre’, pp. 51-77 (p.55). 
64 Saunders, p. 4. 
 
56 
 
contain fiction and do so in response to a particular historical context. Fiction 
might not be an ingredient to include or exclude at ease but the inevitable 
quality of figurative language. In that sense, composite markers like 
autofiction or the one Saunders explores in his book, ‘autobiografiction’ 
(coined in 1906 by Stephen Reynolds) cannot redraw frontiers but only expose 
or mirror them as displaced figures, as Saunders himself points out: 
 
The notion of identity between author and narrator and 
protagonist inevitably contains an element of fictionality; that is, 
as it were, a legal fiction; one that enables classical 
autobiography to proceed; but which modern autobiografiction 
exposes for what it is.65 
 
The next section explores both hybrid coinages (autobiografiction and 
autofiction) as alternative responses to the problem of generic definition 
which nonetheless have had little effect (as Vilain’s parable demonstrates) in 
calming down the battlefield. It seeks to examine whether they propose a 
model in which hybrid and pure genres coexist side by side or whether they 
call into question the idea of purity, or the idea of genre.  Its focus will be 
primarily theoretical rather than historical (Saunders’s and Gasparini’s 
surveys nonetheless explore that dimension with great thoroughness):  it 
attempts to explore the place of renaming approaches (as well as unnaming 
ones, like that of David Shields’s) within the debates about the generic 
definition of “autobiography”— whatever that is. 
 
                                                          
65 Saunders, p. 142. 
 
57 
 
New launches: the hybrid as the balm of Fierabras? 
 
 
As in real-life postcard displays, there is a lot of the unpredictable and the 
serendipitous about the success or the failure of a new approach to 
autobiography. A careless placing of a new arrival behind a rival or in a hard-
to-reach corner might condemn it to years of unpurchased obscurity — years 
that can be, however, miraculously reversed by a rediscovery. This was the 
case of both Reynolds’s ‘autobiografiction’ and Doubrovsky’s ‘autofiction’.66 
However, this new-fangled success (particularly of ‘autofiction’) has 
not been universally celebrated. ‘Autofiction’ has not penetrated Anglo-
American criticism in the same way it has done in France or Spain — where it 
is nonetheless also approached with suspicion. The Spanish critic José María 
Pozuelo Yvancos, speaking of the rediscovery of Doubrovsky’s coinage, 
wittily compares the term to Don Quixote’s balm of Fierabras, ‘which cures all 
meta-theoretical remedies’.67 Readers of Don Quixote might remember that the 
fabled balm — a concoction of wine, oil, salt, rosemary, eighty Our Fathers 
and eighty Hail Marys — only made Don Quixote vomit, and had an even 
worse effect in Sancho (it made him ‘erupt from both channels’).68 Pozuelo 
Yvancos’s comparison could thus be read as a warning against the seemingly 
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magic aura that such neologisms present as the solution to the tiring 
circularities of autobiographical studies. They might instead leave one doubly 
empty. It is a danger that this necessarily brief survey of three of such 
attempts will try to keep in mind. 
 
‘A rather dreadful portmanteau-word’: Stephen Reynolds and 
autobiografiction 
 
The act of renaming autobiography could be interpreted as the consequence 
or the side-effect of a rather rigid vision of genre:  it might be preferable to 
create new genres for awkward texts rather than casting a doubt on the 
purpose and usefulness of generic boundaries. Stephen Reynolds’s 
‘Autobiografiction’ (1906) could be read as an example of this approach, 
although only up to a point.69 Although this coinage has recently been given 
its due importance by critics such as Charles Swann and  Max Saunders (who 
uses it to explore the evolution of life writing at the end of the nineteenth 
century and in the modernist period), my intention here is to read it in 
relation to the dialogues, debates and metaphors of autobiographical theory. 
Reynolds’s opening (which seeks to explain the odd coinage of the 
title) is an early example of how curious texts can destabilise the certainties of 
previous generic categories. 
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The phrase ‘autobiographical fiction’ is mainly reserved for 
fiction with a great deal of the writer’s own life in it, or for those 
lapses from fact which occur in most autobiographies. Hence 
the need for coining a rather dreadful portmanteau-word like 
autobiografiction in order to connote shortly a minor literary 
form which stands between those two extremes; which is of late 
growth and of a nature at once very indefinite and very 
definite.70 
 
 
Reynolds portrays the two extremes between which ‘autobiografiction’ stands 
as fairly hybridised themselves: the ‘dreadful’ coinage, however, does not 
refer to those mongrel ‘extremes’ but to an ideal (but paradoxical) middle 
way. Autobiografiction is compared to the point when ‘the solid, liquid and 
gaseous states of sulphur are in equilibrium’: it is a freak convergence of 
genres rather than a mixture. 71  For Reynolds, this convergence is both 
thematic and formal: autobiografiction is ‘a record of real spiritual 
experiences strung on a credible but more or less fictitious autobiographical 
narrative [which] [...] reads very like [...] an essay.’72 
Convergence, however, is soon unmade and revealed as another 
mixture in Reynolds’s development of his definition. Its content — ‘spiritual 
experiences’ — includes a mixed range of what we would describe as 
‘epiphanic’  experiences (Reynolds calls them ‘intensified’), which range from 
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‘a vision of heaven to a joint of beef eaten with a full perception of its meaning 
in life’: in contrast to Vilain (and anticipating Perec’s gastronomic 
autobiography), the mundane is allowed in.73 Its form is also redefined as a 
patchwork of formal features, or rather negative ones: it is a rejection of plot 
and story-telling but also of the chronological completeness of autobiography. 
As Saunders points out, 
 
[w]hat seemed a distinct form (spiritual experience presented through 
fictionalized autobiography) then appears as a hybrid mode of writing 
(the intersection of autobiography, fiction and essay) that can feature in 
any form’.74 
 
 
Reynolds’s metaphorical framework for his genre shifts from a static 
convergent model to a hybrid and diffuse one.  For instance, he remarks that 
pure spiritual experiences are ‘mightily difficult to make a dish of. Like nitro-
glycerine and absolute alcohol, it positively demands absorption or dilution’: 
autobiografiction becomes a recipe or a formula. Even the text itself mixes 
culinary and chemical metaphors about the act of mixing, as if to set an 
example.75 
 The figures in Reynolds’s piece perform the indistinctness that defines 
them: Reynolds’s deliberately vague and paradoxical descriptions of the 
generic features which make up the formula of his genre only mirrors the 
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‘mixed’ characters of his figures, conveying the hybrid as something that 
cannot be decomposed. Autobiografiction becomes both a recipe without an 
ingredient list and an ingredient list without a recipe. 
It is this paradoxical quality that perhaps motivated Saunders to 
resurrect the term not solely because of its historical and descriptive value, 
but also because of its theoretical one. For instance, he uses it to attempt to 
destabilise the ‘frontier’ model of generic definition: 
  
Literary autobiography thus establishes a structure in which a 
boundary is drawn between fiction and autobiography; but at 
the same time, the form undoes the boundary, suggesting both 
the autobiographic within the fictional works that appear to lie 
outside the autobiography; and also, conversely, the fictional 
within the autobiography itself.76 
 
Autobiografiction is reformulated not solely as the product of a mix but as its 
process. It is redefined through dynamic metaphors: ‘autobiografiction can be 
seen not so much as a separate genre or hybrid of two genres, as an 
expression of the structuration of genres.’ 77   It is not ‘the thing 
auto/biography moves towards, but [...] the move itself’. 78  Movement, 
however, cannot be identified as a possible “solution” to the debate on the 
generic identity of autobiography: it is of itself unpredictable and 
uncontainable, and not always straightforward. It involves bringing back time 
and its perplexities into the picture — as well as the possibility of collapse, 
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torture, the whirligig. Pozuelo Yvancos’s comparison of certain hybrid 
generic tags with balm of Fierabras should warn us about their seeming 
remedial appearances: movement, like the balm itself, might only result in 
sickness. 
 
 ‘That slightly magical neologism’: Doubrovsky and autofiction 79 
 
Saunders’s dynamic turn for autobiographical theory will find an unexpected 
echo when we consider another attempt at generic redefinition, Serge 
Doubrovsky’s ‘autofiction’. The term (and the 1977 book in which it first 
appeared, Fils) has tended to explained as a sort of “son” (an illegitimate one, 
perhaps) of the critical dialogue generated by Lejeune’s theory of the 
autobiographical pact. Lejeune’s chart of first-person narrative (organised 
around the parameter of pronominal identity) had left two of its squares 
empty: an autobiography in which author and protagonist do not share a 
name, and a fiction in which the author and the narrator/protagonist have the 
same name. Lejeune concluded that ‘Nothing could prevent such a thing from 
existing’.80 
The unwitting seed created by this blank germinated in one of his 
contemporary readers, writer and critic Serge Doubrovsky. Lejeune later 
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revealed in ‘The Autobiographical Pact (bis)’ how Doubrovsky wrote to him 
at the time pondering on his intriguing void, a letter he quotes in the essay: 
  
I remember, while reading your study [...] having checked off 
the passage [...]: “Can the hero of a novel declared as such have 
the same name as the author? Nothing would prevent such a 
thing from existing [...], but in practice, no example of such a 
study comes to mind.” I was then right in the middle of writing 
and that concerned me, stuck me to the core. [...]I wanted very 
deeply to fill up that “square”, which your analysis left empty, 
and it is a real desire that suddenly linked your critical text and 
what I was in the process of writing.81 
 
The book that came to fill the empty square is a novel following a day in the 
life of a French literature professor called Serge Doubrovsky. Of course, the 
book is not a novel as such, but rather an autofiction, Doubrovsky’s name for 
the new genre, involuntarily reminiscent of Reynolds’ awkward portmanteau 
word. Both coinages work on the same principle: the need of a name that 
mirrors a hybrid text. 
Fils was christened as an autofiction in the book’s blurb. As Philippe 
Gasparini remarks, this piece ‘assumes unapologetically its advertising 
purposes’: like Lejeune’s pact, the blurb is a reflection on autobiography, a 
manifesto, but also an advert, complete with puns.82 The word appears in the 
concluding paragraph: 
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Autobiography? No, that is a privilege reserved to the mighty of 
this world in the autumn of their lives and in a grand style. A 
fiction of strictly real events and facts; autofiction, one might say; 
the language of an adventure as an adventure of language, 
beyond the wisdom and the syntax of the novel, either 
traditional or new.83 
 
Doubrovsky is voicing here a complaint against autobiography not too 
dissimilar to Reynolds’s. Reynolds found the ‘completeness’ of autobiography 
too restrictive to communicate spiritual experiences. Doubrovsky also seems 
to find the retrospective solemnity and grandiose style of autobiography 
rather forbidding. In a later text, Le Livre Brisé (1989), he describes 
autobiography as a ‘pantheon of funeral parlours’ in which he hopes to ‘sneak 
in with the help of fiction, under the cover of the novel’: a paradoxical 
formulation that kills the genre and makes that murder particularly tempting 
because of the victim’s deadness — turning autofiction into a kind of 
“Orpheus” genre.84  Gasparini points out how the term is not so much a 
generic metaphor but a ‘paradoxical antiphrasis (...) this isn’t a pipe but a 
fiction’.85 
This quality has tended to be read as a response to postmodern 
uncertainties rather than as a defiance of generic categories: E.H. Jones, for 
example, sees autofiction as ‘highly attuned with an age in which the subject 
is no longer accepted to be a unified, simple whole’.86 For her, it is a ‘late 
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twentieth-century form of autobiographical writing [...] a gradual evolution of 
literary form’, rather than ‘the replacement of a dominant form with its 
opposite’.87 Doubrovsky himself has described autofiction as ‘a new type of 
autobiography’, one of the ‘sub-categories of autobiography’.88 
Gasparini defines Doubrovsky’s take on the term by three features:  
indexes of referentiality (homonimity, focus on the ‘strictly real’), fictional 
features (the ‘novel’ tag, use of narrative or the present-tense) and textual self-
consciousness (formal originality, non-linear configuration of time). The 
balance between these features — as it was the case with Reynolds’s chemical 
metaphors — is nonetheless easily disturbed, revealing in its unsettled quality 
the problematic character of such attempts at definition. 
The term’s evolution in criticism from its origin in Fils (which Gasparini 
traces in great detail in his survey) testifies to this impossible equilibrium: the 
term has been redefined as a metaleptic metafictional sub-genre (by Vincent 
Colonna), as a postmodern variant of autobiography (by Jones) or of the first-
person autobiographical novel (by Gasparini himself) or as a variant of the 
autobiographical reading pact defined by an alternance between fictional 
readings and autobiographical readings within the same book (by Manuel 
Alberca and Arnaud Schmitt).89 It has become as fraught as autobiography 
itself, ending up in the same old door which it sought to escape, its only 
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consolation provided by a calming litany of features which would destabilise 
the whole concept were one to examine them in more than a swift or 
perfunctory way (such as self-referentiality). 
 
Or so the official story of the birth and later success of autofiction goes. 
There is, however, a twist.  Isabelle Grell — in an article about the manuscript 
version of Fils — revealed how she stumbled upon an earlier appearance of 
the term autofiction in a discarded draft, a variant which reveals a wholly new 
dimension of the word.90  In the fragment, the protagonist drives away after 
an analysis session, reading a dream notebook his analyst has asked him to 
keep: 
 
the scene seemed to be the repetition of the same scene directly 
lived as REAL without a doubt it made a fold am sitting in the 
bench back of my hand over the wheel I place the notebook 
between my fingers dream book constructed in a dream 
volatilises me I am it’s real if I write in my car 
my autobiography 
will be my AUTO-FICTION 91 
 
Autofiction, then, is nothing more (or less) than fiction (or autobiography) 
written in a car: as Gasparini remarks it is ‘not a word but a pun engendered 
by a love of limousines’.92 Gasparini’s use of ‘engendered’ is amusing: as if 
Doubrovsky has discovered that the real father of his “son” was not Lejeune 
                                                          
90 Isabelle Grell, ‘Pourquoi Serge Doubrovski n’s pu éviter le terme  d’autofiction’, in Gènese et autofiction, ed. by 
Jean Louis Jeannelle and Catherine Viollet (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2007), pp. 39-51 (p.46). 
91 Serge Doubrovsky, as quoted by Grell, pp. 39-51 (p. 46). 
92Gasparini, Autofiction, p. 12. 
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and the empty square, but his car — a disturbing parentage, understandably 
repressed. Doubrovsky admitted in an interview to Vilain that ‘I was self-
deceived about its origin. You can never know yourself completely [...] I 
didn’t realise that the word had been created by the movement of my own 
text. 93  In this passage, Doubrovsky almost seems to be rationalising his 
disturbing creature, as if it was nothing more than a virgin birth, or the 
product of the masturbatory text’s self-impregnation. 
The critic is perhaps as dumbfounded as Doubrovsky about what to 
make of this freakish origin. Read in relation to the arguments of 
autobiographical theory, the original sense of ‘autofiction’ contests the idea 
that genres can be ‘mixed’ at all: it is figures themselves who are hybridised 
and this opens up the door to all sorts of curious variants, the products of 
shocking, unconscious or absurd associations (like Reynolds’s union of 
‘heaven’ and the ‘joint of beef’), partial, capricious, lacking in totalising 
intentions. It is important to consider as well that Doubrovsky’ father-figure 
(as in “fathering” figure) — the car — is a dynamic and unstable one. 
Autofictions (and autobiografiction) are cars — or rather children of cars. 
One wonders whether autofiction could be released from critical 
impasse through its automotive and freakish origins: that attempt, however, 
might still end in the same entry point. Neologisms and new products do not 
possess any magical powers, no matter what Gasparini claims: any renaming 
operation in autobiography is destined to become unsatisfactory as long as 
                                                          
93 Doubrovsky, as quoted by Philippe Gasparini, Autofiction, p. 12. 
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terms such as ‘fiction’, ‘truth’ or ‘narrative’ are used without being called into 
question. That is perhaps why the most reticent of those mixed approaches, 
that of David Shields, might be perhaps the least problematic in the long term. 
 
The unnameable genre?: David Shields’s Reality Hunger 
 
The problems that arise from renaming approaches such as Reynolds’ 
autobiografiction or Doubrovsky’s autofiction might make us wonder whether 
the opposite tactic (that of ‘unnaming’ or ‘undefining’) would be more 
successful.  ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, as we have seen, is an 
unnaming both of autobiography and of the proper name — an antecedent of 
our third case study, David Shields’s 2010 ‘manifesto’ Reality Hunger. The text 
represents a novel engagement with some of the main strands of the debates 
of autobiographical theory and eschews on principle the possibility of being 
able to offer a solution. I would like to examine some aspects of Shields’s un-
theory of autobiography as an alternative (or rather a mirror image) to the 
convolutions and avenues that the other previous definitions or attempts 
have led us to. 
Reality Hunger could be said to resemble, up to a point, meta-
theoretical approaches to autobiography such as Marcus’s. The differences 
between their books, however, far exceed the parallelisms. Shields’s book 
takes the appearance of scholar’s draft notes towards a book on the theory of 
autobiography. Argument is abandoned: or rather, Shields expects the 
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collage/mix-tape structure of his text to do the argument on his behalf. His 
model seems to be Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes: he borrows its 
alphabetical arrangement, albeit only to deliberately disregard it or play with 
it.94 
Shields uses his pseudo-alphabetical categories to gather together a 
series of statements about the novel or about autobiography, removes them 
from their context (authors are omitted), groups them along vague thematic 
lines (such as ‘contradiction’, ‘collage’, ‘reality TV’) and leaves them on their 
own to create an argument, thus making his non-committal approach to the 
subject deliberately explicit. The text is blasé about the possibility of saying 
something new about the subject, although it decides to perform rather than 
state that perplexity. 
Reality Hunger’s peculiar mode of intertextuality is nonetheless more 
ambiguous about its message than the seemingly transparent structure makes 
it out to be. It is not certain whether he expects readers to locate and identify 
his quotes or to take them for his own (or even their own). The book includes 
a sort of  incomplete or draft list of references at the end (with author names, 
but no page numbers or other bibliographical information), introduced by a 
note in which he denounces it as an editorial imposition he commands the 
reader to ignore and even cut up with a pair of scissors. The book concludes 
with a sort of grand statement in which he asks his future scissor-wielding 
readers ‘Who owns the words? Who owns the music and the rest of our 
                                                          
94 Roland Barthes, Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trans. by Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977). 
Shields uses some of the letters as figures (the Z section is called ‘coda’) but not on every occasion. 
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culture? We do—all of us— though not of all us know it yet. Reality cannot be 
copyrighted’.95 
Readers, however, should be wary of taking this conclusion as his 
‘manifesto’. It is in fact a rather arch and deliberately paradoxical 
intervention. It could be read as hypocritical and self-contradictory, in line 
with certain readings of Barthes’ ‘The Death of the Author’.96 It seems to give 
authority to a particular origin-less reading of the text by appropriating the 
ideas of authorship and origin it seeks to refuse. Shields is probably fully 
aware of these objections, and the conclusion should perhaps be read as also 
seeking to promote a kind of readerly mutiny which would restore authors 
back into the text: a rebellion which would pencil names alongside quotes, 
and reread the text anew as a dialogue rather than as a cacophony. Despite 
appearances, the text seems to be asking to be read with both scissors and 
pencil. This final authorial intervention is no more deserving of trust than any 
of the others. 
The deliberately bare-boned bibliography might indeed be read as a 
kind of request for an act of collective rereading. He fails to indicate not just 
the page, but even the source text in many examples. In a sense, the 
bibliography demands a notable effort on the part of rebellious or inquisitive 
readers, asked to ‘complete’ Shields’s deliberately unfinished project in their 
own way. The undecidable quality of the conclusion and the book itself could 
                                                          
95 Shields, p. 209. 
96  This also echoes certain criticisms of Barthes’s ‘The Death of the Author’, which Sean Burke has collected. See 
Seán Burke, The Death and Return of the Author (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), pp.20-33. 
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be read as a sign of post-modern exhaustion or as an invitation to a 
collaborative (and perhaps utopian) “solution” to these problems. 
The text is thus stubbornly non-committal and mirror-like: a curiously 
original approach to autobiographical theory by dint of its deliberate 
unoriginality. The book seeks to copy both grand artistic forms like the 
collage and popular arts devices like sampling — as well as adolescent self-
expression exercises like the mix-tape or the postcard or picture wall. Its 
importance to the theory of autobiography (particularly to its hybrid 
branches) lies indeed in its demystification of the balmy aura normally 
divested in novelty (of which this thesis is not particularly exempt). Although 
it could be read as an impartial participation in those discourses (James 
Wood, for instance, reads it ‘an argument for realism’, albeit not of the 
traditional kind), even this position becomes just another argument in the 
cacophony. 97  Autobiographical theory is here reinvented as inventory, 
demonstrating how repetition might also be useful as a critical tool for 
innovation — we should not be afraid to go back to the whirligig, rather than 
continuing looking for the next exit route. 
 
                                                          
97 James Wood, ‘Keeping it Real’, New Yorker, 15 March 2010, online version, 
<http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2010/03/15/100315crat_atlarge_wood > [accessed on 3 March 
2013>. 
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A way out? :  narrative and autobiography 
 
 
Reality Hunger can thus be read as a warning against ignoring the debates on 
the nature of autobiography, reference and figuration: they might not have 
been brought to a conclusion at all, despite a certain tendency to consider 
them as relics of a past critical era. An example of this approach is a recent 
overview of critical approaches to autobiography by Martin Löschnigg. He 
points out how, at the same time that the battle was being fought between 
mimetic and deconstructionist versions of autobiography, a new take on 
autobiography was quietly gathering strength, and — as he implies — 
perhaps  ending the  battle    .  
 
 
Löschnigg refers to what he describes as the constructivist (narrativist) 
theories of autobiography, represented by the approach of Paul John Eakin or 
Jerome Bruner. For him, those theories 
 
[H]ave emphasized the role of narrative in the formation and 
maintenance of a sense of identity. They foreground [...] the creative (as 
opposed to the mimetic) function of autobiography with regard to 
individual identity, while [...] reviving the concept of autobiographical 
reference.98 
 
 
                                                          
98 Martin Löschnigg, ‘Postclassical Narratology and the Theory of Autobiography’, in Postclassical Narratology: 
Approaches and Analyses, ed. by Jan Alber and Monika Fludernik (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2010), 
pp. 255-274 (p. 255). 
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For Löschnigg, this kind of approaches represent an enlightened and 
undeluded way out of the whirligig due to their focus on narrative itself: 
 
[A]n emphasis on narrativity as a vital factor in the construction 
of identity [...] autobiography, in narrative terms, stages the 
drama of creating the autobiographer’s identity.99 
 
 
Löschnigg seems to be referring here not just to narrativist theories of 
autobiography, but also to another important strand of autobiographical 
theory: the performative one, springing from Judith Butler’s theories of 
gender. Although I will not be able to examine those approaches in detail 
(they tend to be concerned with questions of identity or gender rather than 
definition or temporality), they have nonetheless something in common with 
narrativist ones: both invoke a rhetoric of release from the claustrophobic 
spaces of deconstruction. As Saunders has pointed out, they ‘leave the door 
open to the possibility of self-creation [...] and thus offer an escape from post-
structuralism’s deconstruction of selfhood.100 
Narrativist approaches will also invoke a similar rhetoric of 
compromise as release. Eakin, for instance, describes autobiography as ‘a 
special kind of fiction, its self and its truth as much created as (re)discovered 
realities’.101 It is both creation and rediscovery, it is the same as fiction and 
yet it is ‘special’: as he puts it somewhere else ‘autobiography is nothing if 
                                                          
99 Löschnigg, pp. 255-274 (p.256) 
100 Saunders, p. 513. 
101 Eakin, Touching, p. 25. See his Fictions in Autobiography for a full development of this idea. See Paul John 
Eakin, Fictions in Autobiography: Studies in the Art of Self-Invention (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
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not a referential art; it is also and always a kind of fiction’. 102 This section will 
seek to interrogate this rhetoric of the ‘way out’. It will start by exploring the 
main tenets of narrativist and narratological approaches to autobiography (as 
well as anti-narrativist arguments) in relation to generic definition to later 
narrow its focus to the to the role of the ‘temporal curiosity’ within the 
generic debate and the debate around natural and unnatural narratives 
briefly outlined in the introduction. 
 
 
The narrative escape: Ricoeur, Bruner and cognitive narratology. 
 
The rhetoric of release that Saunders observed in performative theories of 
autobiography can also be ascertained in narrativist approaches. Jerome 
Bruner described his own take on autobiographical theory as a kind of 
mixture between a spring-cleaning operation and an Ariadne-like escape from 
(self-created?) labyrinths: 
  
Autobiography is altogether too familiar a form to be taken at 
face value. Its very familiarity risks obscuring its secretive 
metaphysics and tacit presuppositions, both of which would be 
the better for some airing. Autobiographical “theory” [...] too 
often loses its way amidst the same obscurities.103 
 
 
                                                          
102 Eakin, Touching, p. 31. 
103 Jerome Bruner, ‘The Autobiographical Process’ in Autobiography (see Broughton, above), III, pp.165-183 (p. 
165) (first publ. in The Culture of Autobiography: Constructions of Self-Representation, ed. by R. Folkenflik 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, pp. 38-56). 
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A glance at J. Hillis Miller’s Ariadne’s Thread — his unpicking of 
labyrinth/release tropes in relation to narrative theory — might warn any 
prospective theorist (even an inverted comma-ed “theorist”) of the dangers 
with which a cleaner-cum-Ariadne can be faced in relation to figurative 
language, and — we may extrapolate — to autobiography itself.104  “Release” 
models are usually aware of such objections, to the point of incorporating 
those arguments as part of their counter-argument. This mode of definition by 
self-contradiction and paradox will need nonetheless to be interrogated as the 
possible “solution” to the battle — as Löschnigg has it. 
As it is the case with many theoretical categories, there is no such thing 
as a single narrative-based approach to autobiography. Rather it comprises 
arguments from constructivist or cognitive psychology (such as Bruner’s), 
psychoanalysis (Adam Phillips or Peter Brooks) or different philosophical 
schools (Alasdair McIntyre, Paul Ricoeur).105 Because of the thesis’s focus on 
temporal structure as a way of approaching and mirroring the curious nature 
of autobiography, I will mainly concentrate on Ricoeur’s approach — without 
forgetting (even if it is only able to describe them briefly) the constructivist 
arguments of Bruner and cognitive narratology. 
 Ricoeur’s theory of narrative is a good entry point to those arguments 
because he deals with the same question De Man unpicked, although in a 
different way: the relation between life and narrative. De Man, as we saw, 
sought to disturb the idea of a separate “life” outside the narrative: the 
                                                          
104  See J. Hillis Miller, Ariadne’s Thread: Story lines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). 
105 For a good overview of some of these approaches, see Volume 4 of Trev Lynn Broughton’s anthology. 
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“frontier” between them is a fallacy because it implies the possibility of 
mimetic representation — hence his suggestion that autobiography produces 
the life, rather than the usual way round. Life is just recounted. In ‘Life in 
Quest of Narrative’, Ricoeur approaches the relation from a different 
perspective. Like De Man, he also argues against literary theory’s ‘distinction 
between the inside of the text and its outside’.106 Unlike De Man (who sees 
this outside as an illusion of the figure), Ricoeur argues that the door between 
outside and inside must not be destroyed, but simply kept open. 
Ricoeur achieves this release by switching from text to reader (to 
interpretation and hermeneutics), a move which leads to the relieved return 
of referentiality: 
 
From a hermeneutical point of view, that is to say from the 
point of view of the interpretation of literary experience, a text 
[...] is a mediation between man and the world, between man 
and man, between man and himself.107 
 
 
However, the most influential aspect of Ricoeur’s redefinition of the relation 
between life and text (certainly for the theory of autobiography) is his 
argument for the narrative quality of life itself. Rather than revealing the 
outside as illusion, Ricoeur proposes a redefinition of the origin, what he calls 
‘the pre-narrative capacity of what we call life’.108 Narrative is not an outside 
imposition but the fabric of which life (or rather experience) is made, and 
                                                          
106 Paul Ricoeur, ‘Life in Quest of Narrative’, in On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation, ed. by David Wood 
(London: Routledge, 1991), pp.20-33 (p. 26). 
107 Ricoeur, ‘Life’, pp. 20-33 (p. 27). 
108 Ricoeur, ‘Life’, pp. 20-33 (p. 28). 
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which fictional narrative ‘imitates in a creative way’ (note the return of 
mimesis).109 
The metaphor Ricoeur uses to refer to the relation between experience 
and narrative is that of the ‘anchorage’ — another reassuringly stable figure. 
This anchorage is based on three features: the common phronetic (in the 
Aristotelian sense of ‘practical’ as opposed to theoretical) mode of 
understanding in both the reading of action and the reading of narratives, the 
fact that action is itself ‘symbolically mediated’,  a ‘quasi-text’  (that is, 
‘articulated in signs, rules and norms’) and on the aforementioned pre-
narrative quality of life, the idea of ‘life as an activity and a passion in search of 
narrative’— the action of a life has ‘temporal features which call for 
narration’.110  The structure of experience is the structure of a narrative. 
This twinning of narrative and temporality is the most distinctive 
feature of Ricoeur’s philosophy, and one with important consequences for our 
understanding of autobiography. In Ricoeur’s deliberately loop-like 
definition, temporality is ‘that structure of existence that reaches language in 
narrativity’ and narrativity ‘the language structure that has temporality as its 
ultimate referent’.111  Ricoeur’s theory of narrative (of which I will only be 
able to provide a schematic summary) compares Heidegger’s models of 
temporal organization to the structure of narrative — and in particular to plot 
                                                          
109 Ricoeur, ‘Life’, pp.20-33 (p. 28). 
110 Ricoeur, ‘Life’, pp.20-33 (p. 29). 
111 Ricoeur, ‘Narrative Time’, in On Narrative (see Mitchell, above), pp. 165-186 (p. 165). 
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or ‘emplotment’ (a translation of Aristotle’s muthos), as plot is able to 
transform linear successions of events into stories, and thus into temporality. 
Emplotment is thus described as a ‘synthesis of heterogeneous 
elements [...] a synthesis between the events or incidents which are multiple 
and the story which is unified and complete’.112 In temporal terms, plot draws 
‘a configuration out of a succession’: it is ‘something that endures and 
remains across that which passes and flows away’, ‘a mediation between time 
as passage and time as duration’.113  Life, like narrative, is thus characterised 
by a play or a struggle (Ricoeur uses both models, confusingly) between 
concordance (Aristotelian ‘emplotment’, synthesis) and discordance 
(Augustinian’s ‘distention of the soul’, temporal aporia, heterogeneity, 
mindless succession). Plot, on the other hand, is ‘a totality which can be said 
to be at once concordant and discordant’. 114 
Ricoeur’s model of plot is that of a tense but stable balance. It is 
significant that, halfway through his essay, Ricoeur changes the metaphor to 
describe the relation between concordance and discordance from ‘play’ to 
‘struggle’ — as if the theorist had turned into a parent observing in 
astonishment how his children’s seemingly harmonious games have suddenly 
become violent. It is perhaps this contained violence in Ricoeur’s idea of 
‘emplotment’ which makes it a useful tool with which to examine our three 
‘temporal curiosities’. They all at one point invite a Ricoeurian reading of 
                                                          
112 Ricoeur, ‘Life’, pp. 20-33 (p. 21). 
113 Ricoeur, ‘Life’, pp. 20-33 (p. 22). 
114 Ricoeur, ‘Life’, pp. 20-33 (p. 21). 
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their temporal structures, but the play/struggle inherent in their temporal 
structures is in fact an instrument to problematize the existence of a (narrative 
or non-narrative) outside “life”. 
Narrativist theorists, however, have used Ricoeur’s narrative model of 
experience and time to try to anchor autobiography to referentiality: Eakin 
(who, unlike Ricoeur, confuses narrative and chronology) argues for ‘a direct 
organic connection between narrative structure in autobiography and the 
world of reference it represents’.115 Responding to Lejeune’s description of 
chronological order in autobiography as a clichéd and conventional form, 
Eakin argues that ‘a narrowly literary approach to structure […] fails to grasp 
chronology as a manifestation of the fundamental temporality of human 
existence’.116 Eakin, however, also argues that narrative is both an outside 
imposition or as natural choice: ‘narrative in autobiography is always a 
retrospective imposition on remembered experience, but the choice of 
narrative is justified by its roots in that experience’.117 His argument here is 
again a conciliatory one ― and intensely circular.118 The examination of the 
tension between different narrative temporal models in our three curiosities 
— and how they play out the tensions between chronology, anachrony, 
                                                          
115 Eakin, Touching, pp. 192-193. 
116 Eakin, Touching, p. 193. 
117 Eakin, Touching, p. 197. 
118 In that respect, Eakin’s reading of the four texts used to present his thesis is more complex and nuanced, and 
his book ends after that analysis with no strong conclusion at all, but with a mixture of rather despaired 
assertions and wistfulness (referring to David Maalouf’s ’12 Edmondstone Street) that ‘the world of reference 
beyond the text is lost beyond recall’, ‘the art of memory recalls us not to the life we have lost but to the life we 
have yet to live’ (p.229). 
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achrony and polychrony — will reveal the difficulty in seeking a way through 
the window of time. 
 
In view of the difficulty (even impossibility) of escape, it is not 
surprising that critics uncomfortable with De Man’s opaque and specular 
model of autobiography have welcomed Ricoeur’s formulation of narrative as 
a mode of self-understanding with sighs of relief. For Ricoeur, the ‘virtual 
narrativity’ of experience does not stem ‘from the projection of literature onto 
life’, but arises from ‘a genuine demand for narrative’ as part of self-
understanding: ‘fiction is only completed in life and [...] life can be 
understood only through the stories that we tell about it’.119 Galen Strawson, 
speaking of the turn towards narrative in philosophy and the social sciences, 
made a useful distinction between two different interpretations of models 
such as Ricoeur’s: an empirical (descriptive) approach to narrative and a 
normative (ethical) one. 120   
Eakin — who answered De Man’s objections by first agreeing to them 
and then appealing to the quasi-therapeutic, balm-like quality of 
autobiographical illusions — is a good illustration of the normative approach: 
 
If autobiographical discourse encourages us to place self before 
language, cart before horse, the fact of our readiness to do so 
suggests that the power of language to fashion selfhood is not 
only successful but life-sustaining, necessary to the conduct of 
human life as we know it.121 
                                                          
119 Ricoeur, ‘Life’, pp. 20-33 (p. 28, p. 30). 
120 Galen Strawson, ‘Against Narrativity’, Ratio, 17.4 (2004), 428-452 (pp. 428-433). 
121Eakin, Fictions in Autobiography, p. 191. 
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For Galen Strawson, thesis such as Eakin’s 
 
hinder human self-understanding, close down important 
avenues of thought, impoverish our grasp of ethical possibilities 
[…] and are potentially destructive in psychotherapeutic 
contexts’.122 
 
Strawson proposes an alternative non-universalistic non-narrative model of 
self-understanding which he calls Episodic (a sort of fragmentary, half 
Montaignesque, half-Shandean selfhood). Any alternatives to narrativist 
models — particularly the more prescriptive ones — should nonetheless take 
into consideration the problem of reference and specularity inherent in any 
narrative model, be it episodic or teleological. 
Returning to the story of the balm of Fierabras as a useful allegory of 
these debates, we observe that — no matter how much Don Quixote managed 
to convince himself of its restorative qualities — it did not make it any more 
balm-like and less of a purgative/laxative. At the same time, the balm is not 
an outright poison as Strawson would have it: its effects are nothing more and 
nothing less than a double emptying. The balm is only a mirror of the 
narrative-engine of Don Quixote itself: a constant emptying of Don Quixote 
and Sancho so that they can be refilled (and then emptied again) as long as 
the narrative demands it. 
 
                                                          
122 Galen Strawson, ‘Against Narrativity’, 428-492 (p. 429). 
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Perhaps because of these problematic therapeutic claims, many recent 
developments of narrativist approaches to autobiography have opted for an 
empirical observation of autobiography in everyday situations.  The work of 
Bruner was pioneering in this respect and anticipates the approach of 
cognitive narratology. His case studies for autobiography range from Primo 
Levi’s The Periodic Table to the bedtime monologues of a two-year old girl. 
Bruner argues for a kind of continuum between this oral, imitative narratives 
and literary experiments, proposing an organic, life-like model of 
autobiography itself — with its oral form as its babyhood and experimental 
models as its maturity. 123 Autobiography is reformulated as a speech-act, as 
an act of communication with certain ‘felicity conditions’. 
Perhaps the greatest value of approaches such as Bruner’s is their 
potential to reveal the illusory quality of the ‘curiosity’ metaphor. They could 
be taken as warnings that our charming find might be far from unique — and 
that we might be as deluded as those we seek to undermine. Cognitive 
narratology — which applies constructivist psychological models to literary 
texts — has come to define autobiography as the complete opposite of the 
curiosity: David Herman, for instance, argues that 
 
the genre of narrative can be characterized as deriving [...] from 
the speech-act “telling what happened”. The genre of 
autobiography [...] derives from the analogous transformation of 
the speech act “telling what happened to oneself”.124 
 
                                                          
123 Jerome Bruner, ‘The Autobiographical Process’ in Autobiography (see Broughton, above), III, pp.165-183 (pp. 
174-175). 
124 Herman, Story Logic, p. 35. 
 
83 
 
 Another important cognitive narratologist, Monika Fludernik, comically 
acknowledges that the focus on cognitive frames can come to sound 
‘ridiculously babyish’, as those frames are ‘taken for granted as part of one’s 
bodily enmeshment in the world’.125 It is fair to ask if some of our immediate 
exasperation with the simplicity of Herman’s definition does not resemble 
that of an elder sibling being told that their younger brother or sister is just as 
clever as he or she is.   
It can also be argued, however, that these two rather stark illusion-
defeating approaches are not exempt from being the subject of a thorough 
questioning — for instance, about the nature of Herman’s ‘transformation’ of 
speech-acts into literary genres. Their recourse to tropes and narratives of 
innocence and nature (even in inverted commas) is also problematic, as it 
assumes a kind of hierarchy of the oral over the written. The narratologists 
grouped together under the ‘unnatural’ narratology umbrella (which include 
Richardson, the coiner of ‘temporal curiosity’) have sought to rebel against 
Fludernik’s naturalization of the unfamiliar. Richardson, for instance, affirms 
that ‘unnatural narratives produce a defamiliarization of the basic elements of 
narrative’ — positing their stance as a reclamation of Shklovski’s ostranenie 
and of the paradoxical negative knowledge of narrative obtained through its 
strangest and most curious variants.126 
  Fludernik, replying to some of their objections, resorted to an amusing 
culinary metaphor to compare her approach and that of the unnatural 
                                                          
125 Monika Fludernik, Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 18. 
126 Richardson, ‘What is Unnatural Narrative Theory?’, pp. 23-40 (p. 34). 
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narratologists: while she tends ‘to concentrate on the overall taste, ignoring 
some of the ingredients’, the others ‘savour the tinge of spice that conflicts 
with the overall familiar blandness of the pudding’. 127  This rather self-
deprecating description could be taken by her foes as an admission of the 
baby-food-like quality of some of the cognitivist approaches, with their 
obsession with the “flour” of narrative. It is perhaps fairer to say that the main 
problem of Fludernik’s metaphor is that in her example spice is seen as a 
mere footnote or a companion to blandness rather than as its enemy,  ignoring 
the possibility that the ‘spice’ might utterly transform the pudding, even 
make it inedible — or a purgative. 
 
‘Temporal curiosities’: fabula/sjuzhet in autobiography 
 
The previous (incomplete) survey of the contribution of narrativist 
approaches to generic definition debates has highlighted the role of narrative 
temporality as a criteria to describe the genre — even if most critics from 
Lejeune onwards recognise that autobiography does not have a “defining” 
temporal structure, and that it shares its narrative model with fictional 
confessions. Northrop Frye, for instance, subsumed fictional and non-fictional 
autobiography under the macro-generic category of the ‘confession’.128 
                                                          
127 Fludernik, ‘How Natural is Unnatural Narratology; or What is Unnatural about Unnatural Narratology?’, 357-
370 (p. 362). 
128 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 307. 
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 Frye might have been an influence on a pioneering study of the 
temporal structure of autobiography by Jean Starobinski, in which 
autobiography is also characterised as a confession. For him, what defines 
autobiography is change: 
 
It is the internal transformation of the individual [...] which 
furnishes a subject for a narrative discourse in which “I” is both 
subject and object [...] The narrator describes not only what 
happened to him at a different time in his life, but above all  how 
he became [...] what he presently is. [...] The trace of experiences 
traces a path (though a sinuous one) which ends in the present 
state of recapitulatory knowledge.129 
 
 
Confessional narratives are both teleological (that is, directed towards the 
present self, rather than episodic) and linear (hence the metaphor of the 
‘path’). They would thus conform to Ricoeur’s model of emplotment, with the 
“converted” present self configuring the chaos of the line, which nonetheless 
tends to be dutifully respected and followed. Lejeune’s definition also used 
retrospection as a defining criterion for autobiography. The seeming 
inevitability of retrospection in autobiography has lead Dorrit Cohn to claim 
present-tense first-person narratives as exclusive to fiction, making it a rare 
case of a textual criterion being used for generic definition: one, however, that 
                                                          
129  Jean Starobinski, ‘The Style of Autobiography’, in Autobiography (see Broughton, above), pp. 158-167 (p. 162) 
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present-tensed narratives such as Fils and Le Grand Incendie de Londres seek to 
subvert.130   
As to chronology (in narratological terms, the coincidence of fabula and 
sjuzhet), its pervasiveness has tended to be put into question far more often. 
Lejeune, for instance, believes it tends to be chosen not so much because it is 
natural (as some theorists would have it) but because of reasons of 
 
verisimilitude, convention, facility. Any original inquiry into the 
structure of the narrative awakens the mistrust of the reader, 
who perceives something contrived, whereas the use of 
traditional narrative gives him the impression this is a personal 
experience.131 
 
Lejeune nonetheless mentions that even canonical autobiography involves a 
certain degree of anachrony, although it is one based on ‘the relationship 
between the present of the writing, and the past narrated by the writing’.132 
Lejeune refers here to the frequent returns autobiographers make to the 
present of the narrative (usually to excuse the frailty of their memories). 
Lejeune sees it as a kind of affectation than only Stendhal and Chateaubriand 
have approached with seriousness. These types of anachronies are, however, 
something more than a harmless deviation from chronology. Up to a point, 
they superimpose a certain circularity or spirality (the difference is important) 
onto the line of chronology: the beginning announces the safe final 
                                                          
130 Cohn’s other textual criteria to tell autobiographies and first person novels apart is narratorial unreliability, as 
she claims autobiographers are never consciously unreliable as fictional narrators are. The problem of this 
approach is that it overplays the innocence and earnestness of autobiography, denying that the genre might wish 
to deconstruct itself deliberately. See Cohn, Distinction, pp. 109-131. 
131 Lejeune, On Autobiography, p. 71. 
132 Lejeune, On Autobiography,  p. 72 
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destination of the book, which is reached at the very end. The problem with 
this approach lies in the problematic distance that underpins that structure, 
which is actually rather precarious. 
Deconstructive approaches to confession, such as those of Mark Currie, 
have highlighted the problematic character of these temporal frontiers 
between present and past selves. As he points out, confessional narratives 
 
[E]ntail a steady decrease in temporal distance between the 
narrator and the narrated, and this must necessarily entail the 
erosion of the moral distance between confessor and 
confessed.133 
 
The structure itself destroys any pretences of presence: 
 
The nature of the confessional narrative is to offer an unfolding 
allegory of temporal distance in the act of self-narration. It 
presents an example of the collapse of all temporal distance in 
self-narration.134 
 
Distance (and its ability to create Ricoeurian concordance out of the line) 
needs to be questioned: the model of the confession is not really a source of 
stable knowledge but another figure akin to the whirligig. Currie’s 
observations about the confession can indeed be applied to some of our 
curiosities: Marías, for instance, highlights the unstable nature of conversion 
by structuring his novel as an ‘event’ or ‘change’  (or maybe two) which 
cannot be placed in the narrative, and which disturbs the neat distribution of 
past and present selves. 
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 However, we started this study by pointing at a different source for 
our ‘temporal curiosities’: their ‘forays’ against the mimetic model of 
temporality based on the distinction between fabula and sjuzhet (the basis of 
the study of narrative temporality since Russian Formalism). In that model, 
fabula (the embodiment of linear time in the text) is assumed to precede the 
sjuzhet, which “scrambles” or “shuffles” it as if it were a pack of cards. As 
Frank Kermode pointed out, this is in fact a critical fiction: the fabula never 
had ‘an independent anterior existence’. In fact the natural state of packs of 
cards (except in their first boxed existence) is disorder, which is the engine 
itself of many games (particularly Patience-style ones), which involve a 
reconstruction (through innumerable obstacles) of the pack’s order. 
Fabula should perhaps be read as one of the ‘ends’ of the game of 
narrative rather than as a natural or pre-existent right order.135 David Herman 
also observes how ‘the order of telling also bears crucially — indeed, alters — 
the matter told’.136  Although common-sense would argue that there is, after 
all, a fabula to autobiography, Herman’s observation should make us wary of 
jumping at that conclusion. Cohn has nonetheless proposed a ‘tri-level model’ 
for historical narratives which distinguishes between 
‘reference/story/discourse’:   
 
                                                          
135 About this, see also Richard Walsh, ‘Fabula and Fictionality in Narrative Theory’, Style, 35.4 (2001)  592-609 for 
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136 Herman, Story Logic, p. 214. 
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Outside the realm of fiction, the synchronous interplay of story 
and discourse is undergirded —no matter how shakily— by the 
logical and chronological priority of observed events.137 
 
However, there might be no such thing as a ‘logical and chronological’ 
referent for autobiography: it is not only inaccessible for the reader but it is 
not a proof of the referential character of the text. 
Perhaps the most interesting redefinitions of the fabula/sjuzhet model 
for our curiosities are those which have not sought to add yet another element 
to the dichotomy, but to undo it. Emma Kalafenos described the temporality 
of postmodern narratives as indeterminate, as they hinder the reconstruction of 
a fabula out of the sjuzhet, or viceversa.138 Richardson develops Kalafenos’s 
observation to propose a typology of ‘violations of realistic temporality’ 
which include circular temporal structures (such as that of Finnegans Wake), 
contradictory temporalities (Coover’s “The Babysitter”), antinomic or 
backwards (Amis’s Time’s Arrow), differential (in which a chronology is 
superimposed on another, as in Woolf’s Orlando), conflated (where different 
temporal zones fail to remain distinct) and dual or multiple (when different 
plotlines take a different amount of time to unfold, as in Midsummer’s Night 
Dream). 139 However, in a close reading, none of our ‘temporal curiosities’ 
really fit Richardson’s categories: indeed, they might be more aptly described 
by another reformulation of the fabula/sjuzhet model, that of David Herman, 
who proposed the category of polychrony to account for the occasions when 
                                                          
137 Cohn, Distinction, p. 115. 
138 Kalafenos, ‘Toward...’, 380-408. 
139 See Richardson, ‘Beyond Story and Discourse’, pp.47-63. 
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‘readers can sometimes be prompted to assign storyworld events not a 
definite but only a more or less determinate location in the story’s timeline’.140 
Polychronic narrations ‘order events in a fuzzy or indeterminate way’.141 
Herman notes that polychrony should be separated from what Genette 
denominated achrony or timelessness: ‘not knowing the exact temporal 
positions of several events occurring within a larger narrative sequence does 
not make those events achronic’.142 Herman’s model seems to initially account 
for some of the more perplexing aspects of our examples: the coronation, for 
instance, would have an indeterminate place in the ‘discourse’ of Dark Back of 
Time. It is interesting to contrast the complexity and richness of his approach 
to temporality with the deliberate simplicity of his definition of 
autobiography: polychrony might make the speech-act of ‘telling someone 
about oneself’ impossible or deluded. 
I will return to the different models of temporal order throughout the 
analysis of the three texts in order to consider them in practice. As I 
mentioned in the introduction, approaches such as Richardson’s or Herman’s 
do not take into consideration how self-reflexive structures such as mise en 
abyme may also disrupt chronology and its possible reconstruction from a 
scrambled discourse. Although the next section is devoted to incorporate mise 
en abyme into the debate on autobiographical definition, the device also has 
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important consequences for temporal structure — as our curiosities will come 
to show. 
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A Way In: mise en abyme and the theory of autobiography 
 
And so we wearily return to the start of our tour of the postcard display, its 
inevitable end. The metaphor itself excluded the possibility of any particular 
destination to our argument, dismissing any purgatorial aspirations for the 
definitional hell: it was inevitably a torture (the word appropriately coming 
from the Latin tortura, meaning ‘twisting, wreathing, torment, torture’) ― 
perhaps a self-torture.143 A possible “solution” to this hell of classification (it 
is doubtful it can be actually “solved”) might involve something more than an 
aerial approach — perhaps a metaphor swap.   
 Returning to Vilain’s story of the hold-up, he used a particularly apt 
adjective to describe the astonished attitude of the clients trapped inside the 
bank. The hold-up — he proceeds to describe — took place in front of 
‘dumbfounded customers’ (‘clients médusés’ in French) ‘who, not believing in 
the reality of the scene, didn’t move’.144 Much like future readers of the scene, 
paralysed in utter disbelief.  The main charm of the sentence, however, lies in 
the adjective ‘médusé’, with its invocation of the Perseus myth — a sort of 
warning of the dangers of paralysis inherent in autobiographical definition.   
If we then take Vilain’s cue and decide to see our dilemma not as a Hell 
but as a theoretical Medusa, possibilities of escape and defeat suddenly open 
up. It might be possible to defeat and behead the awkward question through 
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its reflection in a mirrored surface.   Or perhaps not: the shield alone was not 
enough for Perseus — he was also armed with flying sandals, an invisibility 
helmet and a sword.  Or ― changing the myth one more time ― could we trick 
it into turning itself into stone, like a basilisk, so that it can be contemplated at 
leisure, with no risk of paralysis whatsoever? 
The concluding section of our tour will be devoted to examine the 
possibilities and impossibilities of this sleight-of-hand myth swap when 
contemplating the problem of autobiography. Turning generic definition from 
revolving door to whirligig to Medusa is only, at best, a pseudo-solution: if it 
has been kept up the sleeve until this point, it is not because it solves the 
problem but rather because it mirrors it. Ultimately, the change of metaphor 
is only a deliberately clumsy, cack-handed trick used to introduce the figure 
of mirror-shield into the debates around the generic definition of 
autobiography — not in the form of Perseus’s mirror-shield but rather as a 
mirror within a shield, or a mise en abyme. 
That is indeed the most commonly used term to describe involuted 
narratives within narratives, and had its origin in a heraldic device which the 
creator of the term, André Gide, considered as the most perfect metaphor for 
what he was seeking to describe: a transposition ‘on the scale of the 
characters’ of ‘the very subject of that work. Nothing throws a clearer light 
upon or more surely establishes the proportions of the whole’.145  In heraldry, 
mise en abyme is used to describe a device ‘that consists in setting in the 
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scutcheon a smaller one ‘en abyme’ at the heart-point’ ( that is, a miniature of 
the shield within the shield).146 The aptness of the metaphor (which Gide 
prefers to others, such as the convex mirror that reflects the room in certain 
Flemish paintings) is due to its capacity to illustrate neatly the rhetorical 
figure of synecdoche, of which mise en abyme is a variant: the exact miniature 
of a whole that comes to stand for it, “explaining” it in the process.147 
The evolution of Gide’s term in narrative poetics has nonetheless 
belied the air of hermeneutical clarity with which its creator divested it. In The 
Mirror in the Text,  a comprehensive survey of the origin and evolution of the 
term, Lucien Dällenbach makes a distinction between this original meaning 
for the term (which he calls ‘elementary or simple duplication’) and other 
variants of the technique, such as paradoxical duplications (loop, Möbius 
strip-like structures such as that of the Recherche, in which the narrative 
inserted within the narrative is the first narrative itself, rather than a copy) 
and transcendental duplications, that is, the infinite regress structures to 
which the shield within the shield might give rise to, if the miniature shield 
also includes a miniature shield in its heart, ad infinitum.148 
Hence, the hermeneutical key that Gide discovered thus hid within 
itself a figure for the infinite and inconclusive character of interpretation, 
something which then problematizes the illuminating quality of its 
metaphorical moniker. Dällenbach, tracing the evolution of the device from 
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the practice of novelists associated with the Nouveau Roman such as Robbe-
Grillet, identifies a movement away from simple duplication into aporia in 
the use of mise en abyme, a movement that consequently disperses the neatness 
of Gide’s definition. For Jean Ricardou, for instance, mise en abyme ‘must now 
be considered as a range of practical and theoretical possibilities, rather than a 
notion to be rigorously and carefully employed.’149   
Much like autobiography, one might say. Ricardou’s redefinition of 
Gide’s term is thus particularly useful to our exploration of the parallels 
between mise en abyme and autobiography, as it points to a similar trajectory 
of dissolution and redefinition. The use of mise en abyme in autobiography has 
so far been analysed sporadically in relation to particular examples: Saunders, 
for example, frequently remarks on its appearance in some of the key 
Modernist “autobiografictional” texts. There is, however, no systematic study 
of the use of mise en abyme in autobiography (The Mirror in the Text is solely 
concerned with fictional texts), which could be explained by the fact that the 
device is not used any differently in autobiography than in fiction: it is, by no 
means, the much longed-for textual feature that will tell them apart. 
Its importance to autobiography and its theory lies otherwise, as we 
will see. The value of mise en abyme does not lie in its potential for solving the 
problem (it problematizes the idea of a solution itself) or stopping the 
whirligig, but rather in its ability to mirror it. The device is a figure of 
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definition, its mirror-shield rather than its Perseus—Medusa being resolutely 
undefeatable this time round. 
  
Despite the relative neglect of the figure, mise en abyme could be 
considered as a lurking presence throughout the history of autobiographical 
theory. For instance, if — as Lejeune humorously states — the 
autobiographical pact is comparable to ‘The Laughing Cow’, it is not only 
because of its catchiness and convenience. The comparison aptly conveys also 
how Lejeune’s solution may unfurl into infinity and aporia, as De Man alerted 
us: let us not forget that the famous cow has two boxes of ‘The Laughing 
Cow’ as earrings (mise en abyme is a perennial favourite of packaging 
designers). The pact was an engine to create whirligigs, rather than the tool to 
stop its spinning.150 
Its presence, however, can be discerned even further back. Gusdorf’s 
pioneering phenomenological and limit-based approach to the genre uses a 
mirror metaphor to describe the essence of its nature and its temporal 
structure: 
  
Any autobiography is a moment of the life that it recounts; it 
struggles to draw the meaning from that life, but it itself a 
meaning in the life. One part of the whole claims to reflect the 
whole, but it adds something to that to this whole of which it 
constitutes a moment. Some Flemish or Dutch painters of 
interior scenes depict a little mirror on the wall in which the 
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painting is repeated a second time; the image in the mirror does 
not only duplicate the scene but adds to it as a new dimension a 
distancing perspective. Likewise, autobiography is not a simple 
recapitulation of the past; it is also the attempt and the drama of 
a man struggling to reassemble himself in his own likeness at a 
certain moment in his history. This delivering up of earlier being 
brings a new stake into the game.151 
 
 
Gusdorf uses the same example to describe the impossibility of totality and 
closure in autobiography than Gide did to describe mise en abyme in his 
famous diary entry. Gusdorf and Gide concur that the value of the mirror in 
the painting lies in its ‘distancing’ abilities. The difference between them is 
found in Gusdorf’s identification of the incomplete character of the mirror-
view: transposed to autobiography, this means that the genre can never be a 
full synecdoche of the self — even if we concede, as Gusdorf did, that 
autobiography is a representation or a performance of a present self rather 
than a past one.152 
 When finally seeking to define the genre, Gusdorf thus comes to reject 
as criteria both its historical and truth value and its artistic merit. What he 
proposes instead as the best approach is what he terms 
 
[A] second critique that instead of verifying the literal accuracy 
of the narrative or demonstrating its artistic value would 
attempt to draw out its innermost, private significance by 
viewing it as the symbol [...] or the parable of a consciousness in 
search for its own truth.153 
 
 
                                                          
151 Gusdorf, I, pp.77-94 (p. 89). 
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Gusdorf here identifies the figural character of autobiography — as De Man 
will do years later. Their difference lies, of course, in Gusdorf’s insistence of 
the figure having an ‘innermost, private significance’ that the reader can 
access; whilst De Man, as we saw, saw that autobiography ‘demonstrates in a 
striking way the impossibility of closure and of totalization [...] of all textual 
systems made up of tropological substitutions’.154   Gusdorf identifies this 
impossible closure, but — perhaps disturbed by it — decides to act as if he 
had not seen it. The most striking sign of this distress, however, is to be found 
in the definition itself: I am referring here to the rather revealing hesitation 
between ‘symbol’ and ‘parable’. The use of the ambiguous conjunction ‘or’ 
(which can mean both ‘as well as’ and ‘instead of’) subtly points at the 
difficulties of each choice — and its consequences. 
In his 1971 essay ‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’, De Man discusses the 
differences between symbol and allegory (and a parable is but a sub-type of 
allegory) in a way which is particularly revealing not just to Gusdorf’s 
definition, but also to the problem of autobiography and its relation to mise en 
abyme.  De Man starts by remarking how Romanticism valorised the symbol 
over allegory because of its ‘intimate unity between the image that rises up 
before the senses and the supersensory totality the image suggests’. 155 
Gusdorf’s recourse to a similar rhetoric of intimacy and interiority suggests 
                                                          
154 De Man, ‘Autobiography’, I, pp. 264-274 (p. 266). 
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that he might predominantly see autobiography as symbol (rather than 
parable). 
 His hesitation, however, is very revelatory of how autobiography 
might escape the symbolic figural model. De Man moves to describe allegory 
as a temporal form, one that proposes a distanced, non-coincident model of 
figuration: 
 
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or 
identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in 
relation to its own origin, and renouncing the nostalgia and the 
desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of this 
temporal difference. In so doing, it prevents the self from an 
illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, 
though painfully, recognised as a non-self.156 
 
 
 Rereading Gusdorf’s definition in the light of De Man’s distinction, the 
symbolic mode feels more and more ill-fitting. If — as Gusdorf identifies —
autobiography is always at an inevitable temporal distance from the self it 
seeks to represent (or symbolise), the hesitation should probably be  resolved 
in favour of the parable: destroying thus the illusion of inner, deep 
knowledge of a self (be it present or past). As De Man points out, the 
Romantic preference for the symbol ‘will never be allowed to exist in serenity, 
since it is a veil over a light one no longer wishes to perceive, it will never be 
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able to gain an entirely good poetic conscience’.157 The parable acts here as the 
light — or the mirror — Gusdorf wishes to, but cannot unsee. 
This seemingly troubling relation between autobiography and the 
parable/allegory cannot also be dispelled by the exit-manoeuvre into 
narrative discussed in the previous section. It is interesting to read Gusdorf’s 
definition not only in relation to De Man’s distinction between allegory and 
symbol, but also to the (rather De Manian) unpicking of narrative that J. Hillis 
Miller undertakes in Ariadne’s Thread. Although speaking primarily of 
fictional narrative, his conclusions (unsurprisingly) can also be applied to 
autobiography. Miller’s book examines and questions the metaphors of 
narratology, of which the most important one is that of the line. For him, the 
term   
[N]arrative line is a catachresis. It is the violent, forced, or 
abusive importation of a term from another realm to name 
something which has no proper name. The relationship of 
meaning among all these areas of terminology is not from sign 
to thing but a displacement from one sign to another sign that in 
its turn draws its meaning from another figurative sign, in 
constant displacement. The name of this displacement is 
allegory. Storytelling, usually thought of as the putting into 
language of someone’s experience of life, is in its writing or 
reading a hiatus in that experience. Narrative is the allegorizing 
along a temporal line of this perpetual displacement from 
immediacy.158 
 
 
Miller and Gusdorf thus make the same observation about how 
narrative/autobiography opens a hiatus, a distance in relation to what it seeks 
                                                          
157 De Man, Blindness, p. 208. 
158 Miller, p. 21. 
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to reflect, but Miller (echoing De Man) plumps for allegory rather than 
symbol as the figure for this displacement. ‘Allegory [...] expresses the 
impossibility of expressing inequivocally, and so dominating, what is meant 
by experience or by writing’.159 
It could be argued, however, that Miller’s use of ‘expressing’ here 
somehow still allows for some form of meaning, albeit a negative one. This is 
a danger that Miller is fully aware of: as he mentions in the conclusion of his 
book, ‘The good reader will learn to distrust interpretations that claim to give 
reliable knowledge, even bracingly negative knowledge’. 160Miller’s strategy 
consists in not seeing this interpretation as the dead end it seems, but in 
spinning it further. 
One of these spinnings interestingly involves ‘Autobiography as De-
Facement’, which he uses to investigate not the relation between narrative 
and autobiography, but between narrative and death. Miller, following De 
Man, sees death as what ‘names the otherness that inhabits any figuration and 
makes its validity and purport uncertain’.161 But, as he points out, the word 
‘death’ is not the negative referent of narrative but is in itself a figure (‘a 
displaced name’, in De Man’s words) for what cannot be named: ‘a blind spot 
within knowledge’, De Man’s ‘defacement’. 162  Narrative (not just 
autobiography) is a form of prosopopeia, and ‘[s]uch prosopopeias are a form 
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of temporal allegory, a saying it otherwise, of the catachresis in the word 
death’. 163 
Death, however, is by no means, a final referent but another figure of 
figures, like autobiography, like allegory, like mise en abyme. The connection 
between these figural structures will be explicitly put into play in W and Dark 
Back of Time (albeit in very different ways) — I will consider their relation as 
described by De Man and Miller in their respective analyses. The parallels 
between these different models of “squared” figures will form an underlying 
thread to the obsessive reading of the three curiosities. 
 
Before starting that descent with mise en abyme as our pseudo-guide, it might 
be nonetheless wise to try to set some sort of outline of the figure and its 
identification — even if that identification later on proves faulty and 
emptying.  In that respect, Dällenbach (the Lejeune of mise en abyme) is a 
useful starting point. Significantly, he seeks to dissociate mise en abyme with 
both the symbol and allegory: 
 
The reflexion is not a symbol, since the relation between the 
literal and the metaphorical sense is instituted; neither it is an 
allegory, because the two meanings are not a priori 
interchangeable. It alone is neither opaque nor transparent, it 
exists in the form of a double meaning, who identification and 
deciphering presupposes a knowledge of the text. [...] The 
hermeneutic key  can never open up the reflexion until the 
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narrative has revealed the existence and the location of the 
reflexion.164 
 
What Dällenbach’s rather convoluted paragraph seems to imply is that mise en 
abyme differs from symbol and allegory because it is not immediate but 
delayed in its effects: it only comes into being once the reader is fully 
acquainted with the whole of the narrative, when it thus becomes the key to 
its interpretation.  But that is also the case of allegory, and indeed of any 
figure, as De Man and Miller would argue. At a later point, Dällenbach rejects 
the allegorical nature of mise en abyme because he is afraid that it might 
mangle the text’s polysemy by turning the whole into an allegory of its 
production (the sort of negative metaphysics that also troubled Miller). 
Despite this concern, Dällenbach nonetheless insists on considering the device 
‘a hermeneutic key’, which would make it also another threat to polysemy. 
Allegory, as De Man or Miller would point out, is potentially unfinished and 
unfinishable — like mise en abyme itself.   
The next question raised by the relation between allegory and mise en 
abyme is one of boundaries. Following the equation of mise en abyme and 
autobiography, it may be possible to read the whole of the three 
autobiographies as mise en abyme (or parables) of their referent. That reading, 
however, implies a peeping-out into some form of exteriority that is deeply 
problematic. In that respect, it is far more useful to start by keeping close to 
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Dällenbach’s neat boundaries, and study the device in relation to the whole of 
the narrative rather than to an external “self”. 
Dällenbach’s rules for identification involve two criteria: mise en abyme 
must be reflexive, mirror-like; but it also must be contained, fenced within the 
diegesis — that is, it must not be external to it, like a prologue or an authorial 
intervention, or a metalepsis. It can either be intradiegetic, that is, part of the 
narrative itself (his example is the suicide that Anna is a witness to in Chapter 
Eighteen of Anna Karenina) or metadiegetic, a suspension of the diegesis that 
does not involve a change of narrator or an ontological leap out of the book, 
such as narratives of dreams, ekphrastic descriptions of paintings, music (one 
of his examples is Vinteuil’s septet in the Recherche).165   It might thus be better 
to keep the curiosity within the curiosity distinct and contained:  not because 
that might be necessarily the “right” approach to the device, but because it 
highlights (and reflects) how problematic it is to draw boundaries on what is 
nothing more than a reflection of an “unborderable” genre. Dällenbach 
should perhaps take into consideration that even seemingly ‘contained’ 
examples might spill outside their frontiers, and thus question the need for 
such detailed border drawing. 
The thesis will also make use of other of Dällenbach’s taxonomies, 
particularly those that relate to the temporal order of mise en abyme and its 
effects in disturbing neat distinctions between story and discourse. By 
considering the paradoxical temporality of mise en abyme, this study will seek 
                                                          
165 Dällenbach, pp. 50-53. 
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to reintroduce discussions about reflexivity and its effects in the debate 
around narrative order and temporality waged between classical and post-
classical, natural/cognitive and unnatural/postmodern narratology. Heise 
mentions that the use of mise en abyme can create ‘a blurring of the time sense’ 
in readers: it is this blurring and its relation to other forms of temporal and 
generic indeterminacy that this thesis will seek to explore.166 
 
 
Returning to the curiosity and the tourniquet, we have witnessed how our 
metaphor has undergone several contretemps throughout the tour of the 
postcard display. It has seen itself as frivolous, as euphemistic, as deluded 
about its singularity.  But considering autobiography in relation to figural 
language, allegory or mise en abyme could be argued to prove, up to a point, 
that the metaphor is also useful as an approach to autobiography. Perhaps it 
manages to convey what De Man had termed the ‘striking’ way that 
autobiography has to demonstrate ‘the impossibility of closure and 
totalization’. 
The ‘striking’ quality of autobiography could be read as the opposite of 
the ‘curiosity’, that is, autobiography’s innocence and good will (the way it 
does not realise what it is really doing), but De Man’s choice of ‘Essay upon 
Epitaphs’ as his ‘prototypical autobiography’ reveals that he did not conceive 
the genre as naive but rather as self-aware and precocious.  The ‘striking’ 
                                                          
166 Heise, p. 60. 
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quality of Wordsworth’s essay, or our three examples, could be said to lie in 
the way they defamiliarize the genre, and make it curious. Rather than feeling 
chastised by parental admonitions, our examples behave with the insouciance 
of elder siblings flaunting the advantages of  superior age — and, in the 
process, reveal innocence to be only seemingly simple and transparent. 
There remains, however, the question of the torturous 
tourniquet/whirligig. Reconfiguring autobiography as a curiosity is as blatant 
a displacement as the autobiographical pact, the miraculous hybrid or the ‘life 
is a novel’ thesis of the narrativists. Curiosities might prompt obsession, but 
perhaps not torture or nausea. Restoring mise en abyme into autobiography is 
an important step in order to avoid a misleading rhetoric of release and 
resolution that the theory of autobiography has adopted perhaps too 
unquestioningly:  renaming the device as a ‘curiosity’ somehow undoes the 
step, and reveals us as timid and cowardly when faced with the whirligig as 
the rest.  Should we thus discard it altogether?  After all, the examples of 
curiosity in our three texts (particularly the wooden aide-de-camp) were not 
only examples of defamiliarization of the ordinary, but also of how this 
defamiliarization created torturous whirligigs of readerly obsession. The 
answer, of course, needs to wait for the analyses of our examples and for 
whatever conclusion they lead us to — if they indeed can conclude at all. 
They might only keep on spinning. 
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Chapter Two 
The octopus-lamp: Vladimir Nabokov’s Speak, Memory 
(1951/1966) 
 
Neither in environment nor in heredity can I find the 
exact instrument that fashioned me, the anonymous 
roller that pressed upon my life a certain intricate 
watermark whose unique design becomes visible when 
the lamp of art is made to shine through life’s foolscap. 
[A]ll poetry is positional: to try to express one’s position 
in regard to the universe, is an immemorial urge. The 
arms of consciousness reach out and grope, and the 
longer they are, the better. Tentacles, not wings, are 
Apollo’s natural members. 
Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory.
1 
 
And so to our first curiosity: Vladimir Nabokov’s Speak, Memory and its octopus-
lamp. Let us recall that our lamp was but an ordinary — even ugly — ceiling lamp 
which was elevated to the heights of the curious and the wondrous by a well-
applied metaphor. This almost underhand performance of the defamiliarizing 
potential of figural language, disguised as a gentle laugh at a tutor’s bad taste,  gains 
sudden significance when read in relation to Nabokov’s pronouncements about ‘the 
lamp of art’ and the ‘tentacles’ of poetry. It is tempting to read the tentacled flight (or 
pseudo-flight) of our lamp as a fusion of the two motifs: the emblem of Speak, 
Memory itself — an Apollonian elevation of the also ‘painfully bourgeois’ genre of 
autobiography to ceiling heights.2 
                                                          
1
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 14 and p. 169. 
2
 I do not use ‘Apollonian’ here in the Nietszchean sense, although one wonders if Nabokov’s reference to Apollo is merely 
the repetition of a cliché or if it is intended to create philosophical resonances in the passage. The other option, considering 
that Apollo does not tend to be represented as bewinged, is that he is referring to the Apollo genus butterflies to which the 
book’s  frontispiece emblem, the Parnassius Mnemosyne (Clouded Apollo), belongs to. 
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This lamp might perhaps shed some light on the concerns explored in the 
previous chapter — the nature of figuration and its relation to the problematic 
definition of autobiography as a distinct genre. The octopus-lamp — the elevated 
version of the watermark-revealing ‘lamp of art’ — could be used to justify a 
definition of Speak, Memory as a perfect specimen of autobiography as it was 
described by Gusdorf or Ricoeur. The lamp reveals selfhood, makes it transparent 
and grabs hold of it. The tentacles perform Ricoeur’s ‘concordance of the discordant’ 
and cancel out chronology (the principle anagrammatic philosopher Vivian 
Bloodmark calls ‘cosmic synchronization’).3 If this is the case, it might not be possible 
to collect it as a curiosity — that is, as a figure of the impossible generic definition of 
autobiography and the whirligigs of figuration 
  Our octopus, however, is not really flying. It isn’t groping anything either. As 
a sample-lamp, it might not even be switched on, or illuminating anything. Its 
appearance in the book lacks fanfare: it is brief, incomplete and seemingly irrelevant, 
a throwaway piece of social observation. It is not followed by philosophical 
meditations on the nature of time, or by explicit statements of Nabokov’s poetics; but 
by another seemingly inconsequential anecdote.  Lenski, the tutor, takes Nabokov 
and his brother to meet his fiancée in the same secretive way as he had taken them to 
meet the lamp: the anecdote ends with an inventory separated by “ands”, a 
rhetorical device usually termed polysyndeton. 
                                                          
3
 Nabokov, p. 169. Vivian Bloodmark is an anagram of Vladimir Nabokov. Other examples in other books include Vivian 
Darkbloom in Lolita or Baron Klim Avidov in Ada. See Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 2 and Vladimir 
Nabokov, Ada or Ardor: A Family Chronicle (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 175. 
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[H]e urged us to keep his bride’s presence in Berlin secret from our 
parents, and a mechanical manikin in the pharmacy window was going 
through the motions of shaving, and tramcars screeched by, and it was 
beginning to snow.4 
 
According to Gennady Barabtarlo the device creates a ‘“fleeting”, slightly gasping 
diction’ and is used to convey ‘cinematically sliding images’ which ‘are not 
supposed to make a perfectly logical sequence’. 5  This inventory is particularly 
dispersed and flurry-like. Whilst the metaphor of the octopus-lamp grabbed together 
two major self-referential motifs (the ‘lamp’ and the ‘tentacles’ of art), the list collects 
disjointed elements (both uncanny and familiar) but leaves their connections blank, 
undecided. It weakens the comfortable grip of the metaphorical tentacle, confirming 
the illusory nature of “flights” into knowledge or meaning. Emblems, definitions, 
conclusions are always fleeting in Speak, Memory — like Proust’s bumblebee, they are 
distracted or diverted from their pollinating and meaning-making duties. 
These two scenes articulate what makes Speak, Memory not only “curious”, but 
also a paradoxically illuminating demonstration of the issues at stake in the generic 
definition of autobiography: the fleetingness of presence and meaning, the difficult 
balance between concordance and discordance, the prevalence of indeterminacy and 
paradox. The book’s singularity does not lie in the way it “crosses” any particular 
                                                          
4
 Nabokov, Speak, Memory, p. 124. See Gennady Barabtarlo’s study of Pnin, Phantom of Fact, for a brief study of the device 
and its origin (Nabokov identifies its use in Dickens). See Gennady Barabtarlo, Phantom of Fact: A Guide to Nabokov’s Pnin 
(Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1989), p. 107. 
5
 Barabtarlo, p. 107. 
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generic boundary, or the way it freshens up a tired genre, or the way it replaces 
linear time and linear narrative for a poetic, achronic, timeless, transcendent 
alternative. Rather, it proposes an aesthetic which flickers between gathering and 
dispersal in which mise en abyme devices (and couldn’t we read our octopus-lamp as 
one?) play an important role in the book’s generic and temporal definition and 
indefinition. 
The chapter starts by considering the question of the book’s genre and the 
critical debates it has given rise to: debates which seem odd or perverse in the light 
of the book’s clear and seemingly unambiguous self-definition as either a ‘memoir’ 
(in its first version of the book, from 1951) or an ‘autobiography’ (in its definitive 
1966 version).6 I will seek to explain the slippery quality of the book’s generic status 
by examining in detail a paratextual definitional mise en abyme and the problematic 
entry it provides into the text’s aesthetic of dispersed gathering.  The second part is a 
deliberately obsessive peering into the book’s inaugural mise en abyme, which I will 
use to discuss not only questions of genre but also to try to discern how the textual 
model it presents is articulated in terms of temporal structure, particularly in 
relation to the tension between chronology, anachrony and achrony. The third part 
tries to ascertain what happens to that model in the book’s conclusion, when the text 
seems to provide the reader with a “final” word about its generic status and its 
ultimate aesthetic and moral significance. 
 
                                                          
6
 See Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory: A Memoir (London: Gollancz, 1951) and note 12 of the Introduction. 
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The cornerstone: generic definition in Speak, Memory 
 
The apparently unequivocal generic markers of Speak, Memory should have — in 
theory — spared the critic from the tortures of definition. The story about the true 
“parentage” of Doubrovsky’s autofiction has nonetheless taught us not to place 
excessive trust in paratextual self-definitions: their authority can be easily 
overturned by the discovery of a secret, archival, uncanny “original”. This was also 
the case with Speak, Memory: the posthumous publication in 1998 of ‘Chapter Sixteen’ 
or ‘On Conclusive Evidence’ — a mock-review which Nabokov had planned as the 
concluding chapter of the book — revealed that, before the book was ever called a 
‘memoir’, it was actually described as a ‘unique freak as autobiographies go’.7 
According to Brian Boyd’s biography, the reason for its exclusion was that 
‘Nabokov decided the deception of the reviewer’s mask clashed with the integrity of 
the memoirist’.8 Although Boyd backs this remark with archival evidence, there is 
nonetheless something problematic about his explanation — particularly his 
equating of the book’s referential status with its ‘integrity’. It might be more 
deceitful to call the book a ‘memoir’. Nabokov had initially thought very highly of 
this chapter: rather than considering it an unnecessary — and even dangerous —
supplement, ‘Third Person’ (its original title) was planned as the book’s apex rather 
                                                          
7
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 247. 
8
 Brian Boyd, Vladimir Nabokov: The American Years (London: Vintage, 1993), p. 148. 
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than as an appendix.9 In a letter to Katharine E. White, Nabokov described the 
concluding chapter as the book’s ‘summit’, a gathering of ‘the various themes 
running through the book’.10 
As an approach to generic definition and self-definition, the chapter is 
deliberately and explicitly paradoxical, as Boyd points out: 
 
[T]hough he adopts the mask of an imagined reviewer, Nabokov offers 
us more ― and more direct ― guidance to the understanding of one of 
his works than he would ever provide in all the forewords and 
afterwords of his novels.11 
 
For Boyd, the chapter is a hermeneutical key despite its deceit:  we may wonder 
whether it is not because of the mask that Nabokov offers such an insight. Any 
curious reader or re-reader would have detected the book’s motifs, but — had it not 
been for the mask — we would have missed the nuances of Nabokov’s approach to 
generic definition.12 ‘Chapter Sixteen’ performs the ambiguous status of the generic 
tag described in ‘The Law of Genre’: it speaks in a different voice; in this case, the 
reviewer presents himself as a casual acquaintance, an insider and an outsider, 
authorised and dubious. 13   The reviewer is a “sock puppet”, but one with the 
                                                          
9
 White was his editor at the New Yorker. Letter to Katharine E. White, 27 November 1949, in Vladimir Nabokov, Selected 
Letters: 1940-1977, ed. by Dmitri Nabokov and Matthew J. Bruccoli, (London: Vintage, 1989), p.95. 
10
 Nabokov, Selected Letters, p. 94. 
11
 Brian Boyd, ‘Introduction’, in Vladimir Nabokov, Speak, Memory (London: Everyman’s Library, 1999), p. xxiv. 
12
 For instance, some of the earliest critical essays on the book by Elizabeth Bruss, Janet Gezari, G.M. Hyde and Dabney 
Stuart remark on the importance of the colour/jewel theme, the exile/nostalgia/memory of memory strand.  See Bruss, pp. 
152-154, Janet Gezari, ‘Chess Problems and Narrative Time in Speak, Memory’, Biography, 10.2 (1987), 151-162, G.M. Hyde, 
Vladimir Nabokov: America’s Russian Novelist (London: Boyars, 1977), pp. 153-154 and Dabney Stuart, Nabokov: The 
Dimensions of Parody (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984), pp 183-190 . 
13
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 251. 
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uncanny quality of the ventriloquist’s dummy violently turning against his or her 
master. The fact that the reviewer compares Conclusive Evidence (as its equal) to a 
made-up sentimental childhood memoir  — When Lilacs Last by Barbara Braun  — 
creates a smudge in what initially seemed a revealing ‘lamp’ for the intentions of 
author, creating a whirligig right at the point when it seems to be rescuing readers 
from them.14 
The next question raised by this discovery is whether the book’s self-
definition as a ‘unique freak’ should be approached with equal suspicion. The tag 
forms part of a negative definition of Speak, Memory: 
A unique freak as autobiographies go, Mr Nabokov’s book is easier to 
define in terms of what it is not than in terms of what it is. It is not, for 
instance, one of those garrulous, formless and rambling affairs, heavily 
relying on a diarist’s notes, that experts in other arts or the 
administrators of our public existence are apt to produce (‘Wednesday 
night, around 11.40, General so-and-so telephoned. I said to him ―’). 
Nor is it a professional writer’s kitchen, with bits of unused material 
floating in a tepid brew of literary and personal stuff. Emphatically, it is 
not the popular slick kind of reminiscences where the author keys 
himself up to the lofty level of grade-C fiction, and with quiet 
impudence sets down reams and reams of dialogue (Maw and the 
neighbour. Maw and the children. Bill and Paw, Bill and Picasso) which 
no human brain could have preserved in anything approaching that 
particular form.15 
 
 The three negative examples are scathing parodies of autobiography at its worst: its 
name-dropping tendencies, its formlessness, its use of artificial narrative devices 
(such as dialogues). Those three negatives are defined against Speak, Memory’s 
                                                          
14
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 261.  In the Lolita screenplay, Charlotte recommends a novel called When the Lilacs Last to Humbert:  
the book is a   sentimental, pseudo-Freudian affair that Lolita dismisses as silly nonsense. See Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita: A 
Screenplay, (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 1974), p. 47. 
15
Nabokov, Speak, p. 247. 
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positive according to a mixture of both aesthetic and referential criteria. The three 
negatives allow the reader to define Speak, Memory as the exact counter-example of 
those parodies. Not only does the book reuse material from the fiction, it also uses 
dialogue sparingly (Galya Diment compares Nabokov’s memories to ‘silent movies’) 
and has a convoluted temporal structure.16 It stands as an ideal middle between two 
deluded approaches to autobiography which only produce illusions of truth. The 
negative definition is nonetheless deliberately non-committal, in contrast to the 
surprisingly orthodox attitude towards the referential status of the genre that the 
reviewer adopts in other parts of the chapter. He is certain that Nabokov’s intentions 
were ‘to stick to the truth through thick and thin’ and grandly claims that the book’s 
components ‘belong to unadulterated life’. 17   
‘Chapter Sixteen’ thus proposes an uneasy conciliation between referential 
and aesthetic truth as the basis of autobiography. The reader, however, should never 
lose sight of the fact that these seemingly “defining” statements do not come from 
the author, but from a distant “acquaintance” with a taste for kitsch. Considering 
that the most common approach to Speak, Memory is to regard it as a kind of 
superlative anomaly in the history of autobiography (Boyd describes it as ‘the most 
artistic of autobiographies’), it is intriguing to consider that the original of these 
claims could have been intended as a parody of the delusions of individuality and 
novelty of the autobiographical manifesto.18 
                                                          
16
 Galya Diment, ‘Vladimir Nabokov and the Art of Autobiography’, in Nabokov and his Fiction: New Perspectives, ed.by 
Julian W. Connolly (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 36-53 (p. 43). 
17
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 248. 
18
 Boyd, ‘Introduction’,p ix. 
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The temptation to read ‘Chapter Sixteen’ as the paradoxically “truer” 
authorial intervention needs to be resisted: not only because of its unstable meaning, 
but also because of Nabokov’s ultimate rejection of its strategies. This chapter’s 
surprising self-awareness now lives side-by-side with the rather different approach 
to generic definition that Nabokov finally adopted throughout the three editions of 
the book: the 1951 Conclusive Evidence/Speak, Memory (UK title), the 1954 Russian 
translation Drugie Berega and the 1966 Speak, Memory: An Autobiography Revisited. 
In the published paratexts, the discomforts of definition are shrugged off 
perhaps too easily, as if the solution to the revolving door merely involved finding 
an alternative entrance.  Nabokov provided his texts with unambiguous tags; and 
the forewords of both English editions equate autobiography with truth and fidelity 
to an external referent..19  The bare and succinct 1951 “Author’s Note” starts by 
announcing that ‘This account of the author’s European past is as truthful as he 
could possibly make it. If there are any lapses, they are due to the frailty of memory, 
not to the trickery of art’.20 The more garrulous 1966 Foreword also insists on the 
book’s utmost quasi-scientific fidelity to a verifiable reality, a fidelity that needs to be 
respected to the point of sacrificing art (‘What I still have not been able to rework 
through want of specific documentation, I have now preferred to delete for the sake 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
19
 Nabokov seems to use ‘memoir’ and ‘autobiography’ interchangeably.  The match-theme episode, which discusses ‘the 
true purpose of autobiography’, was not changed from one version to another and Nabokov called it an autobiography in 
letters to Edmund Wilson.  See Simon Karlinsky, ed., The Nabokov-Wilson Letters 1940-1971 (New York: Harper&Row, 1980), 
p. 188. 
20
 Nabokov, Speak, Memory: A Memoir, p. 7. 
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of over-all truth’).21 After all, the book’s first title was the rather forensic-sounding 
Conclusive Evidence.22 Although not many critics subscribe to this vision of the book 
as a bare record of facts (not even the author does), the strategy of simply calling the 
book ‘autobiography’ in order not to linger at the door for too long survives in many 
critical accounts.23 
 As I previously mentioned, a curious effect of Nabokov’s final decision to 
avoid a singularising approach resulted in a critical consensus about that particular 
point, although the genre of Speak, Memory has always felt far more difficult to pin 
down.  Even those who tend to define it as an autobiography take refuge in the 
book’s singularity as a sort of antidote. A good example of this approach is Galya 
Diment’s ‘Vladimir Nabokov and the Art of Autobiography’. The article (written 
before the publication of Chapter Sixteen) is surprisingly close to the mock-review, 
even to the point of also using Stephen Spender’s memoirs as a counter-example.24 
Diment dismisses critical readings that label the book as fiction and describes it as an 
anomaly, ‘the most typical autobiography in the history of world literature’ — 
echoing Shklovsky’s dictum about Tristram Shandy. Both books ‘skilfully and artfully 
uncover the otherwise concealed devices present in other works of the same genre’: 
                                                          
21
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 7. The puzzles and riddles include a little poem about the index, a second chess problem (of the 
retroactive type) and a puzzling reference to ‘Hazel Brown (who, moreover, shares my passport)’. See Nabokov, Speak, p. 7. 
The solution is Nabokov’s eyes, which were of that colour. As to Nabokov’s sacrifices in the rewriting, see Boyd, The 
American Years, p. 504. 
22
 The blandness of its shell nonetheless conceals a flavoursome palindromic middle: ive-evi. 
23
 A recent example is Will Norman, Nabokov, History and the Texture of Time (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 65. 
24
 Although published in 1999, after the New Yorker publication, the article only mentions the mock-review in a footnote 
and barely quotes from it. This omission is explained in a post Diment wrote on 2 January 1999 to the Nabokov-L forum in 
which she mentions that she had just written an article on the subject, and that she wished she had been able to read the 
chapter whilst she was writing it, as it is the only mention Nabokov makes of Spender in print.  See Galya Diment, Post to 
Nabokov-L, 2 January 1999, Nabokov-L online <https://listserv.ucsb.edu/lsv-cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind9901&L=NABOKV-
L&P=R81&1=NABOKV-L&9=A&J=on&d=No+Match%3BMatch%3BMatches&z=4  > [accessed 1 April 2013]. 
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for her, ‘Nabokov attempts not only to make his memory speak but also forces it to 
analyze itself’.25 
Diment goes on to discuss how Nabokov underscores the artificial nature of 
certain autobiographical devices, such as dialogue. Comparing Nabokov to Spender, 
she concludes that the latter ‘seems to endanger the “factual” side of his narrative to 
the point where his allegedly “real” facts are quickly becoming “invented”, “fictional” 
facts’.26 Similarly, Nabokov’s disclosure of his compositional method (spiral patterns, 
thematic motifs) 
[C]hallenges autobiographers like Spender to confess than in 
structuring their lives in a conventionally defined spiral manner they 
are often governed not by their “true” experiences but by equally 
compositional demands.27 
 
For all her initial dismissal of those who have read the book as fiction  — critics such 
as Dabney Stuart — Diment’s position is at times quite De Manian: she describes 
Speak, Memory as a meta-autobiography or an anti-autobiography, an exposé of the 
illusions of reference in autobiography and the arbitrary rules that govern it.28 She 
nonetheless fails to take the conclusion further and ask whether once autobiography 
is exposed we can still think of it as a separate genre. She seems to imply we can, but 
probably in the same way that she writes about the factual, the real, or the fictional: 
in inverted commas — the typographical Virgils leading critics out of the hell of 
definition. 
                                                          
25
 Diment, ‘Art of Autobiography’, pp. 36-53 (p. 37). 
26
 Diment, ‘Art of Autobiography’, pp. 36-53 (p. 43). 
27
 Diment, ‘Art of Autobiography’, pp. 36-53 (p. 46). 
28
 Diment, ‘Art of Autobiography’, pp. 36-53 (p. 36). 
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Diment supports her argument in favour of autobiography also by referring 
to Nabokov’s ‘strong opinions’ on memory and the imagination. 29  In these 
interviews, Nabokov presents the relation between the imagination, truth and 
writing in a manner reminiscent of Keats (such as Keats’s assertion that ‘What the 
imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth — whether it existed before or not’).30 
Nabokov seeks to reverse the opposition between ‘pure’ or ‘unadulterated’ life and 
its representation by making the model itself into a copy. He explains that he regards 
‘the objective existence of all events as a form of impure imagination […] Whatever 
the mind grasps, it does so with the assistance of creative fancy’31. Imagination is 
described as 
[A] form of memory [...] When we speak of a vivid individual 
recollection we are paying a compliment not to our capacity of 
retention but to Mnemosyne’s mysterious foresight in having stored up 
this or that element which creative imagination may use when 
combining it with later recollections and inventions.32 
 
Diment uses this statement to allow autobiography to remain in an (inverted) 
com(m)a, half-dead, half-living: ‘If imagination is a “form of memory”, the facts 
remembered are […] facts “imagined”’.33 
                                                          
29
 Diment, ‘Art of Autobiography’, pp. 36-53 (pp. 41-42). 
30
 John Keats, Letter to Benjamin Bailey, 22 November 1817, in Maurice Buxton Forman, ed., The Letters of John Keats 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 67. Humbert Humbert wrote a paper called ‘The Proustian Theme in a Letter 
from Keats to Benjamin Bailey’, which for Sam Slote refers to aletter sent on the 22 November 1817. See Nabokov, Lolita, 
p.16 and Sam Slote, ‘On the Nabokovian Resonance of “The Proustian Theme in a Letter from Keats to Benjamin Bailey”’, 
English Text Construction, 2.2 (2009), 161-172. 
31
 Vladimir Nabokov, Strong Opinions (London: Penguin, 2011), pp. 66-67. 
32
 Nabokov, Strong Opinions, pp. 66-67. 
33
 Diment, ‘Art of Autobiography’, p. 41. The coma/comma pun is borrowed from Guillermo Cabrera Infante, who made it in 
his article ‘¡Ave Marías!’, El País, 27 July 1998, online version, 
<http://elpais.com/diario/1998/07/27/opinion/901490407_850215.html >[accessed 1 April 2013], not paginated. Also see 
Bruss, p. 129 for a similar point. 
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This appeal to the imagination also recalls narrativist arguments, which displace the 
referent from an outside reality into a narrative selfhood. Speak, Memory, however, 
might not simply be a more “enlightened” version of autobiography, as the 
consequence of that “enlightenment” might be the complete destruction of the genre. 
Elevation might just turn it into a grotesque parody of itself. 
Critics who opt to read Speak, Memory unambiguously as a fiction also make 
use of similar arguments to Diment. Dabney Stuart, for instance, argues that 
It is an autobiography, but it is not a record, or account of facts (that 
troublesome curbing one keeps stumbling over). It is imaginative 
narration in which events, actions […] are formed, shaped, and 
rendered significant by a single, ordering consciousness. It is, in short, 
fiction, a molding (fingere), not opposed to fact, […] but the way fact is 
born.34 
 
Stuart calls the totalising, all-ordering, octopus-like consciousness as a witness for 
his conciliatory generic definition, without perhaps taking into consideration that it 
might not be capable of ‘forming’, or ‘rendering’ events at all. Alongside the parallel 
approaches of Diment and Stuart, we also find pragmatic Lejeunian angles:  for 
Maurice Couturier, the book’s generic anomaly is found in its transgressions of the 
autobiographical contract — for instance, it introduces a second addressee (his wife 
Véra) in the conclusion of the book.35 
Speak, Memory has hardly ever been claimed as an autofiction, even though 
Nabokov’s initially described the book as ‘a new hybrid between [an autobiography] 
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 Maurice Couturier, ‘I, X Does not Equal Nabokov’, Zembla <http://www.libraries.psu.edu/nabokov/forians.htm> [accessed 
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and a novel. To the latter it will be affiliated by having a definite plot’.36 The hybrid 
quality of the book, however, has been pointed out by Jacqueline Hamrit in her 
Derridean reading of the book. For her, Speak, Memory ‘stages impurity of genre’: 
Nabokov ‘has superimposed imaginary, fictive scenes to recollections, 
contaminating truth and fiction, memory and imagination’.37 Although Hamrit is 
right in pointing at the self-consciously “created” quality of certain episodes, she 
perhaps fails to question how the idea of the “mixture” of autobiography and fiction 
is also problematized. 
The figure of the mixture, as we have seen, can prove to be a distraction from 
the structures of figuration which underpin it as a definition. Although there are 
studies of Nabokov’s use of specific metaphors in Speak, Memory, figuration and 
generic definition have tended not to be considered in relation to each other. 38 Only 
Maria Malikova has pointed out that connection: for her ‘autobiography is neither a 
“truthful” past, nor a fantasy, but rather a discourse of the past where events are 
expressed through tropes’.39  Although her assumption that events can really be 
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 Nabokov, Selected Letters, p. 69. Nabokov will not call it a hybrid again and in the next letter (to a different publisher) he 
calls it an inquiry and now blends ‘perfect personal truth with artistic selection’.  See Nabokov, Selected Letters, p. 88.The 
only critic that calls Speak, Memory an autofiction (a ‘photobiographic autofiction’, after Johnnie Gratton) is Laurence Petit. 
See Laurence Petit, ‘Speak, Photographs?: Visual Transparency and Verbal Opacity in Nabokov’s Speak, Memory’, Nabokov 
Online Journal, 3 (2009) <http://etc.dal.ca/noj/articles/volume3//04_Petit.pdf> [accessed 19 December 2012] ( p. 2). 
37
 Jacqueline Hamrit, ‘Play! Invent the World! Invent Reality!: Nabokov/Derrida’, Oxford Literary Review, 25 (2003), 157-177 
(pp. 162-163). 
38
 See for instance, Robert Alter’s analysis of illumination metaphors in Alter, ‘Nabokov and Memory’, Partisan Review, 58.4 
(1991), 620-629 (pp. 622-624) or Marina Grishakova’s survey of visual and cinematic metaphors. See Marina Grishakova, 
The Models of Time, Space and Vision in V. Nabokov’s Fiction: Narrative Strategies and Cultural Frames (Tartu: Tartu 
University Press, 2006), pp. 211-217. 
39
Maria Malikova as quoted and translated by Vladimir Mylnikov in his review of Auto-bio-grafiia (published in Russian in 
2002).  See Vladimir Mylnikov, ‘Vladimir Nabokov.Auto-bio-grafiia (review)’, Nabokov Studies, 8 (2004), 199-203 (p. 202). 
This book, the only monograph on the memoir, was written in Russian and unfortunately is not translated so I am unable to 
devote sufficient attention to Malikova’s theories (which I only know via Mylnikov’s review). 
 
121 
 
‘expressed’ through tropes seems naive, her conclusion points towards an 
alternative angle from which to observe the book’s genre. 
This incomplete survey of Speak, Memory’s generic definitions does 
demonstrate the difficulties in completely traversing the infernal whirligig (which 
explains why some of the approaches to the book in the last decade have tended to 
avoid the question altogether). 40  Their overreliance on extra-textual evidence — 
either letters or Strong Opinions — is problematic: as Michael Wood pointed out, 
‘these are only opinions, the simplifying testimony of an interested witness to a 
complex act’.41 The book’s unambiguous generic tags or its pseudo-scientific patter 
present a challenge also to an “indefinite” approach: they could be read as a 
deliberately inauthentic pose, which the complex self-awareness of the text belies; or 
they might reveal a Hamlet-like indecision about “murdering” the genre, perhaps 
because of its testimonial value. 
The analysis that follows seeks to restore the 1966 Foreword back into the 
critical debate on Speak, Memory’s generic status. This restoration does not involve 
reading it as the way out of the whirligig, but rather as a performance of this 
definitional impasse through complex figural structures. Mirror-shields or mise en 
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abymes — as figures of definition — are the starting point rather than the destination 
of our study (if it has one). 
 
The time-bomb: Mise en abyme in the 1966 Foreword 
 
The dynamics between collection and dispersal that we observed in the octopus-
lamp episode are equally at play in the seemingly placid 1966 Foreword. Its solid 
figures of definition might be initially read as ‘lamps’ revealing the text’s internal 
coherence as its defining feature. The foreword, however, cannot be said to have a 
definitional style. It lacks the unity its figures claim for the whole: alongside 
grasping tropes we find riddles, bibliographies, corrections and even a chess 
problem. The cryptic and the referential, the literal and the figural are employed side 
by side. 
This ambivalence needs to be kept in mind when considering the groping 
figures in the opening of the Foreword.  Nabokov starts by describing the book as a 
‘systematically correlated assemblage of personal recollections’.42 The book’s initial 
serial publication is presented as the anomalous middle phase of a project which — 
the author reassuringly informs us — was always conceived as a compact entity.43 
The erratically published chapters ‘had been neatly filling numbered gaps in my 
mind which followed the present order of chapters’. 44  This feature is revealed 
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 Nabokov, Speak, p. 3. 
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 Nabokov, Speak, p. 3. 
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 Nabokov, Speak, p.4. 
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through the use of architectural tropes. He mentioned he had thought of calling the 
book The Anthemion (the name of an architectural ornament) and the first chapter he 
composed — Chapter Five, about his French governess, written in French in 1936 — 
is described as the book’s cornerstone:45 
 
That order had been established in 1936, at the placing of the 
cornerstone which already held in its hidden hollow various maps, 
timetables, a collection of matchboxes, a chip of ruby glass, and even 
— as I now realize ― the view from my balcony of Geneva lake, of its 
ripples and glades of light, black-dotted today, at teatime, with coots 
and tufted ducks.46 
 
How should we read these self-definitional figures? The ‘paint-by-numbers’ 
metaphor or the assemblage seem deliberately unchallenging figures of authorial 
control. The cornerstone, however, is far less “easy” to read. At first it seems 
conventional, a plain inventory.  And yet by the end of the sentence it undergoes a 
wondrous metamorphosis: a drab assembly is transformed into a rapturous quasi-
epiphany. Content and form become radiant, concordant and alliterative: even the 
colours of the waterfowl match (both coots and tufted ducks are black-and-white 
creatures).47 
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This movement and evolution could be read as both an enhancement and a 
challenge to the figure’s pretensions to define the book in its totality. Hamrit, 
speaking of how Nabokov’s works tease the reader about the existence of a key or a 
system remarks that: 
 
Considering there is a play in the structure of a book does not preclude 
the existence of an order and a structure. Yet, it is not based on the 
notion of a centre. Indeed, it is not easy to fix one origin or organizing 
principle.48 
 
The Foreword could indeed be read as a demonstration of this principle: a 
paradoxical definition of indefinition and perhaps of autobiography itself. Or rather 
not — after all, figures are not keys to a definition and solution, but warnings about 
the problematic, even destructive, nature of the search for “solutions” or definitions. 
But there is something else to this passage that deserves our most obsessive 
attention. Like the list that closes the octopus-lamp passage, it propels readers into a 
languid reverie of contemplation. The passage makes explicit the temporal (and thus 
allegorical, if we follow De Man) character of self-definition. As the sentence passes, 
the relation between cornerstone and contents (and cornerstone and whole) shifts 
between collaboration and sabotage, and this breach dents the synthetic powers of 
the figure. Definition is as much about patience (and unsatisfied patience at that) as 
about epiphanic, symbolic, immediate access. We should mistrust the synthetic light 
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the cornerstone trope radiates. It might not be an “illuminating” mise en abyme, but 
something else altogether: a time-bomb.   
The passage, however, starts as a double panorama — a balcony view of the 
book’s system and of Lake Geneva at teatime. The trope of the cornerstone is a 
prototypical synecdoche: the part standing for the whole building. And yet Nabokov 
will erode the cornerstone’s potential for unambiguous symbolism by simply 
lingering on it and delaying its effects. Even if we insist on reading it as an 
‘epiphany’, we have to concede that it is a delayed one. The importance of the 
cornerstone as the mirror of generic definition lies precisely in how it presents it as a 
process in time, and how the temporal dimension of definition destabilises the 
solidity and continuity it seeks to achieve (and which the stone symbolises).  The 
trope is developed into an extended conceit (based on the traditional practice of 
filling the hollow of the stone with relics) which is carried forward towards a series 
of self-contradictory conclusions — some of them only perceptible after many 
patient returns. The chronology of reading is unsettled: instant revelation is 
substituted by a trickle of meanings which are simply strung together by commas or 
‘ands’ and which do not form a coherent whole. 
 The first “discovery” is concerned with the temporal order of creation, and 
what this order might reveal about the nature of authorship in autobiography.  
Nabokov starts his list by mentioning that the stone ‘already held in its hidden 
hollow’ the relics (my italics): as if it was a stone picked at random which contained 
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the seeds (or the remains) of his life and past.49 The volitional action of placing or 
writing those relics is turned into a quasi-miracle: any of the stones (the chapters) 
could be a cornerstone. ‘Already’ transforms a trope about form into one about genre 
and reference. Autobiographical patterns (unlike its contents) are considered to be 
exempt from referential tests: they are assumed to be either the product of the 
author’s imagination or the reproduction of a literary convention. Up until this point, 
the reader could have safely assumed that Nabokov himself is both painter and 
creator of the painting-by-numbers. The use of ‘already’, however, suggests it might 
be otherwise: in fact, he is displaying himself as the discoverer of patterns, as if the 
real author of Speak, Memory was in fact Memory and the book has not been “written” 
at all. 
Some critics have taken this suggestion quite seriously as the defining feature 
of Nabokovian autobiography: for instance, Vladimir Alexandrov concludes that the 
book’s patterning of disparate elements 
[I]s due not to an individual projecting order onto the world around 
him, but to the fact that memory operates in some mysterious 
harmonious way with the patterns “imprinted” by an otherworld onto 
life and nature themselves.50 
 
As an autobiographical self-definition, it subsumes not only content but also form to 
verification: the autobiography is but the final element in a series of perfect 
reproductions of harmonious patterns. This interpretation — which is emphasised 
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by the foreword’s justification for the rewriting of the book as an exercise in 
referential refinement — is by no means the key to the book that Alexandrov makes 
of it. It is suggested only to be dismantled. 
 The cornerstone does not only contain relics — it also hides a bomb which 
will detonate at some unidentified moment in the future. In contrast to the more 
immediate ‘already’, the next clue — the list of relics — can only be deciphered after 
the actual cornerstone, Chapter Five (and indeed the whole book), is read. The result 
of this deciphering confirms and belies the miracle of Nabokov’s pre-patterned, pre-
written life.  Its five components do not appear as themselves in Chapter Five.51 This 
does not mean that this early fragment does not cohere with the rest of the book, but 
its coherence is puzzlingly communicated to the reader through a series of figures: 
rather than choosing examples of the actual building blocks — what Nabokov calls 
‘themes’ — he offers the readers a list of metonymic representations. 
The maps stand for the paths and gardens motif, the timetables for the 
train/travel strand and the chip of glass for the colour/jewel/rainbow cluster. But in 
the transfer to the cornerstone, the motifs become relics of themselves — the 
remnants of the writing and the reading process. They stand for another theme of 
Chapter Five: the memento and the keepsake, a motif which offers a more 
problematic version of memory than the ‘light’ metaphors. 52  Mementos present 
memory as an obstacle rather than as an unhindered access to the past, emphasising 
the distance memory creates between model and representation. Zoran 
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 The chapter contains a red stained-glass window and a train, though. 
52
 Alter offers a detailed discussion of this motif in relation to memory in ‘Nabokov and Memory’, 620-629 (p.622-629). 
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Kuzmanovich has remarked upon Nabokov’s curious paraphrase of one of the 
metaphors in his first poem (‘memory’s sting’), which — as Nabokov explains — 
really sought to convey ‘the ovipositor of an ichneumon fly straddling a cabbage 
caterpillar’. 53  Kuzmanovich concludes that, despite Nabokov’s frequent 
characterisation of Memory as an all-powerful goddess, ‘in one sense at least, 
Nabokov imagined memory as a sharp, long, parasitic and destructive tool’.54  The 
three elements thus seem to stand for their presence and their absence at the same 
time, undermining the illusion of solidity their container conveys. 
This friction between the solid and the vanished is even more perceptible in 
the third element of the inventory: the collection of matchboxes. Again, the collection 
is not mentioned in the chapter or the rest of the book — although matches (and 
lights) are one of the book’s themes. The collection is another example of the relic-as-
origin. Matchboxes could be read as the prelude of an act of genesis: Nabokov might 
be jokingly comparing the capitalised Genesis with his own — in the beginning, 
before the light, was the match-box. 55  However, they can also be read as the 
aftermath of the process, what remained after six days of work. The image is 
ambiguous because the matchboxes are kept closed: the reader will never know 
whether they are full or empty, whether they have been used (and by whom) or 
whether they are about to be used. And of course, matches can also be employed for 
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other purposes rather than illumination, such as an apocalyptic arson attack on the 
world one has so carefully (re?)created. 
As well as providing an intriguing allegory of Speak, Memory’s genesis (or 
apocalypse), the matchboxes also stand for another of the book’s main motifs, that of 
the collection, which Will Norman has identified as the book’s ‘organising principle, 
which compensates for loss to history by providing unique meaning out of a specific 
nexus among moments in time’.56 The matchbox collection is thus simultaneously a 
part and the whole — a collection within a collection (the contents of the cornerstone) 
within a collection (the book itself).  It provides a second mise en abyme within the 
first, one which replaces Nabokov’s model of autobiography as the tracing of a ‘true’ 
or pre-existing design for one in which the author can be clearly seen drawing whilst 
pretending to be tracing.  The matchboxes may be hiding a miniature exploding 
device. 
  There is, however, another twist to the twist: this bomb might in fact be 
deactivated and its fire extinguished by the final (liquid) element in the inventory. 
Genesis and apocalypse might be succeeding each other in a loop, the creation-cum-
edifice constantly being destroyed and rebuilt. The conclusion of the paragraph is 
significantly presented as a kind of digression from the dangerous involutions of the 
cornerstone: Nabokov interrupts the inventory to look out from his balcony at the 
charming panorama of Lake Geneva. It is a diversion in space and time, from the 
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page to the balcony, from 1936 to the present of the writing, from the artificial to the 
unmediated. However, as we have seen, there is nothing particularly spontaneous 
and natural about the lake view: Nabokov uses his entire stylistic arsenal in this 
element, probably to create a mood of enchanted contemplation.   
What separates this descent from that of the snow-storm in Chapter Eight is 
the fact that the view might achieve a closed meaning when re-read. It could be 
considered as the latest link of two (twinned) motifs: that of a fairy-tale-like 
“jumping into a picture” and that of the mysterious intimations of his future in his 
past.  Among the objects his Swiss governess used to keep in her writing desk, there 
was ‘a picture postcard of a lake and a castle with mother-of-pearl spangles for 
windows’.57 It is, of course, Lake Geneva. Just in case the reader was not aware that 
Nabokov had moved to its shores, the Foreword is helpfully dated and located in 
‘Montreux, 5th of January 1966’.58 He has jumped into the picture.59 
The conclusion of the mise en abyme could thus be read as a return to the initial 
self-definition of the book as miracle: as the list progresses, an undercurrent of doubt 
dismantles the “miracle” or otherworldly thesis, but the end could be read as a U-
turn to the first thesis now “proved” by the miracle taking place in front of the 
reader’s eyes. The author looks away, digresses for a moment and is rewarded with 
the latest confirmation of the “otherworldly” patterning of his life. Digression 
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becomes epiphany. Of course, it is up to the reader to believe in this conversion. One 
can also remark that the over-stylization of the lake view might be a sign of the 
digression’s “performed” and artificial quality: the author is not experiencing a 
vision, but rather demonstrating how his design works. The reader is led to the 
coincidence (the Alpha-and-Omega of all coincidences) but Nabokov leaves the 
interpretation of the design open. The lake view could be a miracle proving the 
book’s “truth” or a relic, an emblem of absence, reminiscent of Mademoiselle’s 
kitschy postcard. Rather than a magical window, the postcard is actually a mirror, a 
disquieting parody of the pearly and iridescent texture of both passage and book. 
The mise en abyme presents different versions of memory and autobiography. 
The cornerstone is an allegory of memory which represents it as a window and a 
parasite, and this formulation gives way to two opposing definitions of 
autobiography. The first one poses the book as a kind of hyper-autobiography (true 
content, true design, a representation of world and otherworld, a prevalence of 
achrony over chronology). The second, on the other hand, presents it as an anti-
autobiography: a tropological mirage, a constantly displaced, inconclusive allegory. 
Of course, this half-true, half-sham myth of origins (an afterthought, a 
supplement, a matchbox) is in itself inconclusive and parasitical, and needs perhaps 
to be read in conjunction with the real origin of the book: its first 1951 version, and in 
particular to the other examples of  mise en abyme (and, by implication, generic 
definition) within the text. We should nonetheless be wary of the definitional 
potential of a return to an origin. For Hamrit, ‘the different chapters of the 
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autobiography recede in a constant mise en abyme which excludes totalization’.60 
This decentring process, however, should not be merely explained as the result of a 
multiplication of totalities. As the cornerstone trope shows, even a single mise en 
abyme can exclude totalization by virtue of its inherently allegorical, temporal, 
dispersed and digressive structure. 
To gather together the dispersed conclusions of our analysis of the 
cornerstone (if they can indeed be gathered), the question which immediately 
springs to mind involves the relation between figure (particularly mise en abyme) and 
genre or generic definition. If mise en abyme initially invites the possibility of being 
read as a defining gesture in its ‘illuminating’ containment and compression of 
dispersed elements (akin to Ricoeur’s concordance of the discordant), in practice it 
reveals itself to be but a reflection of the text’s own dispersal and indeterminacy. Its 
temporal curiosity lies not in the fact that the figure seemingly transcends 
chronological time by “grabbing” two points in time at once.  The cornerstone makes 
explicit the impossibility of such coincidences, problematizing the idea of the 
existence of a temporal or atemporal fabula hidden in the text’s sjuzhet, and the idea 
of self-presence implied in Speak, Memory’s octopus-like plot. 
The next section seeks to demonstrate this principle by paying even closer 
attention to another mise en abyme: this time, its “original” and “inaugural” example. 
The deliberately slowed-down pace of the analysis is a response and echo of the mise 
en abyme’s inherently digressive and dispersed structure, and the enchanted and 
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disheartened mood of semantic disorientation they invoke. Thomas Karshan has 
rightly described Nabokov as ‘one of the most digressive writers in world literature’ 
but the device has only been studied in a piecemeal fashion, as if this dimension had 
been hushed (as Lenski was when contemplating the lamp) by the tightness of his 
plots and imagery.61 
The disintegration of the episode of the lamp into polysyndeton, or of the 
cornerstone into inventory are surprisingly close to what Ross Chambers identified 
as the ‘etcetera principle’ which the device of digression exemplifies: 
 
[W]hereas contextuality is a condition of all discourse, no context is 
ever the whole context: there is consequently no message that does not 
admit of there being a second or other message, and indeed, by 
continued application of the rule, a third, fourth, and fifth, to infinity.62 
  
The structure of Nabokov’s mirror-images involves both the tracing of definite 
patterns and the suggestion of a more subtle and invisible disjointed model made 
out of interconnecting tunnels and false movements. This non-structure relies upon 
effects of anticipation and delay, upon the good memory of readers but also upon 
their forgetfulness, upon their patient attention and their haste to bring things to a 
conclusion. The temporal models invoked by the book’s combination of mirror-
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images and digression (and the wildly differing versions of autobiography they spur) 
will then be put in relation to the whirligig of autobiographical definition — and its 
ultimate significance. 
135 
 
The mechanical manikin and the tramcar: on mise en abyme, 
autobiography, time and digression 
 
Matches: mise en abyme as a ‘mechanical manikin’ 
 
What  I previously described as the “original” mise en abyme of Speak, Memory — the 
starting point of many analyses of the book — narrates a seemingly inconsequential 
anecdote used to illustrate a peripheral motif: the ‘match theme’ of his life.63  As we 
will be spending some time in this particular spot, we should perhaps familiarise 
ourselves with all its elements. Appropriately — in the light of our previous 
conclusions — the match story is framed as a digression. Ostensibly, Chapter One is 
concerned with Nabokov’s earliest memories, and its third section (which has the 
match-theme episode at its core) starts with a jumble of reminiscences from a 
holiday in Abbazia in 1904, at the time of the Russo-Japanese war. This customary 
setting of memories within a larger historical context “triggers” an earlier memory 
related to the conflict. The inverted commas are needed here because there is 
nothing particularly automatic or spontaneous about this association: it is in fact a 
sham digression. 
Nabokov proceeds with an anecdote of the shamelessly name-dropping kind 
— the ones parodied by his first reviewer — about a famous acquaintance of his 
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father: General Kuropatkin, the future supreme commander of the Russian forces in 
that conflict. The General is first described teaching a simple magic trick with 
matches to little Nabokov: 
he spread out to amuse me a handful of matches,[...], placed ten of 
them end to end to make an horizontal line, and said ‘This is the sea in 
calm weather’. Then he tipped each pair up so as to turn the straight 
line into a zigzag — and that was ‘a stormy sea’. 64 
 
As the General was going to proceed with another trick, they are interrupted by the 
sudden announcement that the General is to lead the Russian armies in the war. The 
narrative then jumps fifteen years: Nabokov’s father, fleeing St Petersburg after the 
Revolution, meets an old man in peasant clothes who asks him for a match, who 
turns out to be none other than Kuropatkin. The episode concludes with a kind of 
dictum-cum-manifesto: 
I hope old Kuropatkin, in his rustic disguise, managed to evade Soviet 
imprisonment, but that is not the point. What pleases me is the 
evolution of the match theme: those magic ones he had shown me had 
been trifled with and mislaid, and his armies had also vanished, and 
everything had fallen through, like my toy trains that, in the winter of 
1904-1905, in Wiesbaden, I tried to run over the frozen puddles in the 
grounds of the Hotel Oranien. The following of such designs through 
one’s life should be, I think, the true purpose of autobiography.65 
 
This is one of the book’s clearest definitions of what its model of 
autobiography entails. Because of this, it has become popular with critics: one could 
gain a good understanding of the reception of Speak, Memory merely by comparing 
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different approaches to this episode.  Max Saunders considers the passage’s 
aestheticism as the defining feature of Nabokov’s take on the genre: 
[T]he true purpose of autobiography is aesthetic: the evolution of 
themes [...] It’s the match theme that matters to Nabokov [...] The 
national crises, and crises of others, provide the background to his 
perceptions and memories.66 
 
Curiously, patterns have also been read in a moral, metaphysical, transcendent key: 
that is the position of Alexandrov and Boyd. For the latter, patterns of recurrent 
themes reveal 
[A]n artfulness and harmony hiding in things, even in things at their 
worst, watching over life with parental tenderness and leading us to 
the point where all patterns meet, to the great transition of death, to 
the shock of the mind’s new birth.67 
 
Other analyses of the episode describe the story as a meta-autobiographical 
statement emphasising the text’s engagement with history and ethics. Dabney Stuart 
pointed out that there are two designs rather than one in the episode — the match 
theme and the train-falling-through-the-ice theme.68 If readers return to the jumble of 
memories which opens the section, they will find a description of a piece of Japanese 
war propaganda, a locomotive falling through the ice of Lake Baikal: the image 
echoed for real, but in miniature, in his own games. Stuart correctly remarks that the 
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purpose of the passage is not to alert the reader not only about how the book will 
‘ “follow thematic designs”, but also about how ‘he will [...] not point them out’. 69 
The structure combines the explicit and the disguised; and for Stuart, disguise 
adds to the books moral poignancy, communicative force and referential value. The 
design ‘he doesn’t point out here is the more poignant of the two, is complementary 
to the first [...] and reveals what is basic to the design of both: the theme of exile’.70 It 
is interesting to consider Stuart in relation to a recent reading by Will Norman, in 
which the passage is identified as an allegory of the relation between history and art: 
 
History, conceived as the inexorable linear progress of a train 
determined in advance by the track laid out for it, is again associated 
specifically with martial violence and also with mechanization. Here, 
its destructive progress is halted and derailed, while the pattern of 
images which foretold its fate survives intact.71 
 
Norman unusually interprets the falling trains in a positive light, unlike Stuart (a 
historical defeat turned artistic victory), but for him the fall into history is only 
delayed rather than averted: the allegory is itself derailed by the far less triumphant 
development of the text. 
This tension between abstract self-definitions and the examples and 
metaphors used to illustrate them was first identified by Michael Wood in a ground-
breaking and influential reading which called into question the rhetoric of 
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redemption that many critics have pinned to Nabokov’s figures and 
correspondences. For him, 
 
[T]he ‘evolution of the match theme’, ostensibly a mask and an answer 
for loss, leads directly to loss itself, to matches mislaid and trifled with 
[...] The purpose behind the purpose of autobiography, perhaps, is to 
tell us what the tracing of designs can’t do for us.72 
  
For Wood, Nabokov’s more optimistic pronouncements about time and death (and, I 
would add, about the book itself) are always qualified by the text itself — by what it 
conceals and what it delays. 
None of the analyses, however, discusses the match-theme as a mise en abyme, 
a classification we should justify. Using Dällenbach’s criteria, the match theme could 
be described as a reflexive metadiegetic utterance: an utterance of a particular 
incident in Nabokov’s life which also stands for the whole of the autobiographical 
project itself. Although the episode forms part of the diegesis, it is nonetheless 
framed to stand apart from similar anecdotes. Matches, for instance, hardly reappear 
in the rest of the book, which sets them apart as a “theme of themes” — a meta-
theme representing all the book’s coincidental patterns. 
The mise en abyme duplicates both utterance and enunciation: it is a sample of 
the book’s structure of coincidental motifs, and a mirror-image of its creation and 
reception. As Stuart pointed out, the passage teaches readers by example: like 
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sticker-collectors, we are given one packet for free to get us hooked but need to buy 
the rest ourselves. As well as wishing to echo the book’s reception, the episode also 
makes explicit a key aspect of its creation: its nature as a balancing act between 
deliberate authorial design and the designs of fate or chance. 
Nabokov’s use of coincidence, repetition and pattern as the touchstone for the 
book’s generic definition was also present in the Foreword, but here it will be teased 
to its limits — almost to the extremes of parody. The episode deliberately blurs the 
distinctions between his own arrangements and those of fate/chance — perhaps to 
foster the impression that fate may be actually a rather subtle and quasi-demonic 
artist, his equal if not his superior. One wonders, for instance, whether Nabokov is 
not punning with the different meanings of “match”. The episode consists precisely 
on “matching” matches, and the rather felicitous expression ‘match-theme’ describes 
at the same content and container: themes are matches, correspondences; and 
matches are a theme. The second coincidence reveals the elementary mise en abyme to 
be a loop-like, aporetic structure, with no certain origin — reminiscent of the 
uncanny ‘mechanical manikin’ and its incessant shaving. 
This process of squaring continues in what Nabokov refers to as ‘the 
evolution’ of the theme: an evolution that does not only involve loss of the matches 
(and of ‘everything’) but also the matches’ coming into being as meta-narrative 
devices. Matches move from being unused playthings to being lights (the General, 
Nabokov says, ‘asked my father for a light’). 73  What Nabokov does here is to 
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transform a rather commonplace metonym into a metaphor of the light’s meta-
narrative function, as if the lighted match was illuminating itself as a ‘thematic 
design’. The light reveals the peasant to be Kuropatkin in disguise, closes the loop 
and, simultaneously, reveals its true nature as a mise en abyme under its clumsy 
disguise as a digression or a name-dropping anecdote. The anecdote functions as a 
kind of double illumination: one charmingly devoid of transcendence (there is no 
‘watermark’ — only water), impishly revealing nothing but itself. 
The purpose of this squared coincidence and the pun is not easy to discern. It 
may be a sign of what the Oulipian poet Jacques Jouet has designated as a poet’s 
‘cratylic desire that is more or less opposed to the arbitrariness of the sign’. 74 
Nabokov indeed uses the word ‘light’ as a light, but again one should not 
extrapolate that behind this is a confirmation of non-figural character of language 
(and of the “true” character of the book). After all, there is nothing natural about the 
match pun itself, which is the result of the freakish coincidence of two separate 
origins: ‘match’ meaning ‘pair’ is of Anglo-Saxon origin, ‘match’ meaning ‘flame’ 
comes from medieval French.75 The pun could be read in relation to mise en abyme 
(and autobiography) as an enhancement of its figural and displaced quality. It also 
provokes a reflection on the idea of the origin and the role of chance in design: we 
may wonder whether the pun is simply adding an extra flourish to the anecdote or 
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whether it is its actual source and origin (the story having been chosen not because 
of its poignancy, but because it “matched” the pun). 
A comparison to Proust’s Recherche might be useful here to understand the 
perplexing nature of the match-theme. There, the madeleine in lime-flower tea or the 
uneven paving stones acted as the random ‘matches’ that sparked the narrator’s 
autobiographical project. The match-theme, ironically, cannot be so easily identified 
as the spark of Speak, Memory: it is rather an illustration a posteriori of an abstract 
principle of composition whose origin (probably random and freakish) cannot be 
traced. The purpose of the whole episode may be nothing more than to test and tease 
the reader’s credulity, or — taking it a bit further — it may wish to mock 
autobiography’s delusions of reference at the very moment the text is proposing a 
theory of the genre that conciliates memory and imagination, science and art. 
Also, as Stuart pointed out, the match-theme is presented as self-contained 
and unable to be contained. The end drifts and digresses into the supplementary 
theme of the trains-falling-through-ice, the counter-point that defines and undefines 
it. The conclusion plays with notions of solidity and liquidity, the real and the make-
believe, and it is designed to highlight ironic discordances as well as concordance. 
Patterns might be fragile rather than solid, (snow)fall rather than lamps: in that case, 
the train/ice allegory would confirm the literality of the figures in this episode (and 
hence their “truth”), but in doing so robs coincidences of any aspiration to 
transcendence and permanence in themselves. 
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This feature is enhanced and echoed (another echo) by the elusive character of 
its referents:  for instance, the fall of the locomotives only took place in the 
imagination of a Japanese propagandist. The trains that fall through the cracks in the 
puddle were only toy-trains, their fall only a make-believe one. The purpose of the 
train theme may be to point out how the seemingly solid “matches” may also have 
no solidity at all, and may only be evoked for their emblematic quality, or their 
ability to camouflage real disasters and personal losses in images that either 
prefigure or ape them. 76  This indirect technique has been remarked upon and 
described by critics such as Boyd, Diment, Bruss or Gezari — particularly in relation 
to how Nabokov narrates the assassination of his father — although nobody so far 
has remarked on how the explicit disguise of pain might only highlight the fragility 
of such autobiographical strategies, and the distance which separates such events 
from their figures.77 
The mixture of non-referents and hyper-referents which characterises the 
passage unsettles any attempt at generic definition through the mise en abyme.  In a 
similar way to the cornerstone, its predecessor/sequel, the mise en abyme highlights 
pattern and design (rather than just memories or language) as the most significant 
element of the book, whilst leaving its significance undecided: patterns can be read 
as proof of the book’s autobiographical character; or as an authorial stamp which 
relegates referential truth to a secondary and perhaps insignificant level in relation 
to its artistic construction. 
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In a way, pattern turns reference into something elusive and figural: an 
elusiveness which is not entirely the result of art but also of history. Hence, they 
might be the only possible strategy for autobiography rather than a deviation from it, 
although this by no means makes the genre escape the whirligigs of figuration or 
provides a referential anchoring to the text. The main difference between the match-
theme and the cornerstone, as we have seen, is its immediacy, highlighted by the 
passage’s use of puns and metaphors: the reader is invited to grasp its significance at 
once (Nabokov even hedges his bets by the addition of an authorial explanation). 
The whole can be immediately comprehended, even if its significance is left 
undefined. 
Or perhaps not. It is tempting to read the pattern created by this “original” 
mise en abyme in relation to the figure of the anthemion that Nabokov proposed as an 
alternative title for his book (the typical decorative motif of frontispieces and garden 
fences that Nabokov describes as ‘a honeysuckle ornament, consisting of elaborate 
interlacements and expanding clusters’).78 The match-theme could be considered as 
the origin and the template of a meaning which its borders mirror and develop —
like the anthemion’s outer leaves. However, the episode subverts the hierarchy 
between centre and ornament: the match-theme needs to be supplemented by the 
train theme and the authorial coda. The neat boundaries of the mise en abyme are 
expanded: the matches need the toy trains, and the toy trains need the painted trains 
and so on.  This extends to the relation between main narrative and digression: the 
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digression turned out to be the main narrative in disguise (and in condensed form) 
and this main-line was in its turn diverted by the toy trains. 
The analysis of the match-theme needs to spill out into an analysis of the play 
and the tension between its centre and its interlacements: this spillage articulates the 
impossibility of containing genre within a definition or enclosing it within a mise en 
abyme.  Our analysis of the borders of Chapter One considers whether their 
interaction with the centre articulates a different hermeneutical model to that of the 
light (which in itself is far less ‘illuminating’ than it claims to be), in order to describe 
how the stability of the centripetal model of definition is challenged by the pattern’s 
development in time as well as space. 
 
The tramcar and the snow: time, movement and dispersal in Chapter One 
 
Nabokov’s explanation about what ‘pleased’ him about the story of Kuropatkin and 
the matches emphasised not only the ‘match’ itself, but also its interruption and its 
dispersal (the “magic” matches ‘trifled with and mislaid’). If the previous section 
concentrated on the paradoxes of the match-theme as a figure of generic definition, 
this tail will seek to do the same with its borders. The ability of the match-theme to 
grope and illuminate will be thoroughly interrogated through its temporal 
dimension. This section compares the temporal structure that the mise en abyme seeks 
to impose on the whole (and its philosophical and generic dimensions) to the 
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(allegorical) temporal structure it conceals, and which is articulated around a 
particular model of digressive figuration, the rambling comparison. 
It might be useful, however, before starting on this temporal excursion, to 
return briefly to Dällenbach’s Baedeker of the device, and in particular to his 
exploration of its temporal dimension. Whilst Gide’s model was eminently spatio-
visual, Dällenbach’s is narrative — and hence temporal. He points out that mise en 
abyme is always anachronic, out of sequence, and that the technique 
 
[C]annot avoid calling into question the chronological order of the 
book itself: unable to say the same thing at the same time as the story 
itself, its analogue, saying it elsewhere and ‘out of time’ sabotages the 
sequential progress of the narrative.79 
  
This conclusion is particularly relevant if we are to consider the device in relation to 
generic definition — particularly the question of reference and autobiography’s 
relation to temporality. Rather than presenting an achronic panorama, mise en abyme 
creates a diversion — or rather a duplication — of the narrative’s fabula and szhujet. 
The reduplication of the process creates a potentially infinite discordant line out of 
the single time-organising plot. Dällenbach also observes that mise en abyme’s 
potential for disruption or revelation depends on its temporal position within the 
narrative. Following Genette’s model of temporal order, Dällenbach points out that a 
mise en abyme can be prospective (or proleptic) if located at the beginning of the 
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narrative (which he calls a ‘programmatic loop’), retro-prospective if in the middle (a 
‘pivot’) and retrospective (or analeptic) if placed at the end (the ‘coda’).80 
The position of the device determines its power as an instrument of authorial 
control and readerly subjection. Dällenbach points out that initial or final mise en 
abymes are far less common than middle ones because loops and codas risk making 
the narrative that follows or the mise en abyme itself redundant and isotopic. As the 
device ‘allows a maximum closure and codification of the narrative, it 
correspondingly reduces the possibility of polysemy’.81 The risk is far smaller in the 
case of an ‘isotopic shifter’: 
Thanks to the mise en abyme, the redundance is diminished; the 
narrative becomes informing and open — and above all it accepts, 
after having imposed its own form on the ‘analogue’, that the latter, in 
turn, superimposes its own form on the narrative82. 
  
Location, however, is only one factor in the creation of semantic stability or 
instability and authorial control: Dällenbach also points out other factors, such as the 
degree of analogy. The pivot’s polysemy depends on its modification of the initial 
structure it is supposed to mirror as much as on its position.83 
Several questions rise at once when we return to the match-theme in relation 
to Dallenbach’s taxonomy. The initial position of the “match-theme” enhances its 
definitional force, but its content throws this function into disarray. We may wonder 
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whether it is possible for a loop to “programme” a completely open interpretation of 
the book. Initial mise en abymes might all be loops, but they might not necessarily be 
programmatic if the model they propose is hence denied by the narrative that 
follows. It is possible to argue that within Chapter One, the match-theme functions 
as a pivot rather than as a loop, which would then turn the whole of Chapter One 
into a mise en abyme and the ‘programmatic loop’ of the book.84 
Our questioning of the borders of the mise en abyme, however, should 
nonetheless bear in mind how this spillage might obstruct any models of authorial 
control such as those proposed by Dällenbach’s taxonomy. The rest of this section 
tries to ascertain not only the classification of the match theme in terms of 
Dällenbach’s structures, but also whether the match theme indeed “programmes” 
the reader’s reception or whether the dispersed and supplementary quality that we 
observed in relation to the matches and the trains undoes the mise en abyme and its 
definitional potential. 
Starting thus with its temporal structure, the first part of this section considers 
the temporal narrative model “imposed” by the apparent synecdoche of the mise en 
abyme, as well as the philosophical implications of the model as a possible way of 
accessing and interpreting identity and selfhood (as Ricoeur and the Narrativists 
would have it). Speak, Memory’s temporal structure and its thematic treatment of 
time constitute one of the major concerns of critical approaches to the book — 
although the role of mise en abyme for the book’s definition of time and the 
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configuration of its temporal structure remains unrecognised. The match-theme is 
indeed the first example of the ‘curious’ temporal pattern which Moraru identified: 
the linear sequence of Nabokov’s lifetime is interrupted to offer a prolepsis (or 
‘sequel’) into the future of one particular element, a future which sometimes 
involves the element’s absence, sometimes its retrieval, sometimes both. This model 
of reading the past in relation to the future (related to Ricoeur’s idea of emplotment) 
could be considered as the loop which the initial mise en abyme “programmes”. 
The structure nonetheless allows a certain degree of interpretative freedom 
due to its variation between negative, positive and ambiguous outcomes: despite the 
fact that the prolepsis in the match-theme is used clearly as an intimation of future 
loss, there is enough ambiguity in the motif for it not to impose its outcome as the 
‘outcome’ of all prolepses. As we saw in Moraru’s analysis, Nabokov’s use of non-
linear chronological structures has tended to be read as the narrative translation of 
his philosophy of time.  Although Nabokov’s thematic treatment of time is related to 
the temporal structure of mise en abyme, we should not read them as mirror-images 
of each other. The text mingles figural and performative treatments of time (of which 
the mise en abyme is but one instance) and overt and direct discussions of time as a 
theme, and plays them against each other — making it difficult to pinpoint a single 
philosophical (and generic) stance towards time and self. 
            Let’s take, for instance, the reading that certain critics make of Nabokov’s use 
of anachrony and achrony. Boyd reads it as an ‘attempt to escape the rigid 
sequentiality of time’ which shows ‘the mind triumphing over time’ and ‘intimate[s] 
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something beyond human time’. 85  This position seems to be confirmed by the 
‘temporal curiosity’ we examined in the introduction, the butterfly-hunt episode, 
which includes a much commented-upon “confession”: ‘I confess I do not believe in 
time’.86 This remark is usually read (for instance, by Alexandrov or Moraru) as an 
unequivocal rejection of mortal, linear time and an affirmation of the triumph of 
human consciousness over its limits — a conclusion which misses the irony of its 
confessional frame, that most temporal of narrative structures.87 Alexandrov reads 
the passage in relation to Vivian Bloodmark’s octopus-like model of ‘cosmic 
synchronisation’: the text becomes a microcosm of the timeless realm of both 
consciousness and the otherworld. 88  This is, however, problematic: as a textual and 
temporal model, synchronisation is perhaps a utopian model (maybe even a garish 
one). It is also formulated paradoxically — either through masks and deceit (the 
anagram) or through linear temporal structures (the confession). 
              Regarding prolepsis itself, it is important to notice that Nabokov’s victories 
over time are only proved by what we may call “successful” prolepses, like the 
butterfly hunt, when the past is retrieved in the future. There is something far less 
victorious about another kind of proleptic narrative model which the book implicitly 
exemplifies. Nabokov recalls at one point how his mother encouraged him to 
observe the present as if it was already a memory: she asked her son not to look at 
things but to remember them. Rather than defiance, this kind of prolepsis is an act of 
                                                          
85
 Boyd, The American Years, p. 152. 
86
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 106. 
87
 See Alexandrov, p. 40 and note 10 in the Introduction for Moraru reference. 
88
 Alexandrov, pp. 28-38. 
 
151 
 
surrender to time, an acceptance of loss. It is because of this (motherly) model of 
prolepsis that Michael Wood affirms that 
 
[T]he dominant posture in Speak, Memory is not disbelief in time and 
not simple submission to it [...] It is an intricate engagement with what 
Nabokov, echoing Proust, calls ‘time itself’’.89 
 
  The value of Wood’s conclusion lies in its reluctance to impose a philosophical 
model onto the text. For other critics, the text’s seeming embracing of ‘time itself’ has 
tended to be read through a Bergsonian lens. Such readings of Speak, Memory (such 
as Leona Toker’s and Will Norman’s) do not focus on Nabokov’s use of anachrony 
but rather on another of Nabokov’s temporal ‘styles’, found in the periphery of the 
match-theme: dawdling, enchanted, contemplative scenes of pure memory, such as 
the account of his first memory or his early hide-and-seek games.90 Toker reads these 
scenes as representations of the idea of durée or duration (or, as Nabokov calls it, ‘the 
pure element of time’), a temporal model emphasising a non-transcedent model of 
consciousness and selfhood: for her, those scenes enact an engagement with pure 
time, ‘a mobile medium, in which one inserts the mobility of one’s inner life’.91 
               Toker’s conclusion might lead us to wonder whether Nabokov intended this 
model to be the true ‘programmatic loop’ and heart of the book. Norman, on the 
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other hand, concedes that scenes such as the one mentioned above attempt ‘to render 
the experience rather than the metaphorical representation of la durée’ as a pause in 
the tempo of the narrative, but he also points out how these moments are 
punctuated by the disruptive presence of History. 92 He considers that Nabokov’s 
philosophy of time is in fact closer to Benjamin’s historical materialism, as Speak, 
Memory is 
A work which enacts la durée’s interruption by history [...] Bergson’s 
aesthetic [...] is founded upon notions of continuity and 
interpenetration, while Speak, Memory operates through the 
fragmentary and the episodic, the suspension of time through literary 
technique before its inevitable resumption as history.93 
 
Again, we should be wary of any attempt to explain the book under a single 
philosophical approach to time, history or identity. The use of fragmentation (and its 
opposite, collection and ‘matching’) and the episodic both suspend time and submit 
to its linear character. The very same technique which Norman and Toker read as a 
sign of Nabokov’s engagement with Bergson’s durée was read by W.G. Sebald as 
signifying timelessness, or a ‘desire to suspend time’ achieved through ‘the most 
precise re-evocation of things long overtaken by oblivion’.94 
          Any account of the temporal structure of mise en abyme (and its definitional 
significance) should not, however, bypass the temporality of figuration. Our survey 
of critical approaches to temporality in Speak, Memory demonstrates how the book’s 
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mise en abymes are deliberately unsatisfactory synecdoches: they fail to ‘programme’ 
its genre, its approach to selfhood, identity and time or its prevalent narrative style. 
A seemingly central mise en abyme is supplemented and modified by its borders, but 
those borders do not substitute the central model for another, as Hamrit suggested. 
Dispersal is not solely the effect of multiplication (of an ‘and…and…and…’ structure) 
but it is inherent to the mise en abymes. The engine of the ‘matching’ machine of the 
mise en abyme (a ‘mechanical manikin’) is fuelled by time: time as deferral, as loss, as 
history. The synecdoche conceals an allegorical structure of distance and dispersal:  
the signifying, illuminating, descriptive functions of Nabokovian mise en abymes rely 
on structures (the ‘ands’, the snow) that take the reader further and further away 
from the single univocal meaning they repeat and seek to impose (the manikin’s 
‘motions of shaving’).  In their turn, these figures expose the distance of the core 
(here, the match) from its absent referent. 
         Contemplating a mise en abyme is thus in itself a temporal experience: a journey 
out, a digression. The match-theme might have started as fake digression, but it 
concealed a true one inside.  The vehicle in which this excursion is undertaken is —
of course — a vehicle. The train simile exemplifies a different model of figuration to 
that of the octopus/lamp: the Homeric or epic simile; or, as Professor Timofey Pnin 
— and his creator — call it, the “Rambling Comparison”. 95 Nabokov (like Pnin) 
traced the history of the device in his critical writings (such as the Cornell lectures) 
and practised a highly idiosyncratic version of it, which Susan Elizabeth Sweeney 
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(author of the only in-depth article on the trope) baptised as ‘amphiphor’ — a 
Nabokovian coinage defining, from the inside, a particularly rambling comparison 
in Bend Sinister.96  For Sweeney, these ‘amphiphors’ are ‘characterized by extended 
analogies; baroque, seemingly uncontrolled imagery and rhetoric; and inherent 
ambiguity’.97 She explains that Nabokov develops the simile’s ‘initial absurdity first 
into an ironic undermining of grandiose, romantic images, and then into a 
fundamental ambiguity which cannot be resolved’. 98 They are parodies of symbols, 
undecidable in their meaning. 
         One could indeed ramble on about this device: for reasons of space, I will only 
concentrate on the train simile (an interrupted rambling comparison) and mention —
briefly — some of the surprising destinations the reader is led to in that journey. 
Nabokov might be playing with the original Greek meaning of metaphor, “transfer”, 
which is discernible in some of the critical terminology on the device:  I.A. Richards 
designated as ‘vehicle’ the literal meaning of the word used metaphorically. 
Nabokov’s vehicles are literally vehicles (much as his matches are matches), and 
they are vehicles in motion, screeching tramcars. 99  It is not a coincidence that 
Professor Pnin exposes his theory on ‘Homer’s and Gogol’s use of the Rambling 
Comparison’ on board of a bus, a ‘crowded and spasmodic vehicle’ in New York, a 
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city he is unfamiliar with.100  His journey is punctuated by his ‘vigorous ducking and 
twisting of the head’, as he tries to ascertain where he is and that will not miss his 
stop.101  Pnin’s trip, with its combination of the pleasures of rambling about rambling 
and the anxieties of an unfamiliar journey, echoes the experience of reading 
Nabokov’s figures of speech: both ride and similes are characterised by a tension 
between charming mirroring correspondences and spasmodic and unexpected turns. 
           Like Pnin himself, Nabokov’s readers are equally anxious about getting off at 
the right stop in order not to miss their hermeneutical destination. The train simile is 
a good example of the misleading, ambiguous quality of these figurative 
supplements, as Stuart and Wood’s contrasting readings of the episode 
demonstrated. 102  The vehicles soon lose their ability to prop the “tenor” of the 
comparison — the match-theme — when their own prop, the ice, gives way under its 
weight; and yet Stuart is not wrong in seeing the train simile as the first example in 
another potentially infinite list of correspondences propping up the “original” match. 
Readers may get off wherever they prefer: or rather they may be conducted (or 
rather mislead) first to one stop and then to the other at different points in the 
reading. 
Sweeney reads the Nabokovian “amphiphor” as a development of Gogol’s 
rambling similes (the subject of Pnin’s mobile lecture), although this example seems 
to be echoing another of its practitioners, Proust.103 The opening of the Recherche also 
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featured travel as a kind of “vehicle” of sleep: Nabokov’s trains seem to share some 
of the qualities of Proust’s similes. The combination of polysyndeton and commas 
indeed echoes the balmy rhythm of railway-travel, as if the sentence itself was on a 
train. However, the reader is woken up from this trance by figures of rupture: the 
thinness of the ice interrupts the flow of play and childish reverie. The traveller in 
Proust’s comparison was reassuringly returning home: the broken ice is a stark 
reminder of how Nabokov’s trains cannot run homewards any more. 
It probably does not come as a surprise that such an unstable figural model 
does not help to stabilise the text’s generic status, or its stand on temporality and 
selfhood. If we consider them in relation to Alexandrov’s or Boyd’s vision of Speak, 
Memory as a referential project of combination without invention, the passage 
affirms how the matches and the similes of Speak, Memory are to be found in a pool 
(or a puddle?) of specific memories rather than in distorted fictions. However, even 
if both matches are ‘authentic’ or ‘real’  (that is, have an external historical referent), 
their combination gives rise to a model which pulls the matches not only away from 
each other, but also away from anything they might seek to symbolise or represent. 
The train simile is a paradoxical vehicle for generating cohesion or reference: the 
interruption of the digression by the broken ice can be read as a meaning-creating 
move (because it leads the reader back to match the toy-train with the picture-train), 
but the result of the second ‘match’ leads the reader to a dead end: to imaginary 
history, to apocalyptic nightmare and fantasy, to echoes of a history which might be 
ultimately unrepresentable. 
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The central anthemion soon morphs from a stylised representation of the 
honeysuckle flower into a real overgrown bush spreading across the book’s facade. 
One particular example of the “spread” of the central mise en abyme illustrates well 
its ambiguous character as both mechanical manikin and passing tramcar, and the 
consequences which both models have for generic definition, and its testimonial 
dimension. Chapter Nine (focused on Nabokov’s father) closes with an anecdote 
from 1911. Nabokov’s father was libelled in an article published by a reactionary 
newspaper, and was left with no other choice than to call a duel between him and 
the newspaper editor. Nabokov found out, and was gripped with fear. The story, 
however, ends happily: the editor published an apology and the duel was averted. 
The chapter ends with the boy running to meet his father after school, realising there 
will be no duel and breaking into tears. Years later, his father will be assassinated by 
a fascist thug who intended to kill the same friend the newspaper editor had 
insulted in his article. 
 
And then it happened: my heart welled in me like that wave on which 
the Buynïy rose when her captain brought her alongside the burning 
Suvorov, and I had no handkerchief, and ten years were to pass before 
a certain night in 1922, at a public lecture in Berlin, when my father 
shielded the lecturer (his old friend Milyukov) from the bullets of two 
Russian fascists and, while vigorously knocking down one of the 
assassins, was fatally shot by the other. But no shadow was cast by that 
future event upon the bright stairs of our St Petersburg home.104 
 
                                                          
104
 Nabokov, Speak, pp. 149-150. Wood points the final sentence is an explicit echo of Great Expectations. Note also the 
insistence on the ‘bright’ staircase. See Michael Wood, p. 86. 
 
158 
 
 The temporal structure of this episode repeats that of the match-theme 
(prolepsis into death and loss, followed by a kind of return to the starting point). The 
duel (like the trains) simultaneously screens and presents Nabokov’s mourning and 
pain. Janet Gezari relates it to Freud’s concept of nachtraglichkeit (“deferred action” 
or “displacement”, a memory re-remembered according to more recent experiences 
or psychological developments).105   For her, through this structure of anticipation 
and retrospection ‘Nabokov succeeds in presenting his father’s death movingly but 
self-effacingly, neither sentimentalizing it nor drawing attention to himself [...] as a 
mourner’.106  This might lead us to read the match-theme and its echoes as obsessive 
repetitions of the trauma of the father’s death, as unnerving as the manikin’s shaving: 
an indirect approach to autobiography and testimony.  But, again, a vehicle (of a 
different sort) screeches by and breaks the spell — a sinking, rather than a rambling, 
comparison. 
The child’s bursting into tears is compared to a famous incident from the 
battle of Tsushima, in the Russo-Japanese war. The Suvorov was a Russian flagship 
which was set on fire and sunk by the Japanese, and the Buynïy was the ship that 
came to her rescue and managed to save some of her officers. The passage could be 
read as an example of Nabokov’s model of indirect representation through figures 
which Sweeney highlights as one of the purposes of Nabokov’s autobiographical 
‘amphiphors’: 
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[ They] convey a sense of grief and loss so great it can only be expressed 
metaphorically; that is, only in a figure of speech can the emotion be 
controlled, resolved, and made a pattern of artistic significance.107 
 
The trope, however, is not only a self-effacing representation of grief (past and 
present): it is also a “snake” (as in the board game) which takes the reader back to 
the start of the game, to Kuropatkin and his trick. The connection introduces a 
discordant note in the rescuing wave. It is possible to read the simile as the ironically 
sombre riposte to little Nabokov’s dismissal of Kuropatkin’s match trick: what 
seemed pat and disappointing actually prefigured the war that interrupted the better 
tricks that Nabokov was expecting. In the battle, the matches are set alight and the 
wave becomes real. There might be no better trick than this one in the whole book. 
The simile unsettles the pattern of trauma/screen model of indirect reference (and 
possible healing) identified by Gezari through the introduction of a repetition within 
the repetition:  rather than suggesting that the origin of the match-theme should be 
sought in the father’s murder (as its displaced memory), it proposes a different order. 
The match-theme is here the model, the onerous premonition of another onerous 
premonition. It makes matching matches (of any kind) uncanny, dubious and 
unsatisfactory. 
 Again, however, that isn’t all. Although Norman does not refer to this 
passage, we can read the Suvorov (and the ship motif of which it is a part of) in 
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relation to the Benjaminian motifs he identifies.  Ships articulate an incomplete or 
fragmentary release from history: they save three generations of Nabokovs (in their 
flight from Soviet Russia and occupied France), but not all the rescues are wholly 
successful. His father and his brother Sergey figuratively drown, like the Suvorov 
itself. This interpretation is not conclusive, however, and does not solve the 
quandary of the book’s genre. The digression takes the reader both backwards and 
forwards in a double process of sinking and rescue: the loops of this passage toy 
with the possibility of making absence present behind figures or screens but do not 
seem to wholeheartedly commit to it as the core or the definition of the book. The 
sinking comparison supplements both scenes by multiplying their referents and 
suggesting a mode of signification that cannot help sink or fall. As the match is 
struck, the ship burns down: the placid sea becomes stormy. 
 How should we continue after such bleak loops?  Mise en abyme seems to be 
everywhere and nowhere, constantly being switched on and off in a nervous, jittery 
fashion.  If the match-theme is the timetable or the travel-guide for our journey, it is 
not a full one or even a correct one — like the out-of-date timetable that misleads 
Pnin into catching the wrong train to Cremona. Even when considered in isolation, 
statically and synchronically it fails to provide a stable self-definition: once the 
reader realises that it is neither isolated nor static, interpretations have multiplied. 
The mise en abyme generates a structure of by-paths demanding a close focus which is 
only partially rewarded: it takes us into unexpected and sometimes opposed 
avenues without offering any security that they might be the correct destination. 
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It is tempting to stop the journey here at the point where the octopus-lamp 
episode ended: in the snow, in a relentless fall of disconnected ‘ands’. Thomas 
Karshan identified a related motif (the play with mottled surfaces of light and shade) 
as a sign or correlative of ‘free play’, which is set in opposition to rule-bound 
games.108 Karshan, however, also observes that 
 
[S]uch perfect freedom in play is inexorably elusive: a game player will 
naturally repeat the acts he or she at first improvised, generating 
patterns and even rules which then bind the game.109 
 
This caution should check our temptation not to read on and to remain outside: the 
freedom of the beginning might not be sustained, it might also become routine, even 
defined and stabilised in a particular genre, or a particular vision of time or self. The 
conclusion of this chapter considers time in time, as it were, in order to determine 
whether Nabokov’s figures (both his mise en abymes and his rambling comparisons) 
are finally led to some form of destination in their ceaseless wandering. 
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Pivots and codas: mise en abyme in time 
 
Pivots: jigsaw puzzles, miniatures, collections 
 
A mise en abyme as non-definitional and paradoxical as that of the match-theme 
should at least avoid making the narrative that follows completely redundant: the 
elements and motifs might be familiar enough, but there is an element of surprise in 
identifying which part of the scattered non-patterns they echo. One could then 
conclude that it might be difficult for any mise en abyme following such an opening 
act to be read as anything else than a pale shadow. A quick survey of the examples 
that follow the match-theme reveals them to be more modest not only in their 
intentions and patterning, but also in their hermeneutical (or rather anti-
hermeneutical) power and authority. Rather than seeking to dominate over its 
predecessors, they complement each other: they will aspire to illuminate merely a 
fragment of the text (or rather a fragment of its production and reception) rather 
than the whole. 
Jigsaw puzzles, for instance — the first mise en abyme after the match-theme — 
synthesise merely one aspect of the writing and the reading process, the piecing 
together of fragments according to affinities and (deceiving) resemblances: 
Under her expert hands, the thousand bits of a jigsaw puzzle gradually 
formed an English hunting scene; what had seemed to be the limb of a 
horse would turn out to belong to an elm and the hitherto unplaceable 
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piece would snugly fill up a gap in the mottled background, affording 
one the delicate thrill of an abstract yet tactile satisfaction.110 
 
The puzzle includes a mottled background, but merely as one of the pieces rather 
than the piece. We have moved from free play to a game, albeit one with a clear goal 
but no set rules. The process of puzzle-solving is here presented as successful and 
intensely satisfactory, a model in which author and reader are mirror images of each 
other rather than rivals, as if both author and reader were reconfiguring scattered 
pieces into a whole.   
But there are differences: in the jigsaw analogy, it is not clear whether the 
author is solely a puzzle-solver. In fact, he is also a puzzle-maker, cunningly 
disguising branches as horse legs, fragmenting his themes in such a way so as not to 
make them easily identifiable. The otherworldly readers (such as Alexandrov) would 
argue that he is merely copying natural mimicry, but the emphasis of this mise en 
abyme is not just on camouflage but on fragmenting and dispersing nature. As Perec 
will argue years later in the preamble to Life A User’s Manual, ‘it is not the subject of 
the picture, or the painter’s technique, that make a puzzle more or less difficult, but 
the greater or lesser subtlety of the way it has been cut’: the skill of writing and 
puzzle-making lies on the cunning with which both simple and complex images and 
                                                          
110
 Nabokov, Speak, p. 27. In Chapter Sixteen, Nabokov mentions there was a painting in his St Petersburg nursery  ‘in the 
bright sportive English style, used for hunting scenes and the like, that lends itself so well to the making of jigsaw puzzles’; it 
represented, with appropriate humour, a French nobleman’s family in exile’ (see Nabokov, Speak, p. 252). This painting is 
not in the book at all, and the quote is made up. The picture is only present in jigsaw puzzle form. 
 
164 
 
patterns (say, both mottled backgrounds and mischievous horse-leg-like branches) 
are fragmented and distributed. 111 
The jigsaw-puzzle is a fundamentally optimistic mirror-image for Speak, 
Memory, offering the tantalising promise of completion as a reward for the reader’s 
patience. The conclusion of the book (and final mise en abyme) is related to the stable 
figurative model imposed by the jigsaw puzzle. Speak, Memory ends at the point 
when Nabokov, his wife and his son are on their way to board the ship that will take 
them to America, in the port of St Nazaire. Nabokov and Véra see the ship’s funnel 
concealed in the roofs of the town, and — instead of pointing it out to the little boy 
— they instead wait for him to realise what it is. The book ends at that point, with a 
final metaphorical flourish: the funnel is compared to ‘something in a scrambled 
picture — Find What the Sailor Has Hidden — that the finder cannot unsee once it 
has been seen’.112 
Here we have another game as a mise en abyme — a picture puzzle. This kind 
of puzzle game is no longer fragmentary: it is instead a pure, synthetic condensation 
of the most thrilling aspects of jigsaw solving. The closing image, incidentally, could 
also be read as another example of Nabokov’s engagement with the Recherche: it is 
reminiscent of Elstir’s painting of the port of Carquethuit, in which the sea was 
painted in urban terms, and the town in marine ones. The narrator sees the 
painting’s magical blending of town and sea as representing ‘the rare moments in 
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which we see nature as she is, poetically’113.  The painter seeks that ‘the eye should 
discover no fixed boundary, no absolute line of demarcation between land and 
sea’.114 Both examples play with a poetic blending effect, although Nabokov is more 
succinct and concentrated in his effects than Elstir or Proust. The contrast between 
the two ekphrastic mise en abymes articulates well how the text moves from an 
unpatterned shimmering surface, reminiscent of the Elstir painting, into something 
more concentrated and less uncertain in its effects. Unlike the painting, which brims 
with camouflaged and ambiguous images, the picture-puzzle solely focuses on one 
instance of blending which then uses as a synthesis of — among other things — the 
writing and reading process.115 
The self-conscious and meta-autobiographical character of the ending has 
been frequently remarked upon: Norman, for instance, concludes that ‘the puzzle is 
the motif with which Nabokov chooses to end his autobiography, and is the model 
he has employed as a structuring device’.116 In another essay, however, Norman had 
identified a different organising principle for the book, the collection. 117  His 
hesitation is not an inconsistency: both models can be said to work in conjunction. 
Collections are the first stage in the reading process. Ironically, these motifs appear 
in a dispersed and fragmented fashion in the text: there are successful collections (his 
mother with her basket full of Bolete mushrooms, his lepidopteral catches) and 
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unsuccessful or scattered ones (the uncommon Hairstreak butterfly that escapes 
through a hole in his net, his father’s library). 
Perhaps the most incisive insight of Norman’s analysis of the motif is his 
singling out of a particularly poignant passage about his father’s library. Nabokov 
mentions how he found in the New York Public Library ‘a copy of the neat catalogue 
he had privately printed when the phantom books listed therein still stood, ruddy 
and sleek, on his shelves’.118 For him, the catalogue 
 
Is the perfect metonym for Speak, Memory itself — a collection of signs 
pointing to absent referents, an ordering of memories. It may provide 
conclusive evidence of its library’s previous existence, but it also marks 
its absence in the present.119 
 
Norman calls this passage a coda: it represents the real end of the collection after the 
gratification and bliss of its completion. As a coda, it is out of sequence, proleptic, as 
if Nabokov was hiding the end half-way through the middle. If the collection is a 
figure for reception, it presents the process in the wrong order:  by ending with the 
successful completion of the puzzle, he obscures the fact puzzles and collections do 
not end when they are finished and done — they might have special sequels and 
afterlives in which they might become undone again or disappear into one’s stomach, 
like the ceps his mother gathered.120 
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 I will not be able to devote the attention it deserves to another two important 
cluster of mirror-images: miniatures, of which Chapter Seven (the story of a seaside 
childhood romance) and Chapter Eight (the story of his tutors, where we find the 
octopus/lamp) are good examples — to the point that the latter could be read as a 
parody of the former, a deliberate undermining of its synecdochal purposes. 121 
Chapter Eleven (the story of Nabokov’s first poem), which might be considered 
superficially as another miniature, has nonetheless more in common with a different 
style of mise en abyme, what Dällenbach calls the transcendental type or the fiction of 
origin. 
Its most obvious model is again probably Proust (the episode of the church 
spires in the Guermantes walk), although it also draws heavily on Romantic poetics. 
This episode has been used (by Moraru or Alexandrov) as the evidence of Nabokov’s 
transcendental mode of autobiographical reference. The chapter, however, is a 
synthesis of all stages of literary composition, displayed in order (unlike the puzzle 
or the collection mise en abyme): the triumph of inspiration (understood as an exercise 
in establishing relations between disparate objects), the charms and perils of rhyme 
(sometimes a revelation of secret links between words, others usurping the poem 
from the poet) and finally, and curiously, the uncomfortable disappointment of 
completion. At the end of the chapter Nabokov reads his first poem to his mother 
(who, moved and proud, begins to cry) and is startled by the consequences of his 
writing: 
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She passed me a hand mirror so that I could see the smear of blood on 
my cheekbone where at some indeterminate time I had crushed a 
gorged mosquito by the unconscious act of propping my cheek on my 
fist. But I saw more than that. Looking into my own eyes, I had the 
shocking sensation of finding the mere dregs of my usual self, odds 
and ends of an evaporated identity which it took my reason quite an 
effort to gather again in the glass.122 
   
The chapter reproduces the text’s mottled, sun-and shade games in a 
heightened, quasi-hysterical manner, moving from summer storm to the brightest of 
rainbows and sunlight and finally to a night scene illuminated in stark chiaroscuro: a 
bright landscape ― a Benois, say, who is mentioned in the chapter ― morphed into a 
De La Tour interior.123 Wood provides an incisive analysis of this conclusion, which 
he reads as a counter-epiphany of dispersal (a legacy from his mother — who 
collected things that were destined to be eaten rather than preserved): 
 
She allows him to see that writing too is loss, a form of dishevelment. 
This is not the way Nabokov usually talks about writing, or about 
himself [...] Nabokov elsewhere insisted so much on the composed self 
because the ‘shocking’ truth of writing continued to shock him. He 
didn’t want to hide it, and he is confessing it here. But he didn’t want 
to parade it, and the bravery of reconstruction appealed to him much 
more than the memory of disarray.124 
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Following Wood’s argument, we could argue that Nabokov avoids giving too much 
emphasis to this shocking truth by scrambling the order in which it appears: 
reconstruction is disguised as the sequel, rather than the origin, of disarray. The mise 
en abyme of Chapter Eleven might represent the book in the ‘right order’, but it is an 
order susceptible to be infinitely repeated, and its meaning depends on the point in 
which the pattern decides to end. Reconstruction is both the beginning and the end 
of dispersal, and dispersal is the beginning and the end of reconstruction. 
This overview of the pivots of Speak, Memory has not done much to dispel the 
fear of redundancy: and yet, as we read on, we are gripped in an anxious collecting 
fever in which yet another example of a motif calls for our attention, always 
revealing the same and something else. All mise en abymes are propping different 
aspects of the inconclusive conclusion of Chapter One, and yet they do so in a way 
which explicitly counters the methods of the beginning: the change from metaphors 
of free play (such as sun-and-shade effects, upwards and downwards movements) to 
metaphors of games (collecting, jigsaws, picture puzzles) suggest the progressive 
atrophy of the shimmering movements that Karshan talked about. They suggest a 
more tightly-controlled (game-like) model of reception and do it in a more overt and 
explicit fashion than the initial one. And yet, once their whole is reassembled 
according to the manufacturer’s instructions, the result is a similarly undefined end-
product. We are no closer to being able to define the book’s stand on temporality or 
its genre: for example, the same figures that support the hyper-autobiography 
position (the puzzle, the first poem) also support the anti-autobiographical thesis 
(the text as deceit, artifice, dispersal).  Again, we need to read on. 
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Coda: The chess problem 
 
‘If the initial mise en abyme says everything before the fiction has really started, the 
final or terminal mise en abyme has nothing to say save repeating what is already 
known’.125 Nothing to say: this is Dällenbach’s rather blunt dictum about the coda, 
and the nothing it says might be even less if everything has been said at the 
beginning, and then the same everything has been repeated myriad times across the 
book.  And yet Nabokov includes a coda: or rather, several of them. An immediate 
explanation for this double hermeneutical reinforcement of Speak, Memory might be 
the leaky quality that we have observed in the text’s pivots (which complement but 
also relativize each other’s interpretative solutions) and the seemingly hieratic non-
committal symmetry of Chapter One. 
Several unanswered questions mingle at the conclusion, or rather at the brink 
of the conclusion of Speak, Memory. Generic definition has been related to the tension 
between spontaneous, unauthored coincidence and a coincidence achieved through 
metaphors, tropes and authorial acts of ‘folding’ or piece cutting. Although both 
types of coincidence are “autobiographical” (or “fictional”), the first one 
presupposes the presence of a reality (even of a reality mirroring a supra-reality) that 
the second one does not take for granted at all, a presence that can only take place as 
absence. Both problematically share the same props. 
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Speak, Memory’s coda needs to be considered in relation to this uneasiness. 
Although Dällenbach conceives that an initial or a middle mise en abyme might 
contradict or offer differing interpretations — and thus act as isotopic shifters — he 
does not think the coda might seek to do the same. For him the problem of semantic 
redundancy can only be avoided in one way, ‘by moving on to a higher plane and 
universalizing the meaning of the narrative’, perhaps by resorting to ‘a tale or 
myth’.126 Speak, Memory’s coda, which appears at the end of chapter fourteen is 
neither of those and has no obvious universalising purpose by itself. 
The coda appears just after the other terminal mise en abyme, the portrait of 
Sirin (the pseudonym he used in his Russian writings) which employs a very 
different strategy, reminiscent of that Chapter Sixteen.127 Unfortunately I will not be 
able to give it sufficient attention (there are excellent analyses of this section by 
James Wood, Max Saunders and Michael Wood) — as a coda, it is deliberately 
inconclusive: an advert for Nabokov’s misleading modes of figuration (described, 
aptly, as ‘a rolling corollary, the shadow of a train of thought’).128 In contrast to this 
oblique masked approach, the book’s other coda is modelled after a game — a chess 
problem, a sign that the play of sun and shade has evolved into a patterned 
monochrome board and a rule-bound game. 
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Chess problems are described as ‘highly specialised, fanciful, stylish 
riddles’:129 
[A] beautiful, complex and sterile art related to the ordinary form of the 
game only insofar as, say, the properties of a sphere are made use of 
both by a juggler in weaving a new act and by a tennis player in 
winning a tournament.130 
 
The next two paragraphs make the analogy between chess-problem setting and 
literature (poetry in particular) even more explicit.131 The process of composition is 
described in terms similar to those of literary creation. Although the ostensible 
purpose of this extended metaphor is to assimilate writing to problem-setting, its 
effect is actually the opposite: it highlights the poetic or literary qualities of chess 
problems, and thus emphasises rather than contains the book’s shimmering play. 
The board becomes ‘a system of stresses and abysses’ (note the sibilant 
alliteration) — a succinct but evocative summary of the book’s combination of 
harmony and vertigo. 132  The description of his problems (‘I was always ready to 
sacrifice purity of form to the exigencies of fantastic content, causing form to bulge 
and burst like a sponge-bag containing a small furious devil’) seems tailor-made for 
his similes.133 The strangeness of the connection, taking the cosy ‘bathing’ motif into 
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a rather unexpected place conveys the tensions created by the book’s hermeneutical 
time-bomb. 134 
The compact shock of the simile is nonetheless defused as the reader is taken 
further and further into the analogy. The mise en abyme moves from a description of 
chess-problem setting to a specific chess-problem that the reader cannot avoid 
interpreting as a mirror-image for the book. Nabokov’s model here is Lewis Carroll, 
who also started Through the Looking-Glass with a chess problem en abyme. 135 
Nabokov’s problem, a mate in two moves, is the allegorical ‘expression’ of a 
particular theme.136 Nabokov describes (and solves) the problem before giving out 
the position of the pieces. This is his account: 
 
 It was meant for the delectation of the very expert solver. The 
unsophisticated might miss the point of the problem entirely, and 
discover its fairly simple, ‘thetic’ solution without having passed 
through the pleasurable torments prepared for the sophisticated one. 
The latter would start by falling for an illusory pattern of play based 
on an avant-garde theme (exposing White’s kings to checks), which the 
composer had taken the ‘greatest’ pains to ‘plant’ (with only one 
obscure little move by an inconspicuous pawn to upset it). Having 
passed through this ‘antithetic’ inferno the by now ultrasophisticated 
solver would reach the simple key move (bishop to c2) as somebody 
on a wild goose chase might go to Albany to New York by way of 
Vancouver, Eurasia and the Azores. The pleasant experience of the 
roundabout route (strange landscapes, gongs, tigers, exotic customs, 
the thrice-repeated circuit of a newly married couple around the 
sacred fire of an earthen brazier) would amply reward him for the 
misery of the deceit, and, after that, his arrival at the simple key move 
would provide him with a synthesis of poignant artistic delight.137 
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The purpose of describing and solving the problem before readers have a chance to 
do it themselves is not deceitful: Nabokov’s description is accurate, the solution 
correct.138 Nabokov reverses solution and exposition partly because he probably was 
only too aware the whole thing might be mercilessly skipped if left bare, partly to 
force a rereading of the chapter. 
The Phileas Fogg-like rambling comparison is in fact echoing the abstract 
discussion about spirals and the Hegelian triad which opened this chapter: the 
referent of the allegory/abyme of the chess-problem might not be Speak, Memory itself 
but the spiral. In another of the book’s authorial self-definitions, the spiral is 
imposed as the primary structural principle of his life (and book?): 
 
The spiral is a spiritualised circle. In the spiral form, the circle, uncoiled, 
unwound, has ceased to be vicious; it has been set free. I thought this 
up when I was a boy, and I also discovered that Hegel’s triadic series 
[...] represents the essential spirality of all things in relation to time. [...] 
If we consider the simplest spiral, three stages may be distinguished in 
it, corresponding to those of the triad: We can call ‘thetic’ the small 
curve or arc that initiates the convolution centrally; ‘antithetic’ the 
larger arc that faces the first in the process of continuing it; and 
‘synthetic’ the still simpler arc that continues the second while 
following the first along the outer side. And so on.139 
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The next paragraph uses the Hegelian triad to splice his life cleanly into three parts: 
thesis (childhood and adolescence in Russia), antithesis (European exile) and 
synthesis (American years, ‘and new thesis’, he added in 1966): the terms also used 
to describe the chess problem.140 This passage has invited critics to create an analogy 
between the shape of his life and the shape of his book. Bruss reads the first five 
chapters as the thesis, the next five as the antithesis and the last five as the 
synthesis.141  Book and life, however, are not as analogous as Bruss believes, which 
explains the awkwardness of some of her divisions (her synthetic part contains both 
the antithetic and synthetic solution). If the book resembles a spiral at all, it is an 
asymmetrical and a three-dimensional one, with a thesis four times as long as its 
antithesis and a synthesis which is not actually part of the visible design but only 
glimpsed through its crevices. 
Bruss’s tripartite division is founded upon a specifically ‘spiritual’ or moral 
reading of the spiral, in which the pattern represents moral development, an escape 
from the self and an awareness of the sufferings of others. The spiral model suggests 
a different model of selfhood: one closer to the confession, and thus to traditional 
autobiography.  Indeed, Diment had not singled out the spiral structure as one of the 
text’s curiosities, but as a textual device that the text ‘flaunts’. 142  Nabokov’s 
description of the spiral compares it favourably to the (vicious) circle as its improved, 
‘spiritualised’ version — perhaps in an attempt offer a moral definition of the figures, 
and to make explicit the ethical dimension of pattern. Ellen Pifer — who compares 
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the book to Lolita — reads the book as a transparent confession, an account of his 
moral evolution.143   
Nabokov’s account of his last meeting with his teenage sweetheart Tamara 
could be read in a confessional key, as a questioning of the restorative powers of 
memory and pattern and a rejection of his achronic “confessions”. The narrative of 
the meeting superimposes his obsession with coincidence (presented as an 
adolescent phase) with a mature ethical consideration about  the suffering of others, 
which — as Richard Rorty pointed out — tends to get conveyed through the use of 
poignant details (in this case, the bar of chocolate the girl breaks nervously during 
the encounter). 144  The contrast between the two details signals a possible split 
between selves, and presents memory as a palimpsest: the adult memory is written 
over the adolescent one, and it corrects it in shame. Symbolic, circular achrony is 
here substituted by a linear and temporal idea of selfhood and narrative time. Or 
perhaps not: the spiral, after all, is an ambivalent figure. It imposes a stable linear 
model in the narrative but in doing so it sets in motion the unstable whirligigs of 
figuration and the distance from its origins. The farewell scene might condemn 
pattern but it also makes use of it to create an ethical reading of the scene. The 
broken chocolate bar matches the broken glass under which Andersen’s Little 
Mermaid (Tamara is compared to the fairy-tale character) is forced to walk for love 
or the chocolates lonely Mademoiselle used to devour.145 
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Nabokov’s brief sketch of his brother Sergey is a poignant example of a failed 
confession: he is aware that the portrait is incomplete and faulty, an apology for 
having ‘balked’ the task  but which fails again to write him back into the book.146 
Norman notes that Sergey’s appearances ‘are brief, dull and incidental. He is not 
assimilated into the patterning of the work, or found to coincide with its many 
thematic and symbolic structures’. 147  This failed restoration destabilises the 
confessional model and demonstrates its insufficiency, the incomplete and 
problematic character of its claims to presence, particularly in its moral dimension. 
The very form of the spiral as a figure of reflexivity excludes the possibility of 
arriving at a stable moral point, closing the gap between selves and reconstructing 
the broken self in the mirror. It is adopted only to be subverted and to be exposed as 
aporetic. Infinity can never be as cosy or as comforting as a bath. It is always a devil 
in a sponge-bag: it will burst out, even if its position conceals it. 
 
 The devilish conclusion of our exploration of the spiral mise en abyme is a 
warning against reading the chess-problem coda as what it initially purports to be: a 
figure that imposes a solution to the text and stabilises its flurries and its devils. It 
can be read as a stable model of reception and definition, but also as an infinite one. 
As is the case with other self-referential figures, it problematizes the 
correspondences it purports to illuminate, in this case, between the spiral, the 
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Hegelian triad and the problem. Because the problem is solvable, one may be led to 
think that is also the case with the book.  Indeed, many critics have considered the 
chess problem as the instruction manual not only of Speak, Memory but of the whole 
of Nabokov’s oeuvre.148 
Nabokov’s description of the chess problem could be used as evidence for this 
argument. For instance, the anchoring of the problem to the historical context of its 
composition (May 1940, after the Nabokovs had finally managed to obtain a visa to 
emigrate to the United States) enhances its definitive and defined quality. In the final 
paragraph, the reader finally accesses the problem in toto: Nabokov offers its set-up 
on the board and its material reality. He reveals it was composed on a piece of paper 
stamped by the French Authorities, symbolising the release of both problem and 
author from Nazi control.149 Nabokov concludes the chapter with the assertion that a 
secret has been revealed: ‘it is only now, many years later, that the information 
concealed in my chess symbols, which that control permitted to pass, may be, and is 
in fact, divulged’. 150 The stamp might be the watermark — finally disclosed. 
It may seem perverse to read this sentence and indeed the whole problem as 
anything other than a solution. Boyd interprets problem and stamp as the keys to the 
book: ‘the [...] stamp also solved [...] the real-life problem of exile. America [...] 
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provided as neat a synthetic solution [...] as bishop to c2’.151 Boyd’s reading is backed 
by biographical information that the book omits: Nabokov’s wife (the ‘you’ in the 
paragraph) was Jewish, so obtaining the visa was a question of life and death for the 
family, an unambiguous solution. It is, however, also a private one, like the 
addresses to ‘you’: something that the text refuses to reveal completely. It highlights 
how his autobiography is deliberately detached from his self, and should not 
perhaps be defined in terms of its supposed connection to its author. 
However, the strongest argument against a conclusive reading of the mise en 
abyme is to be found in the figures that “stamp” Nabokov’s supposed “solution”.  
His identification with an emigration bureaucrat could be read as a rather self-
deprecating portrayal of his slightly paranoid control over his text’s ‘information’ 
(exemplified by the saturation of mise en abymes and codas). The comparison 
between the problem and a poem (rather than a narrative) tends to be disregarded: 
like a poem, it should not necessarily be read as a story with a beginning, middle 
and end. Its end, its solution, is a convention: a constraint that needs to be respected 
in chess problems (like rhyme or meter), but which does not define it and has no 
symbolic significance. 
The Hegelian triad, as we mentioned previously, imposes a model based on a 
solution which is ill at odds with the problem itself. Although many critics have 
used the problem as a hermeneutical key, not many tend to read it closely. When 
they do (as in the case of Chris Ackerley), they follow closely the pattern established 
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by the Hegelian triad.152   Ackerley describes the play alternatives in terms of the 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis model: the thetic solution involves promoting a pawn to 
Queen, which doesn’t work because it can only involve one move (the problem is in 
two moves). 153 In the antithetic inferno — the ‘avant-garde’ solution in the figurative 
and literal sense, as it involves a piece at the avant-garde of the board — that very 
same pawn is promoted to knight, which opens up six possible mate options. All of 
those, however, can be countered by moving ‘an apparently innocuous pawn’: this 
move means that none of the six mates can be realised in the stipulated two moves. 
The synthetic solution involves no promotion but rather the blocking of that pesky 
pawn at the back though the bishop (the key move) which opens up four possible 
mate options to solve the problem. 
In chess problems, there can be several options for the second move (all valid) 
but only one for the first move. Ackerley justifies the problem’s analogy to the 
Hegelian triad by describing the first move as the synthesis of the problem. Whilst 
this reading is valid, it leaves a question open about how to read the four second-
moves in relation to Speak, Memory. If we identify the move to America as ‘bishop to 
c2’, then we could consider that (say) Nabokov’s literary success, his entomological 
discoveries, his happy family life and his scholarly achievements are the four 
possible “second moves”. The analogy is possible, almost plausible, but it is 
awkward and messy: those achievements are simultaneous rather than four options 
excluding each other. 
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The chess problem imposes a temporal model which is not as linear or as 
straightforward as the ‘roundabout route’ comparison makes it. The solution takes 
place half-way through — after it is found, the solver still needs to discover the 
different “second moves”.  The “solution” is displaced from its apparent conclusive 
position, and thus becomes difficult to identify. It might be the catalogue (the coda 
according to Norman), but it could be anything else: even the octopus, the manikin 
or the snow. Continuing with the deliberately faulty allegory, it is even more 
difficult to find equivalents in the text for the promoted white pawn, the bishop, or 
the ‘innocuous’ black pawn. Solution is here turned into a figure. 
Like the octopus-lamp itself, the chess problem will be dispersed by the figure 
which immediately follows it. Chapter Fifteen opens with one of the most haunting 
of Nabokov’s figures of absence, a return to the Berlin setting of the manikin and the 
snow. Nabokov remembers walking back home in the early hours after his son was 
born, and being startled by how the familiar evening shadows (which he remembers 
from when he had walked in the same streets ‘childless’) were reversed in the early 
morning. He goes on to compare them to the reflection 
 
In the mirror of a barbershop the window toward which the 
melancholy barber [...] turns his gaze [...], and, framed in that reflected 
window, a stretch of sidewalk shunting a procession of unconcerned 
pedestrians in the wrong direction, into an abstract world that all at one 
stops being droll and looses a torrent of terror.154 
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The meaning of this terror is unfathomable. It might have been triggered by the 
word ‘childless’: the fear that his son’s birth could be reversed into his death, his 
absence. 155  The endless reversed reflections of the barbershop mirrors echo the 
manikin and its ceaseless repetition and make it unsettling, uncanny. In fact, the last 
chapter could be read as a deliberate delay of the dispersed model of figuration of 
the chess problem: a delay justified by a fear that cannot be ‘unseen’ once seen — 
like the solution of the picture puzzle. 
The text’s final return to the mise en abyme of the jigsaw puzzle does not 
necessarily represent a return to a more optimistic or comforting reading of pattern, 
or of the book’s genre.156 It might be not the key move after all: the chess problem has 
made the conclusions problematic, doubtful, floating. The puzzle model is 
temporary: it will be scattered, the discovery that ‘cannot be unseen’ will lead 
another thesis, and the port of St Nazaire will be turned into the port of Carquethuit, 
a shimmering surface where everything is dispersed and blended.157 
 
The snow — the most unadorned and inconspicuous of the items in the inventory —
was perhaps the real key to Speak, Memory, to its mode of dispersed figuration 
pierced by absences. It even conveys the flurry-like and unsettled nature of these 
generic and temporal definitions as they were reflected (perhaps uncannily) in the 
mirror of the chess problem. The text’s differing versions of itself (as an 
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autobiography, a confession, a copy of an otherworld or a solid and beautiful edifice) 
might be nothing else than its false moves — to be neutralised by a pawn, to be 
neutralised in its turn by a bishop. None of those moves has any authority over the 
others: even figuration itself might be one of them.   
What matters about Speak, Memory’s flurry-like definition — and what it 
reveals about the generic debate — is that it is not a definition. It resists it, and 
quietly points out to the reader the mechanical reductive (shaving) quality of such 
readings.  Although the notion that something resists definition has become 
something of a critical cliché (a bronze ceiling lamp in itself),  it is one that — like the 
‘dreadful’ lamp itself — might allow the ‘life’ of autobiography to flee the 
confinements of identity, of definitions and enclosures. It is because it is ‘dreadful’ 
and fear-inspiring in its unflinching uncovering of absence that autobiography (and 
the lamp) may “float” and survive, as its readers contemplate the miracle and purr ― 
as Lenski did. 
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Chapter Three 
The frame: Georges Perec’s W or the Memory of 
Childhood (1975) 
[I]t’s because of this present [...] that I’ve 
always thought frames were precious objects. 
Even nowadays I stop to look at them in the 
windows of camera shops, and I am 
surprised every time I come across frames for 
five or ten francs in Prisunic chain stores. 
Georges Perec, W or the Memory of Childhood.
1 
 
 
Perec’s frame, compared to a metamorphosed lamp and a self-consciously 
curious toy soldier, seems rather ordinary in comparison to our other 
samples. Unlike the lamp, it is not “elevated” by metaphor from its banal 
disguise. What turns the frame into a ‘precious object’ is another frame: just as 
the humble leather frame protected the photograph of Perec’s father 
(propping and emphasising its value and singularity), Perec’s poignant but 
understated description protects the frame and makes it valuable, ‘precious’, 
curious. 
But there is more. The passage is framing the leather-frame (which, in 
its turn, is framing the photograph) not once but twice: the whole passage is a 
footnote — that is, a narrative frame for Perec’s detailed description of his 
father’s photograph. Along with other twenty-six notes, it supports a short 
autobiographical piece about Perec’s parents which he wrote in his early 
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twenties. This piece — printed in bold to “frame” it from the rest of the text — 
was itself an early attempt of young Perec to provide — of course — a written 
frame for that cherished photograph of his father.   
The piece thus starts with a description of the photograph in a tone 
which is alternately neutral and empirical (‘He is tall. He is bareheaded’), 
speculative and conjectural (‘Between the polished military boots — it is 
Sunday —‘) and blank and tautological (‘The father in the photograph poses 
like a father’).2 The footnotes/frames try to correct those speculations (‘to 
judge by its format (15.5x11.5), it is not an amateur’s snapshot’), but the 
reader is uncertain as to whether those propping deductions are accurate or 
not.3 As Gunnthórunn Gudmundsdóttir explains, ‘what at first sight seemed a 
detailed, rather objective description [...] has become suspect like many of 
Perec’s memories’. 4  And, we may add, the footnote/frame might have 
unwittingly spread that suspicion to itself. The reader cannot ascertain the 
factual veracity of any of the descriptions because this photograph (or indeed 
any of the other photographs described) is not included in the text. We only 
have frames. 
Gudmunsdóttir points out how photographs in W or the Memory of 
Childhood are ‘historical documents that do not give any information beyond 
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their appearance, clues to a gap, a lack, to nothing’.5 They do not ‘evoke 
memories, only absence’.6 In other words, they are frames. The leather one — 
for all its propping abilities — spreads inwards and outwards in infinite 
regress.  If by looking in the reader is only lead to more frames (the 
photograph-frame is but the beginning of the chain, as we will see), the same 
process also takes place when the reader looks out. 
The section which contains the description and the footnote is part of 
an autobiographical narrative comprised of nineteen short sections. This 
collection of fragments was also a frame for a novella called W. Perec 
published it in instalments in Le Quinzaine Litteraire between 1969 and 1970, 
and reprinted it with hardly any changes in W or the Memory of Childhood.7 W 
had been initially advertised as an old-fashioned adventure yarn, but the 
serial was a rather more unusual production.8 
Although it starts with a first person narrator promising the reader an 
account of his terrifying adventures in an island called W, the story that 
follows — in which a suitably mysterious stranger asks our protagonist to 
help with the search for a deaf-mute boy who has gone missing after a 
shipwreck — is interrupted when the quest is about to start. As David Bellos 
recounts in his biography, Perec prefaced the seventh instalment of the story 
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(the beginning of the “adventure” so carefully framed) with a note which 
emphasised the interruption with ‘unpalatable bluntness’:9 
 
There was no story so far. Forget what you have read: it was a 
different tale, at most a prologue, or a memory so distant that 
what follows cannot fail to submerge it. For it is now that it all 
begins, now that he sets off in his search.10 
 
But there was to be no search (and no ‘he’ either) in the rest of the serial. What 
followed was a dystopian narrative, told in ‘the cold, impassive tone of the 
ethnologist’ about W, an island off the Tierra del Fuego.11 The narrator, if it is 
still him, is a mere observer. W’s society revolves around sport and 
competition, and is governed by the Olympic ideal. This ideal, however, is 
taken to its extremes: W’s inhabitants are routinely humiliated and 
dehumanised in the name of Sport. 
An inventory of increasingly cruel and debasing competitions follows, 
which is interrupted, in its turn, by an eerie prolepsis in which readers are 
told that when someone enters the Fortress (the site where rulers, women and 
children lived) in an unspecified future they will only find 
 
The subterranean remnants of a world he will think he had 
forgotten: piles of gold teeth, rings and spectacles, thousands and 
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thousands of clothes in heaps, dusty card indexes, and stocks of 
poor-quality soap... 12 
 
As Philippe Lejeune aptly explains, the reader soon realises that W is ‘an 
allegorical narrative not about what may happen, but about what has 
happened’.13 What was left (or will be left) of the people of W is also what was 
left of the victims of Nazi concentration camps. The second part of W re-
enacts the horrors of the camps for the readers, making them forget what 
came before and relentlessly dismantling hopes of adventure or heroism. This 
is the dimension which W or the Memory of Childhood and its autobiographical 
frame props. The first section starts by stating how Perec lost both his parents 
and how he has ‘no childhood memories’.14 He cannot truly explain why, or 
rather he can only explain it too well: ‘History with a capital H, had answered 
the question in my stead: the war, the camps’.15 
 The reader wonders whether that is the last frame in the chain, but 
History does not really answer the question. The French original (‘Histoire 
avec sa grande hache’) — as many critics have pointed out — puns with the 
two meanings of ‘hache’: the letter and “axe”.16 History is not a frame, it an 
axe: as Ross Chambers explains, this H/axe 
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Has chopped into his existence, inserting into it a gap or a blank 
that has made that existence a divided one [...] (dis)joined by a 
hiatus that renders his sense of being precarious.17 
 
History is another gap, like the photographs were. After looking outwards we 
are back to where we started, to the frame in the shop window and the 
Prisunic. Indeed, what makes those objects so poignantly ‘precious’ is not just 
that they are frames, but also that (we imagine) they are empty.  W or the 
Memory of Childhood might be the frame of W (the 1969-70 short novel), but if it 
is, it is — like the one in window— painfully blank. Or potentially full. We 
don’t know yet. 
 The purpose of this chapter will be to explore the paradoxes and 
enigmas raised by the empty frame and its seemingly endless multiplications 
and echoes. As we have seen by our “looking outwards” operation, the frame 
is used as a mirror-image, a mise en abyme  which reflects the  ambivalent and 
paradoxical nature of the text itself, half-autobiography, half-fiction — half-
narrative, half-gap. The text’s explicit performance of these clefts (which were 
equally observable in the description of the photograph and its combination 
of objectivity, conjecture and tautology) make this text a particularly 
appropriate tool with which to explore the debates around the generic 
definition of autobiography, its narrative structure and the nature of its 
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figurations, as well as its ethical dimension (which is brought to the fore by 
the text). W or the Memory of Childhood — like the picture frame — articulates 
what Chambers has described as a ‘poetics of quandary’ in which binary 
oppositions such as presence and absence, concordance and discordance, and 
— inevitably —autobiography and fiction are interrogated though the 
paradoxical enigma of another word which — like the frame — is 
misleadingly “cheap”, small, and easy to ignore: ‘ou’, or — in English — ‘or’.18 
The chapter starts by reading the ‘or’ in the book’s title and the frame 
in relation to the dilemma of the text’s generic definition, then moves to an 
exploration of the paratextual frames of the book, and finally to a review of 
critical approaches to those frames in relation to the text’s generic status and 
its testimonial dimension as a narrative of the Holocaust.  The second and 
third sections explore the text’s use of mise en abyme and its relation to its 
temporal structure as a way of approaching the text’s paradoxical mode of 
figuration. Although critics have approached the text’s ‘poetics of quandary’ 
though certain lenses (its use of letters, for instance), mise en abyme and 
narrative time have remained relatively underexplored: however, the text’s 
mode of endless reflexivity and its puzzling temporal enigmas will be 
revealed as mirror-images of each other. Its conjunction and disjunction form 
the lens through which this chapter approaches this text’s ultimately 
ambiguous and indeterminate mode of figuration. 
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The division between the second and third section is not based around 
thematic lines, but instead follows the book’s own split between Parts One 
and Two.  This approach tries to stay close to the torturous but obsessive 
experience of reading the text, in order to allow us to discern the dialogues 
and collisions between its fictional and autobiographical segments, as well as 
the relation between the text’s temporal structure and its use of mise en abyme. 
The conclusion tries to bring those analyses together in relation to a question 
posed by the conjunction of the frame and the ‘or’: once purchased, can the 
frame perform its duties? Will it be able to hold together and contain the hole 
of indeterminacy (the ‘or’) at its centre? 
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The Or-Text: (or)igins, frames and the generic definition of W or 
the Memory of Childhood 
 
 
It is easy to overlook the significance of the disjunctive conjunction in the title 
of our curiosity. Its use is not original: Melville’s Pierre; or, the Ambiguities or 
Moby Dick; or the Whale or Nabokov’s Ada or Ardor: a Family Chronicle — to 
give examples from two of Perec’s favourite authors — also have disjunctive 
titles.19 The second arm of the disjunction is traditionally used to provide a 
second explanatory title (usually referring to the book’s theme). Of course, it 
may also be possible to read the second part not as an additional title but as 
another title: the book’s title is either Pierre or The Ambiguities. In ordinary 
language, ‘or’ can refer to two types of logical disjunction: it can be either 
logical or inclusive (where one or more of its components is true, represented 
by the symbol ∨) or exclusive (where one component or the other are true, but 
not both, an “either/or” construction, represented by the symbol ⊕). 
 The next question that inevitably follows is whether the or at the centre 
of our title should be described as an inclusive or as an exclusive disjunction. 
Its layout might provide us with a clue: unlike its forebears, it has no 
punctuation and its three components appear in different lines rather than as 
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a consecutive sentence in the title page.  This separation might be a hint that 
its two alternative titles are not twins. Perhaps there is a difference, and the 
reader might need to choose. 
The dilemma posed by the word or (even its syntactical tag, 
“disjunctive conjunction” is a paradox) can nonetheless be easily overlooked 
in the light of the title’s other mysteries — such as the meaning of the letter W 
or the odd singular (‘le souvenir’ rather than ‘les’).20 Of course, for the book’s 
first readers the W itself was not a riddle, although the novella did not really 
explain the ultimate meaning of its title (it just mentions the island is called W 
because its founder might have been called Wilson). 
After the last instalment of the novella in La Quinzaine Litteraire, Perec 
added a note in which he explained to his probably baffled readers that W 
was only a fragment in a larger project, W or the Memory of Childhood.21A 
reader might have then surmised that the Memory of Childhood was the theme 
of W, and would have waited (still baffled) for the next instalment. W or the 
Memory of Childhood arrived four years later than promised: it still included W 
(in italics) and a second text woven into it, an autobiography (in Roman 
script). 22  Fiction and autobiography are alternated, constantly interrupting 
each other up to a (seemingly) central point, a page with only an ellipsis sign 
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on it. After that point (or rather points) the series fiction-memoir-fiction-
memoir starts anew. 
 We discussed previously how the autobiography section could be read 
as the ‘frame’ of the fiction, the tag or the supplement which explains it. 
Chambers — in a detailed reading of the title and the letter — reads the 
disjunctive conjunction as playing ‘an analogous role’ to the ellipsis sign 
‘while substituting for the continuity/discontinuity relation of the “points de 
suspension” an either-or of alternation, hesitation and dubiety’.23  He thinks 
initially that it might be possible to read the or as an inclusive disjunction: 
both arms are true and they explain and prop each other.24  He points out how 
Perec turns the letter W into a ‘basic figure’ from which other letters and 
symbols can be created (the letter X, the Star of David, a swastika).25 
This apparently pivotal character of the W has been picked upon by 
other critics. Madalina Akli, for instance, reads the letter as an unambiguously 
‘anchoring’ emblem which stabilises the text, a master-key: the letter ‘recalls 
his mother’s death’, designates ‘the narrative structure of the book based on 
juxtaposition and [...] convergence’ and is also ‘a prop [...] a place-mat and a 
web that allow rooting and anchoring’.26 Chambers — unlike Akli — reads on 
beyond the letter’s semblance of coherence. For him, the letter’s shape (its 
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middle in particular) point ‘to a site of juncture without connection, or 
connected disjuncture’: the centre is ‘a place of intersection and éclatement’.27 
In other words, for Chambers the W might not be an “and” but an 
“or”: it provides a prop ‘but on shifting, unstable ground’.28 The three parts of 
the title are mirror-images of each other, frames within frames. Even the 
singular ‘le’ is another unsolvable disjunction: as he remarks (as well as other 
critics such as Vincent Colonna), it could refer to ‘the general topic of 
“remembering childhood”, and hence to embrace the childhood writing of 
“W” as well as the memories addressed in the narrative of personal 
reminiscence’.29 Or it could allude to 
 
The forgotten memory [...] that cannot be recounted [...] the 
memory for which the double set of memories are only [...] a 
dubious [...] substitute, an inadequate supplementation.30 
 
The title (which Colonna describes as ‘disruptive and unifying’) spreads the 
unsolvable disjunction of its centre to its two borderlines, creating an infinite 
regress of frames — a whirligig.31 
Akli’s and Chambers’s disparate readings of the letter W illustrate in 
miniature the critical debates around Perec’s text (of course, the W is itself a 
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miniature, a synecdoche). Those debates ultimately revolve around the 
interpretation of the text’s emblems, symbols and mise en abymes — which, as 
Chambers rightly points out, are both settling and unsettling. The act of 
interpretation of emblems such as the W becomes also an act of generic 
definition, as the contrasting positions of Akli and Chambers demonstrate. 
Akli reads the W as a perfect conjunction of content and form which 
reconciles figuration and memory, fiction and autobiography; Chambers sees 
it as a sign of both disjunction and conjunction, of writing as the restoration of 
memory and writing as its absence. 
As we will shortly see, the conjunctive reading is perhaps the more 
frequent of the two. Chambers is one of the few critics who follow Perec’s 
frames inwards and outwards in their incessant expansion (although he does 
not analyse the ‘frame’ motif).32 The conclusion at which he arrives from this 
dizzying excursion provides an interesting alternative to the other approaches 
to W’s genre — which will be discussed shortly. But before doing so, it might 
be wise to consider Perec’s own generic definition: the frame of the title. It is 
likely it will leave us in the same place, but it might also allow us to look at 
the or from a safer distance. 
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‘Fragile overlapping’: X and the exergue of W or the Memory of Childhood 
 
Although I have been so far referring to definitional paratexts as “generic 
markers” (as Derrida does in ‘The Law of Genre’), it is very tempting here to 
refer to them by another metaphor he uses in Of Grammatology, the exergue.33 
The reason for that choice would have nothing to do with Derrida’s use of the 
word, or its content and resonances (there is a small coin motif in W, though) 
but simply with the word itself: it contains the e, the r and the g of Perec’s 
name, the e of the dedication and even an x, another of the alphabetic 
emblems of W.  Indeed, the first paragraph of this border-line piece ends with 
the word ‘intersection’ (Bellos translates it as ‘overlapping’) — an X. 
Initially published as a blurb (French editions place it either in the 
back-flap or at the back cover), it was moved to the front in its English 
translation  (one wonders what Perec would make of the errant drifting of his 
note, as if it was one of the lifeboats of the Bureau Veritas).34 Compared to the 
author’s note published years earlier in La Quinzaine Littéraire, this piece 
seems less enigmatic and oracular. Colonna, for instance, considers it ‘a 
veritable user’s manual to the book’.35 This section analyses how this passage 
defines W or the Memory of Childhood (or not) from both a generic and a 
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narrative point of view, in order to ascertain if this piece — ostensibly the last 
frame of the book — provides any stability to the whirligigs of the title. 
The note starts with a description of the text’s curious structure, 
suggesting a possible interpretation for it: 
 
In this book there are two texts which simply alternate: you 
might almost believe they had nothing in common, but they are 
in fact inextricably bound with each other, as though neither 
could exist on its own, as though it was only their coming 
together, the distant light they cast on each other, that could 
make apparent what is never quite said in the one, never quite 
said in the other, but said only in their fragile overlapping.36 
 
Initially, one could agree with Colonna in regarding the note as a helpful 
gloss to the mysteries of the book: the opening paragraph “explains” the 
awkward disjunction by emphasising instead the connection and 
interdependency between the two arms of the text. It inclines the reader 
towards an inclusive reading (in the line of Akli’s): there is ‘overlapping’, 
there is an X. However, the first paragraph also insists on the fragility of that 
criss-crossing: the difference between the two is rendered through the 
metaphor of distance. Fiction and autobiography are also far from one 
another, casting mutual ‘distant light’ on each other. This distance could be 
read in both spatial and temporal terms, which makes their bridging more 
difficult. An X can, after all, be unmade into a square if its four arms are 
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detached from each other: the X might be another frame inside another 
frame.37 
The opening paragraph is perhaps too inconclusive; but those readers 
looking for a manual should not desist yet. The second paragraph abandons 
foggy metaphors for clear-cut definitions, both generic and narrative. After 
establishing a kind of distant kinship between the book’s two components, 
Perec immediately proceeds to differentiate them along generic and formal 
lines: 
 
One of these texts is entirely imaginary: it’s an adventure story, 
an arbitrary but careful reconstruction of a childhood fantasy 
about a land in thrall to the Olympic ideal. The other text is an 
autobiography: a fragmentary tale of a wartime childhood, a 
tale lacking in exploits and memories, made up of scattered 
oddments, gaps, lapses, doubts, guesses and meagre anecdotes. 
Next to it, the adventure story is rather grandiose, or maybe 
dubious.38 
 
Lejeune had identified the paratext as one of the most frequent locations in 
which the ‘autobiographical pact’ is performed — this blurb might be no 
exception. It explicitly defines the two “arms” in generic terms, although not 
as a single genre: one part is clearly a fiction, the other an autobiography. And 
the fiction is not merely a fiction but ‘entirely’ a fiction: perhaps because it 
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belongs to a particularly “fictional” or non-realistic sub-genre, the adventure 
story.   
However, the sharp outlines of the definition are soon blurred by the 
supplementary (framing) description of the two parts which follows their 
definition.  The fiction is described as an ‘arbitrary but careful reconstruction 
of a childhood fantasy’: Perec hints here at its autobiographical anchoring.39  
The fiction is transmuted into an example of juvenilia — with the implication 
that it cannot be read solely in its own merits, but as a fantasy of the author’s 
youth (to use Lejeune’s expression). 
The description of the autobiography, on the other hand, does not 
dismantle its referential status: in highlighting its fragmentary nature, it 
presents it as an honest and transparent representation of the recollections it 
purports to narrate. Its form and its content are concordant.  As a definition, 
Perec’s note upsets the apparent generic balance and tilts the book towards 
autobiography: it asks us to look as the fiction as a ‘childhood fantasy’ but not 
to read the autobiography as other than referential. However, as Colonna 
points out, the two arms are also described as ‘textes’ (texts) and the whole as 
‘livre’ (book): for all the apparent certainty of the definition, Perec does not 
place the whole unambiguously within one generic camp or the other.40 
                                                          
39
 Perec, W, preface. 
40
 Colonna, ‘W, un livre blanc, pp. 15-23 (p. 17). 
 
201 
 
 Another interesting feature of the supplementary description — and 
one which allows us to read questions of genre in relation to narrative 
structure — is that it separates the two “arms” according to formal criteria. 
The description of the fiction as an adventure novel does not immediately 
confirm or deny the reader’s initial expectation about that genre’s form (one 
expects adventures to be linear and plot-driven). The description of the 
autobiography, on the other hand, immediately identifies it as a formally 
anomalous one: it is full of gaps and ‘lacking in exploits’. If the generic 
definition tilted the book towards autobiography, the narrative definition 
nonetheless characterises his approach to the genre as both sincere and 
unconventional. 
  The blurb thus defines the two arms of the book against each other. The 
fiction, in contrast to the authenticity of the fragmentary structure, becomes 
suspect and perhaps false. Narrative choices are charged with moral and even 
ideological significance: indeed, for Claire Boyle Perec’s rejection of 
traditional linear autobiography is part of an indictment of ‘totalizing 
systems’ and ‘a political commitment to uncovering their ideological blind 
spots’.41 Perhaps the genre of the adventure story (and its non-fragmentary 
form) is also morally ‘dubious’. The text’s narrative and generic choices are 
read in a moral and ideological key.  This reading, whilst convincing, is 
nonetheless based in a partial and fragmented reading of the blurb. In the 
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next sentence (‘For it begins to tell a tale and then, all of a sudden, launches 
into another’), the ‘dubious’ nature of the tale is given an explanatory frame 
which problematizes the narrative definition of the text.42 It implies that the 
‘dubious’ character of the tale of W might not be the result of its linear 
structure but rather the opposite. The fiction is here defined as a departure 
from the conventional narrative model of the adventure story: it is also 
fragmented. Perhaps there might not be any inherent moral or ideological 
value in fragmentariness: the tale might be suspect because of its cleft and 
elliptical nature. If that is true, readers may wonder whether the 
autobiographical is equally ‘dubious’. Maybe, maybe not. As Colonna puts it, 
‘this new hiatus weakens the autobiographical covering of the fiction and the 
homogenisation of the two texts’.43 Again, we are faced with a supplementary 
prop which ends up disturbing the stability fixed by its predecessor. 
The blurb, however, does not end there either. It concludes by 
returning to the question posed by the beginning: how the two parts — which 
the ‘defining’ paragraph has starkly divided, particularly in narrative terms 
— might relate to one another. 
For it begins to tell one tale and then, all of a sudden, launches 
into another: in this break, in this split suspending the story on 
an unidentifiable expectation, can be found the point of 
departure for the whole of this book: the points of suspension on 
which the broken threads of childhood and the web of writing 
are caught.44 
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The conclusion returns to the blurry focus and figural language of the start in 
order to explore the significance of the gap between the two texts. This gap, 
marked by an ellipsis sign, is described through both temporal and spatial 
metaphors. Perec first calls it an ‘attente’, an ‘expectation’: although Bellos’s 
translation is correct, the French word can also refer to a concrete waiting 
period as well as to an abstract concept. The gap is thus an interruption of the 
flow of the reading process. Perec then switches to a spatial metaphor and 
calls it ‘the point of departure’. The gap is redefined not as an interruption but 
a kind of omphalos, its belly button, at the same time centre and origin (or is it 
(or)igin?) of the whole structure. Again we are faced with a (tilted) choice. 
Having concluded the preface/blurb, readers may wonder whether 
they have been led to a more stable observation point. The opening and the 
middle haven’t, but we can still hope for a last-minute change. The 
spatial/temporal metaphors initially seem useful, although we may wonder 
whether we should actually interpret them in those terms. The spatial figure 
is also temporal (the point of departure as the true beginning of the book) and 
the temporal one spatial (the ellipsis as the bus stop or station platform in 
which we wait for the journey to start again). They designate similar spaces or 
spots of time. The omphalos reading also misinterprets the supposed centrality 
of the ellipsis: it might be a symbolic centre, but it is not a physical one. The 
book is interrupted a third of the way, rather than in the middle: W — unlike 
“W”— is not symmetrical. That does not necessarily make the ellipsis any less 
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of a departure point, but it hinders any easy identification between the stable 
model created by the W and a text which might not be balanced, and which 
denies us the chance of reading this dissymmetry (or inclination) as a definite 
choice. 
The textile (and textual) tropes are equally hard to pin down. 
Childhood and writing are defined using different metaphors: his childhood 
and his memories are ‘broken threads’, writing is a ‘web’, and they are 
‘caught’ in the ellipsis — a verb that turns the ‘points de suspension’ into a 
spider-web or a fishing net.  The figures seem inconclusive — like the ellipsis 
sign. Indeed, they can be read alongside Chambers’s detailed analysis of that 
ellipsis sign (which he reads on its own, without its paratextual props). He 
starts by affirming that the ‘points de suspension’ point’ (his pun) at a 
‘supportive function of writing’, which turns it into ‘a relic [...] when the 
possibility of completeness and wholeness has been exploded and 
nothingness threatens’.45  So, if we consider the web of the ellipsis from this 
point of view, the points might be able to catch the falling threads, and thus 
repair the cleft of the ‘or’ — as well as the cleft between genres and narrative 
styles. Returning to our initial comparison to the frame, we may deduct that 
the ellipsis might be different. 
The exergue, however, has constantly teased the reader by suggesting 
the possibility of conjunction: both fiction and autobiography are 
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autobiographies, both adventure story and memoir are fragmentary. Those 
unions, however, have quickly generated new questions, new gaps. It is no 
surprise that Chambers’s optimistic reading of the ellipsis sign becomes 
dubitative very quickly: he soon thinks that the ‘suspension points draw 
attention to the void that surrounds them’, and what they index is ‘the 
absence of support, the silence and emptiness that writing attempts to 
supplement’.46 
The figures used by Perec do not exactly bring writing and childhood 
together, but describe them antithetically: the fact that they are both ‘caught’ 
does not mean that they can be assimilated into one another. Maybe the 
threads can be caught, but they cannot be turned into a web. The comparison 
of the ellipsis sign with a net cannot disguise that it also signifies a void: the 
centre of the empty frame. The figure of the web that gets caught in a web 
only serves to bring to mind the dizzying structures of framed frames which 
we observed at the start. We haven’t moved on, of course. 
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Autobiography or fiction: W or the Memory of Childhood and the generic 
debates  
 
Autobiography or fiction — is that the inevitable end-point towards which 
the blurb directs the discussion of the text’s genre? The ‘or’ might be 
inclusive: both genres might be “true”. Or it might be exclusive: only one of 
the genres is “true” of the book. Or none of them. In fact, the disjunction 
seems inappropriate and misguided: there is no such thing as the ‘truth-value’ 
of a genre. And autobiography might not even be in a disjunctive relation 
with fiction. For all the initial assertiveness of the blurb’s generic definition, 
the frame of the ‘generic tag’ was quickly unsettled by the other frames which 
surrounded it. 
And yet the blurb does not immediately dismiss autobiography as a 
generic tag. Like Speak, Memory, W also unfolds in a complex structure of mise 
en abymes (or framed frames) which unsettle the definition and the binary 
oppositions it relies on. The second and third part of the chapter will examine 
the relation between generic definition, reflexivity and figuration in more 
detail; but — before moving on — it might useful to explore different critical 
approaches to the text’s genre: W’s curious nature provides us with an 
excellent angle through which to assess arguments and positions in the debate 
about autobiography. 
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Taking that aim into consideration, the ideal starting point for our 
survey should be perhaps Philippe Lejeune, whose works also include one of 
the most detailed and exhaustively researched monographs on W: La mémoire 
et l’oblique (Memory and the Oblique). Although the introduction has examined 
Lejeune’s delightful musings and U-turns (and U-turns of U-turns) about his 
theories, we have not explored how he applies the ‘pact’ to a complex and 
ambiguous text. Unsurprisingly, he examines paratextual generic definitions 
of the text (such as Perec’s 1978 article ‘Notes on What I am Looking For’) as 
sites where the autobiographical pact is performed. 47  In this piece, Perec 
undertakes an exhaustive taxonomy of his works: W is placed in the 
‘autobiographical’ camp, together with Je me souviens and La boutique obscure.48 
His definition of the text as an autobiography is not solely based on this 
supplement: for him, the detailed genetic study of the text’s drafts and 
manuscripts also ‘proves that it was an autobiography, constructed from the 
failure of a fiction’. 49  Curiously, he does not mention his criterion of 
homonimity between the author, narrator and protagonist — perhaps because 
it only applies to one part of the book rather than the whole.50 
In fact, his approach is not particularly pragmatic or reader-centred: his 
classification is supported by a definition of autobiography which differs 
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 See Lejeune, ‘Georges Perec:Autobiographie et fiction’, in Genèse et autofiction (see Jeannelle, above), pp. 143-
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from the one given in ‘The Autobiographical Pact’. He affirms that in W 
‘autobiography is active in two levels: it is at the same time the means of the 
system, and its end’. 51  He defines autobiography according to different 
criteria: its ‘means’, which probably implies the use of homonimity and first-
person retrospective narrative; and its ‘ends’, which we would presume 
implies reference. Autobiography as an ‘end’ is also underpinned by the 
‘phantasmatic pact’ and his model of the ‘autobiographical space’: a move 
that only leads to a thorough collision with the problem of figuration. 
For Lejeune W integrates in one text the two components of the 
autobiographical space ‘making them produce meaning through their 
assembly’.52 We would thus assume that the meaning of the autobiography is 
supplemented by the phantasmatic fiction. However, this fiction is also 
described as a ‘failed’ fiction (Lejeune mentions that these were Perec’s 
words, not his). The notion of ‘failure’ was also used by him in his definition 
of the ‘autobiographical space’, although he applied it to an autobiography 
which needed to be supplemented by fictional phantasms because its author 
had  ‘organized [...] a spectacular failure of their autobiography’ and had 
‘chosen to leave their autobiography incomplete, fragmented, full of holes’.53  
Failure is the engine of the ‘autobiographical space’, but Lejeune’s notion of 
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failure is oddly articulated as an authorial formal choice, rather than a 
readerly one. 
However, we may wonder whether that model actually describes W. 
The comparison might be unsustainable: according to Lejeune, in W the 
fiction is read phantasmatically because of its own failure, rather than the 
failure of the autobiography.  What that failure entails is not easy to discern: a 
fiction cannot really “fail” to refer to an external referent, although it could 
“fail” to comply with certain formal criteria (which it is not in itself a failure).  
It is also not clear whether Lejeune is referring to a failure in the reception of 
the book, either. Of course, his criteria can also be applied to the 
autobiographical section. If both are failures, can there be a privileged mode 
of reading? Although W is structured around the interaction or collision of 
two texts, this game of contrasts does not lead to an unproblematic access to 
reference, truth and meaning, as Lejeune claims. 
Perhaps the most illuminating parts of Lejeune’s reading of W are the 
ones that stray from the rigid models of ‘The Autobiographical Pact’. 
Curiously, he describes the interaction between the two texts through a 
familiar metaphor: for him 
Perec [...] organised a kind of revolving door/stand between the 
two series, each being [...] the truth of the other, although truth 
is presented as a problem that the reader must take 
responsibility for.54   
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Although the insistence on ‘truth’ is problematic, at least here it is presented 
as a ‘problem’. Later on he defines the book not just as an autobiography but 
as a ‘critical autobiography’:  an autobiography which ‘instead of defending 
itself against suspicion, takes it into account’ and where the author 
‘undertakes [...] a critical examination of his/her own memory’. 55 
Nonetheless, many approaches in the last twenty years have tended to define 
W as an autobiography (Boyle or Linda Anderson´s readings, for instance) 
and have uncovered (to different degrees) aspects of this self-questioning 
process.56 
Another important feature of Lejeune’s analysis of W is its Freudian 
orientation, particularly his use of the concept of the ‘screen memory’.57 This 
mode of interpretation — whilst proving valuable insights — needs 
nonetheless to be explored in relation to the text’s questioning of stable 
readings. Ultimately, perhaps the most intriguing aspect of his approach is his 
(rather Perecquian) inventory of the features that define Perec’s 
autobiographical writings (discretion, conviviality, intertextuality, operability, 
sabotage, accumulation, obliqueness, blockage, enclosure and dissemination): 
a list which highlights their paradoxical, contradictory and perhaps 
undefinable character. 
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Other approaches have sought to analyse W’s testimonial dimension 
and how its nature as a narrative of the Holocaust relates to its generic status. 
Claire Boyle takes Lejeune’s remark about the ‘oblique’ character of Perec’s 
autobiographical writing as the basis for her generic definition of the text: for 
her, Perec’s book follows a new, awry mode of referentiality which seeks to 
subvert the systems of traditional autobiography but which still aspires to 
present a testimony of his personal history and that of his parents.58 Boyle 
identifies an element of ethical unease in Perec’s fragmented model of 
autobiography, which for her is partially alleviated by the text’s use of 
allegory: 
Perec’s answer to the conundrum of how to testify to his 
experience against the backdrop of the Holocaust’s legacy 
which has dispossessed him of his history and selfhood is to 
refuse to recount directly the defining events of his life. Instead 
he will bear witness to the past only by alluding to it, [...] 
Through the allegorical technique [...] Perec is able to answer an 
imperative to bear witness to his history; by employing allegory 
in conjunction with two parallel intercut narratives, he creates a 
dispossessed text which tells ‘towards’ his experience, whilst 
foregrounding the gaps and absences which are central to 
Perec’s relationship to his own past through the text’s 
incompleteness and fragmentation.59 
 
Boyle interprets the fictional arms of the book (particularly the second 
part, the story of the island) as Perec’s attempt at representing the Holocaust 
through allegory. The fiction is not only a trace of his earliest creative attempt 
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to make sense of his personal history. It also must thus be read allegorically as 
well as autobiographically, as the closest Perec can get at representing the 
unrepresentable: 
 
The W segments venture towards the horror of the deportations 
to concentration camps, thus allowing the indicibilité that cloaks 
the historical events, as well as the enterprise of autobiographical 
writing, to begin to be surmounted.60 
 
Perhaps the main problem with Boyle’s theory is her assumption that a 
fragmented, self-conscious autobiography cannot provide sufficient 
testimony, and that allegory will give an unequivocal access to historical 
truth. She reads the W story as a ‘critique of textual systems’ (and by 
implication, of the totalitarian ideology that might underpin them) but then 
also points out how ‘the success of W or the Memory of Childhood nevertheless 
depends on a textual system: allegory’.61 The frame again mirrors the frame. 
Boyle is aware of a paradox in Perec’s use of allegory but it does not let it 
spoil her argument for the referential “success” of the book. Perec is as 
suspicious of allegory as he is of traditional autobiography: the book indeed 
simultaneously proposes and disarms totalising interpretations. Ultimately, 
the idea of success (like the idea of failure) is problematic, and oversimplifies 
allegory as a mode of figuration and reading. Her dismissal of contradiction 
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fails to take into account that testimony might be itself aporetic (as Derrida 
discusses in Demeure).62 
 Regarding contradiction and testimony, Ross Chambers offers an 
interesting alternative to models such as Boyle’s. Chambers uses Deleuze and 
Guattari’s idea of ‘disjunctive synthesis’ or agencement as an approach to W’s 
paradoxes. Chambers defines this concept as 
[T]he “agencing” of an effect of signification that would be 
unavailable to direct expression and even escapes authorial 
control, but can nevertheless be registered and acknowledged 
(if not described) through an act of reading that in turn has 
cultural effects.63 
 
For Chambers, W’s ‘deficiency of signification’ can result in a 
[R]ecognition that readerly supplementation shares with 
writerly supplementation a more basic deficiency — that of an 
inability to identify verbally what it is in language itself that 
goes unsaid.64   
 
Those silences could be read as a presencing of ‘the void, [...] oblivion, [...] 
emptiness; or [...] atrocity, the Shoah, death, danger or destruction’. 65  
Chambers’s contribution to the generic debate is significant precisely because 
it is not a contribution to it: rather than trying to pin down the text around a 
binary opposition based on reference, he prefers to discuss the text’s mode (or 
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modes) of figuration. However, his model shows how a rejection of reference 
might not entail a rejection of the possibility of testimony: a testimony which 
nonetheless operates though silence rather through tropological substitutions.  
In relation to the debates we have examined, Chambers’s contribution 
emphasises the importance of reading on in W (as well as reading inwards 
and outwards) and the dangers of over-simplifying its modes of figuration. 
 Despite the problematic nature of the autobiography/fiction divide in 
W, we also find readings of W as either a fiction or an autofiction. Those who 
have read W as an autofiction include the term’s father/mother, Serge 
Doubrovsky — although he also points out at the differences between his 
own and Perec’s strategies.66  The model of hybridity evoked by autofiction 
can only be half-applied to Perec’s text: Lejeune has accurately pointed out 
how the relation between its two components is not ‘not a fusion but rather a 
fission — the apparent war of two alternating texts’.67 Despite of this, many 
critical approaches to W (particularly that of Bernard Magné) are based 
around the identification of what he calls ‘suture points’ or ‘stitches’ between 
the two sections. Magné’s reading does not invoke hybridity, or even equality 
between the parts: for him ‘the fiction submits to the autobiography, because 
the writing of the fiction is not solely part his biography […] but —essentially 
— part of his autobiography’.68 
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 Perhaps the most controversial of all readings of W is that offered by 
David Bellos in his biography. Bianca Lamblin (Perec’s cousin) strongly 
objected to some of Bellos’s speculations: Bellos disregards W’s textual and 
figurative dimension in favour of reading it as a key to unlock Perec’s 
secrets.69  Bellos nonchalantly describes W in its very first mention in the 
biography as an “autobiographical fiction” (in inverted commas), a generic 
inscription which is never fully justified or explained.70 One can guess why 
through his analysis, which is nonetheless based on a rather narrow concept 
of fiction (he uses it as synonym of “falsifications” and “lies”). Bellos attempts 
to correct factual errors in the autobiography but does not read those errors as 
sporadic anomalies. For him, 
Almost every assertion in the memory chapters of W or the 
Memory of Childhood asks to be questioned, and the answer in 
most cases is that the memory [...] has been altered, reworked, 
decorated or plainly falsified’71. 
 
Bellos’s analyses read Perec’s explicit signposting of the provisional, fragile 
and figurative nature of his memories as a deceit, and thus as a fiction. He 
fails to recognise they might not be “lies” at all: tragically, there is no “truth” 
to judge them against. The weakness of Bellos’s analysis is its reliance upon 
problematic assumptions about referential ‘success’ or ‘failure’. For him, ‘the 
whole dynamic of the writing of W or the Memory of Childhood lay precisely in 
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falsification, in producing a book that cheats but works nonetheless’.72 The rhetoric 
of cheating (which W explicitly explores and undermines) only reinforces the 
problematic oppositions between success and failure, or truth and lies. 
Bellos’s reading, for all its apparent iconoclasm, does not really stray 
very far from that of Lejeune. His analysis of Perec’s errors and lies interprets 
them in an autobiographical and referential key — like Lejeune, he sees fiction 
as the ‘means’ of autobiography. According to him, the errors are planted to 
be discovered by readers, in order for us to question what is being omitted 
from the text, what the memories hide, the truth behind oblivion and lies. For 
Bellos, the thread that connects Perec’s ‘lies’ is his Jewish identity:  through a 
network of invented memories he shows his guilty and uneasy wavering 
between denial and affirmation, and presents an indictment of the historical 
circumstances that made it possible (it is this unjustified insistence on Perec’s 
guilt that Lamblin finds problematic).73 Ultimately, like Boyle’s analysis, it 
narrows down the “truth” of the book to one of its parts, rather than 
exploring how meaning is made and unmade by the interaction and collision 
between the fragments. 
This sample of how genre has been approached throughout the history 
of W’s critical reception has highlighted the limitations of generic definitions 
based on referential criteria.  For instance, Boyle’s emphasis on access (oblique 
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or direct) or success simplifies significantly the nature of testimony and 
historical reference. As we have seen, W is a text which is continuously (and 
temptingly) proposing various self-inflicted simplifications (or synecdoches of 
itself) only to immediately undermine and dissolve them, and in which 
success and failure are used as figures which the reader is required to 
interrogate. 
The text’s resistance to totalization will be the thread that connects this 
chapter’s various foci. This movement was traced by Chambers through his 
analysis of the alphabetic motifs: this chapter, however, will use different 
props, props which may not have been “purchased” that often throughout the 
history of W’s critical reception. They will not be selected because they are 
necessarily better props or better frames: their lack of critical popularity does 
not make them any less frame-like — and ultimately any less insufficient. 
Readers of W are continuously tempted by synecdoches that seemingly reveal 
the meaning of the text (my “frames” frame is no exception): perhaps a more 
scattered approach might prove less restrictive. Despite our reservations 
about the illusory allure of novelty, the relative neglect of our samples might 
nonetheless reveal something about the role of props and frames in how the 
book has come to be remembered and read: we may wonder whether certain 
self-referential motifs are more important than others, and whether that 
hierarchy (like everything else) is suggested only to be dismantled. 
The “bargains” which the second and third part of this chapter 
examines are the text’s narrative temporal ‘frame’ and its use of mise en abyme.  
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W’s narrative structure was characterised in the exergue as both disjunctive 
and conjunctive: a tension which is re-enacted in the conflicting metaphorical 
accounts of the text as a ‘fission’ (by Lejeune) and as a ‘stitching’ operation (by 
Magné). The next two sections seek to explore this tension by examining it in 
relation to the text’s play with fabula/sjuzhet dichotomies in its organisation 
and its multiplication of temporal structures.  The text’s indeterminate and 
polychronous narrative structure will be examined in relation to the text’s 
self-referential frames in order to discern the connection the text establishes 
between time, silence, figuration and testimony. 
The narrative structure of W (as anything else in the text) cannot, 
however, be examined in isolation: it is itself a mirror which is mirrored (and 
disturbed) by the other mirrors of the text. This analysis makes use of the 
Gidean moniker for the device, mise en abyme: not because the term itself is a 
kind of master-key but solely to provide some theoretical propping to W’s 
framing games. In fact, the reflexive and paradoxical dimensions of the 
technique articulate succinctly the unsettling movements of W’s self-
referential motifs. If the theoretical frame is relatively novel (the exception 
here is Matthew Escobar’s essay on Gide and Perec), its “photograph” 
nonetheless isn’t: what Chambers designates as Perec’s ‘figures of figuration’ 
have not been ignored at all. 74 The letters (both French and Hebrew) and 
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other motifs such as the “wound/prop/fall/parachute” cluster have become 
recurrent critical obsessions.75 
As I previously mentioned, this chapter examines mise en abyme 
through relatively “unpurchased” examples which include the temporal 
structure itself, frames in all their different disguises (which only Magné has 
commented upon), as well as one of Perec’s regular figural models — games 
— which have been bypassed by critics in favour of using sport to provide a 
critique of totalitarian ideology. W, however, combines both play and sport 
motifs: this opposition will also be interrogated. Perhaps the most important 
decision a critic must make before considering any of the frames of the book is 
to decline to study them in isolation: instead, the focus should fall on their 
collaborations and disagreements and the power dynamics that these 
relationships disclose. 
As I mentioned in the introduction, the next two sections seek to 
combine the tidiness of a thematic approach (with a drawer for ‘time’ and 
another for ‘motifs’) with a deliberate reflection of W’s messy nature. At 
times, the structure follows that of a reading guide or an annotated 
commentary — indeed, the best one available, Anne Roche’s, is particularly 
insightful because of its unstructured format. Section two will cover the 
chapters preceding the ellipsis, and section three the chapters that follow it —
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although the two parts (like the two ‘frames’) will not be described in  
isolation from each other. The purpose of this structure is to examine how the 
linear process of reading W is constantly being broken (or forgotten) and 
repaired (remembered and then re-membered, re-jointed). 76  Memory and 
oblivion are not only the concern of the author, but also of the readers — who 
are forced to perform both as they advance through the book. The 
preponderant “purchase” of certain motifs in the text’s critical reception could 
also be read as a sign of that the text might be remembering itself, that it 
might be creating its future memories (for instance, though the repetition of 
certain episodes). 
Ultimately, memory itself (both the author’s and the reader’s) is 
revealed as paradoxical and aporetic: memory is also oblivion because it 
needs to forget oblivion in order to become memory. Rescuing a feature from 
oblivion (for instance, the backgammon game) also brings into relief what that 
‘memory’ is itself forgetting. The text is facilitating our critical work and 
diabolically making it impossible. We must thus proceed with our reading 
with the awareness that we may be constantly defeated — but also with the 
hope that the text might not be a game at all. Or maybe not. 
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A game of backgammon: Part One of W or the Memory of 
Childhood 
 
 
A game of backgammon: this was the rather anti-climactic ending of the first 
instalment of W in La Quinzaine Litteraire. Until that point, as Roche points 
out, the tale seems to adhere to the narrative conventions of adventure 
stories.77 However, the familiar breathable air of the story is soon clouded by 
the ‘mindless mist’ announced by the text’s epigraph (a line from Raymond 
Queneau’s Chêne et chien). The narrator’s ‘guiding spirits’ or ‘ombres 
tutelaires’— Melville’s Ishmael and Bartleby— soon haunt and cloud the 
reader.78 The narrator’s account of his childhood and early life which follows 
the preamble combines precision (dates) and vagueness (Kafkaesque 
initials). 79  The ‘mists’ and ‘shadows’ of the epigraph climax in the 
aforementioned (non) cliff-hanger ending: ‘I [...] spent most of my evenings 
watching television or, occasionally, playing backgammon with one or 
another of my workmates’.80 
The game is granted a place of privilege in the narrative, but why? 
Although the ending might be nothing more than a parody of the closure 
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conventions of serial fiction, backgammon seems at first sight a rather 
convincing (perhaps privileged) mise en abyme for the whole: it might be 
indeed the real ‘guiding spirit’ of the book — particularly for those readers 
acquainted with Perec’s love of games and his Oulipian activities. 81  The 
design of the board resembles the design of W. Its two arms might be playing 
against each other, moving forwards in opposite directions. Both narratives 
are also, in a sense, ‘bearing off’ their pieces: the opening chapter the tale 
could be said to be discarding the burden of ‘adventure-story’ clichés, and 
obstructing the reader’s passage through the board. The game of 
backgammon is itself a “move” in a larger game of backgammon. The 
autobiography — as we observed in our analysis of the frame and the 
description of the father’s photograph — will also be motivated by a similar 
desire to subtract and “bear off” its content by highlighting its “framed” 
quality. The game between the two sections might be but the echo of the game 
between Perec and the reader. 
There is a point, however, when this allegory machine breaks down. 
The reader starts to wonder what (or who) are the dices, for example. It might 
be useful to compare it here to Nabokov’s chess problem. That figure seems to 
render the dynamics between writer and reader more accurately: Nabokov 
sets the problem and we play. But reading W as a game of backgammon 
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between reader and writer assumes that reader and writer are playing against 
each other a game that none of them have written — which is not the case 
here (or is it?). The frame here is not toppled by another frame: it simply 
seems to be fall apart at one point.  But then — we tell ourselves as we read 
on — that is precisely what happens to the story of W when it reaches the 
ellipsis: it breaks down. The allegory is an allegory because it is not an 
allegory. 
As we open the backgammon board, a series of motifs, 
correspondences and paradoxes are thus brought to our attention. It is a 
‘programmatic loop’ (to return to Dällebach’s taxonomy), but one that only 
programmes loops.  For Escobar, Perec (and Gide) use mise en abyme ‘to create 
a sense of dynamic play between the texts being compared — a play that 
depends upon difference’.82 This play can be observed in the awkward nature 
of some of the parallels between board game and book, but here the play 
seems uneven: the mise en abyme wins because even its differences are mirrors 
of other differences. The reader is constantly beaten into further disjunctions, 
and yet the author refuses to plump for any specific meaning. 
This is the paradox with which this analysis is concerned, which it will 
investigate in relation to two different aspects mirrored by the backgammon 
game. The first part is concerned with the parallels between play and 
narrative structure: it explores the book’s and the game’s tension between 
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forward movement, obstruction and substraction (a tension which also has 
important consequences for generic definition). The second part will be 
focused on the games between the backgammon game and other examples of 
mise en abyme in Part One.   
 
 
Moving on, blocking, bearing off: the temporal structure of Part One 
 
The analysis of the narrative structure of W is also articulated around a 
disjunction, a choice. There are two structures to choose from: the two parts 
(and their respective fabulas and sjuzhets) cannot be analysed simultaneously. 
Of course, they could be compared, and their dialogue (or collision) might 
thus help create an explanatory model. An autobiographical reading of the 
fiction would subordinate the fictional timeline to that of the autobiography 
— the autobiography would be the master-structure because it reflects the 
authorial self’s existence within a timeline. However, Perec states vehemently 
at the beginning of the memoir that he has ‘no childhood memories’: there 
might be no such thing as an original or “real” fabula. 83  The focus of our 
analysis will need to be bifurcated: we must first follow how the fiction moves 
in time across the board, and then how the autobiography does it.  But then, 
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such an approach would ignore the fact that — as in the game of 
backgammon — both players are moving and blocking each other’s play at 
the same time. We cannot lose sight of the misty, shadowy original; even if it 
seems wiser to tidy up our approach on generic lines. 
 We have observed already how the fiction starts by conforming to the 
retrospective first-person narrative model of adventure stories — as well as 
that of confessions. W is presented as a “secret” finally disclosed by the tale 
that will follow. The story suitably starts with the birth of the hero and moves 
forwards from then on, although not without obstacles — such as the back-
gammon game (which, as a mise en abyme, sabotages the linearity of the 
whole) or the intertextual spectral interferences. Of course, those features can 
also be read as part of the story’s “bearing off” process: through those 
obstacles the story might be moving towards victory and hence slowly 
revealing its “secret”. 
 The chapters that follow the backgammon game are, however, not in 
themselves an account of the adventure but merely their prologue. This 
preamble proceeds in a linear fashion — although it also includes a nested 
narrative. Most of the chapters conform to the cliff-hanger convention: the 
enigmas those endings pose, however, are not resolved but ‘piled up’, ‘in 
imitation of Kafka’s most famous narratives’, as Claude Burgelin observes.84 
Certain clue-like details like the initials after Apfelstahl’s name (MD) or the 
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coat of arms in his headed paper are described in detail but left unaccounted 
for. They left behind and forgotten as a consequence of the narrative thrust 
that propels the story to move to another threshold. 
Of course, those might not be obstacles at all, but discarded pieces: 
indeed, clues such as the initials or the coat of arms were ‘deciphered’ by 
Roche as prolepses of the secret (or secrets) of W — not just the island itself, 
but also the historical reality concealed by the island. 85 If we apply their 
analyses to the temporal structure, they could be read as anachronies which 
interrupt the linear discourse and reveal what lies ahead not just in the 
fictional fabula but also in the autobiographical one, and which would ‘stitch’ 
them together. This stitching, however, imposes a hierarchy between the 
narratives and its temporal levels: the secret behind the secret is in the 
autobiographical level.  It might not come as a surprise by now that this 
reading cannot really be sustained for too long. The narrator tells us that the 
designs of the coat of arms ‘seemed to be open to several different 
interpretations, without it being possible to decide on a satisfactory choice’.86 
The ‘stitch’ is really a loop which dismantles a chronological reconstruction.87 
 The origin unravels into an (or)igin: an empty ellipsis. The embedded 
story of the deaf-mute child might have no relation to the frame story (and 
hence we might have two threads rather than one). It is not an analepsis to 
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“Winckler”’s past (or only a partial one) and it is not an analepsis to the story 
of the island and its secret. The two fragments are never stitched. And hence 
the whole story might be also disjointed from the autobiography as a spurious 
origin: indeed the composition of the story of the island (as we are told in the 
autobiographical frame) preceded that of its pseudo-prologue. Although the 
fabula of both embedded and frame narrative can be reconstructed, they 
cannot be joined be together. 
 
The narrative structure of the fiction is thus characterised by the now 
familiar tension between conjunction and disjunction, concordance and 
discordance. Even when the autobiography seems to attach itself (like a stray 
thread) to the structure of the fiction (say, when the story is read as a “stage” 
in Perec’s journey to memory and recovery), the attachment is temporary and 
fragile. The temptation of this connected reading is constantly suggested and 
dismissed as the reader seeks to reconstruct and tidy up its temporal structure 
in the memoir section. For instance, Chapter One and Chapter Two seems to 
be arranged in a sort of chiasmus (ABBA) pattern in terms of their structure 
and narrative style: if the fiction started with a confessional shape and ended 
with a linear but disjointed narrative, the memoir starts with an axed 
narrative and ends with the hope of temporal and personal reconstruction. 
Bartleby and Ishmael still haunt or shadow the start of the memoir 
section, as its blunt (but sharp and ‘crisp’) opening — with its insistence on 
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his lack of memories and the ‘axe’ of History — demonstrated. It echoes the 
dulled linearity of the story of “Winckler”’s past rather than the evocative 
temporal loop of the beginning. As the narrative advances, the line of Perec’s 
life will nonetheless be turned into a more reassuring confessional shape.  The 
story of W itself (or rather of its creation) is given an explanatory frame: he 
created it when he was 13 as a series of drawings, then he remembered it in 
1967, and then published it as a serial in 1969-70. 88 The threads of Perec’s life-
story might be woven together again (the dating is, for instance, quite precise) 
— even the fiction itself is incorporated into the autobiographical fabula. 
Attaching the two stories allows the reader to deduct that the autobiography 
is also heading towards a revelation: as Magné points out, both narratives are 
stitched together by the mention of Venice.89 The secret would be the book the 
reader has in his/her hands (as if it was the Recherche): the origin retrieved. 
The book that the reader is holding, however, is emphatically not a 
book that solves or reconstructs anything at all, and the concluding paragraph 
quickly alerts us of the fact, undoing the chiasmus “key”:   
W is no more like my Olympic fantasy than that Olympic 
fantasy was like my childhood. But in the crisscross web they 
weave as in my reading of them I know there is to be found the 
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inscription and the description of a path I have taken, the 
passage of my history and the story of my passage.90 
 
The tale is not an origin but a reconstruction: fiction and memoir are (nearly) 
contemporary creations. The palimpsest is fake, and the quasi-Proustian story 
of the retrieval of memory and the past needs to be questioned, like all other 
origins.   
 Bellos’s translation of the last sentence obscures the fact that the 
opening chapter concludes with another chiasmus (within a chiasmus, of 
course): the French original reads ‘le cheminement de mon histoire el 
l’histoire de mon cheminement’. 91  The sentence plays with readerly 
assumptions about the rhetorical device. A chiasmus relies for its rhetorical 
effect on the contrast between A and B: ‘cheminement’ and ‘histoire’ resemble 
each other (a ‘passage’ is a figure for a history/story).  An AAAA chiasmus 
denies and emphasises the absent B: Perec’s story/history is neither a story, 
nor a passage nor a history. The path he has taken is not the path.  The 
conclusion only serves to remind the reader of the axe, which shreds the 
pseudo-Proustian weave (and its promise of temporal and generic stability) 
back into threads. 92 
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The rest of the memoir chapters unfold through a similar dynamic of 
weaving and unweaving which we have observed in the first chapter and in 
the fiction itself. The text invites us to read those moves as examples of 
‘bearing off’: they might be part of the text’s advance towards victory, a 
paradoxical victory that only unhinges the two parts of the board/frame.  
There are nonetheless ostensible differences between how the fiction and the 
memoir “play”: the memoir is structured so that its fragmentariness is 
brought to the fore, and morsels of fabula and clue are camouflaged. The 
strategy the memoir follows is to combine what Roche calls the ‘“obligatory 
scenes”’ of childhood memoirs (her inverted commas) with  a piercing self-
commentary which casts doubts over them (Roche calls it ‘ruin’), as well as 
with a series of meta-autobiographical codas.93 
 Perec starts the defamiliarisation/ruining process of those scenes by 
their very arrangement: the sjuzhet of the memoir is disordered. His first 
memories come before his birth and his family history, with only the final 
part (a series of brief sketches of photographs and early memories) 
maintaining some semblance of chronological order in the disposition of its 
seven vignettes. And yet, even if it is disordered, it seems easy enough to tidy 
up into a fabula. Or maybe not. Perec’s strategy does not solely rely on 
anachrony for his ‘ruining’ operation. As Roche points out, Perec constantly 
hedges any certainty by using adverbs and adjectives of doubt or the 
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conditional tense, and also points how the notes (such as the note about 
frames which forms the epigraph of this chapter) emphasise the ‘framed’ 
quality of these memories and their distance from the origin they seem to 
evoke — origin which, like the photographs, is absent, private.94 
The text in bold characters (composed around 1955-59) which the 
frame-note comments upon only highlights and makes explicit the palimpsest 
quality of W, the fact that is written over previous texts.95 Not only does the 
dating become more imprecise here (hindering the reconstruction of the 
fabula), the inclusion of this early attempt at an autobiography also signals to 
the readers that the fabula they are reconstructing from the memories has a 
fabula of its own: there is a secret chronology of how and when he 
remembered or wrote certain episodes and how he reconstructed his past. At 
one point Perec mentions Lieux, his unfinished autobiographical project: this 
project was indeed an attempt to record the history of memory.96 W — unlike 
Lieux — eschews clear chronology and scientific methodology, perhaps in 
acknowledgement of their insufficiency. 
Other critics have sought to relate the instability of the fabula with 
Freud’s concept of the ‘screen memory’: Lejeune reads the annotated and 
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reiterated farewell scene as one, for instance. 97  The memory of memory, 
however, cannot be contained by any explanatory models (as we will see in 
the episode of the shirts). The section in bold characters is preceded by Perec’s 
comment that ‘[t]he idea of writing the story of my past arose almost at the 
same time that my idea of writing’. 98  Memory and writing cannot be 
separated: the fabula of the fabula is only a frame imposed by the writing. It 
does not precede it. 
 The mise en abyme of the frame only serves to highlight the figural 
character of the temporal structure itself, and hence its unsettled foundations. 
This close interrelation is also observable in the structure of episodes such as 
the memory of the Hebrew letter, the swallowed key/coin, the torn medal, 
and the farewell to his mother, which — for reasons of space — I will not be 
able to examine in detail. Every obstacle, every bearing off is both a step 
forward in the game and a reminder of the state of paralysis and uncertainty 
the reader is lead to when one reads the book through the frame of the 
backgammon game. The second part of this section examines the figural 
model proposed by the two frames (the temporal and the figural) and the 
game of backgammon in relation to the other self-referential motifs in Part 
One: particularly to one which might not even be a motif, a mise en abyme or a 
figure at all. 
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The sinking of Part One: mise en abyme, ellipsis and silence 
 
Our trail across the temporal structure of the two arms of Part One has 
demonstrated that the game of backgammon is both a reflection and a 
distortion of W. The two arms are competing to bear themselves off — they 
employ different strategies but arrive at the same result. And yet critics like 
Magné, Burgelin or Roche have strongly argued against reading the relation 
between the two parts as a conflict. In closer examination, however, their 
‘stitches’ are provisional, insufficient or illusory. Bearing this in mind, the 
dices still remain unidentified: perhaps they could represent the chance 
nature of writing and reading, or even a kind of indirect reference to 
Mallarmé.99 The mirror-image is incomplete — perhaps because it still needs 
to be compared to the other mirrors it contains. 
The backgammon-game, for instance, contains another game inside it: 
hide-and-seek, found in the other arm of the chiasmus. The figure appears 
just after Perec narrates his epiphanic recovery of the tale of W from the 
depths of his memory, when he mentions that 
Once again the snares of writing were set. Once again I was like 
a child playing hide-and-seek, who doesn’t know what he fears 
or wants more: to stay hidden, to be found.100 
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Andy Leak identifies hide-and-seek as a metaphor for the creative process, 
which he puts in relation to psychoanalysis.101  However, he also points out 
that game is itself paradoxical, a disjunction: 
 
Hide-and-seek is a paradoxical game: to be played well, it has to 
be played badly. The asyndeton in the quoted passage is clearly 
not a mere effect of style: [it is not] a simple alternative. Each of 
the terms is marked both by a positive and a negative (desire 
and fear), making it possible to combine the two terms in four 
different ways.102 
 
Hide-and-seek temptingly suggests the possibility of a secret (to be revealed 
by the memory of W) only to immediately problematize it.  Not only writing 
is both the seeker and the sought, but the game is presented as potentially 
infinite and unfinishable.   Whatever (or whoever) it is that is “hiding” is 
threatened with collapse and loss, no matter what it chooses to do: either 
ending the game (and losing), or leaving it unresolved (and then winning). If 
hide-and-seek is an antiphonal response to the game of backgammon (or its 
frame) it only comes to highlight the fractured nature of games figures. 
 This collapse will take place in a passage which simultaneously 
performs this sinking and renders it impossible to represent. It is not a mise en 
abyme but rather a kind of self-referential discursive coda to the book. I am 
referring to the closing section of Chapter Eight — one of the most-often 
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quoted and analysed passages in W. It appears right after Perec’s succinct 
account of how his mother and his two grandfathers were deported to 
Auschwitz and the description of his mother’s death certificate, which he 
received in 1958. 
This coda abandons the labyrinthine narrative and the playful self-
referentiality of the footnotes for a muted, ‘white’ tone in which thoughts are 
juxtaposed with colons or semi-colons. Vocabulary becomes repetitive, almost 
obsessive.  The notes become the scaffolding for a non-existing building. The 
coda is really an apology, again simultaneously targeted at the reader and 
himself but primarily at his absent readers, his parents. It is others that matter 
here, not the self. 
 
It is not, as for years I claimed it was, the effect of an unending 
oscillation between an as-yet undiscovered language of sincerity 
and the subterfuges of a writing concerned with shoring up its 
own defences: it is bound up with the matter of writing and the 
written matter, with the task of writing as well as with the task 
of remembering. 
I do not know whether I have anything to say, I know that I am 
saying nothing; I do not know if what I might have to say is 
unsaid because it is unsayable (the unsayable is not what is 
buried inside writing, it is what prompted it in the first place); I 
know that what I say is blank, is neutral, is a sign, once and for 
all, of a once-and-for-all annihilation.103 
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Perec undoes here W’s disjunctive tension by performing a kind of arithmetic 
operation with its two branches, as if showing the result of adding up a 
positive (sincerity?) and a negative (artifice?) is but a zero (blank, neutral, 
‘rien’). The passage reconfigures the idea of what constitutes ‘success’ and 
‘failure’ in memory and writing: the blank must be blank because it is a ‘sign’ 
of another blank. Silence is voicing silence — losing is not really losing. 
 However, the conclusion twists this “conclusion” a bit further. Even 
negative referentiality is a form of figuration. A passage which looked like an 
anti-mise en abyme ends up transforming the whole text into one: both its 
words and its blank spaces (Perec even brings them to the reader’s attention 
at one point). This is how the coda ends: 
I am not writing in order to say that I shall say nothing, I am not 
writing to say that I have nothing to say. I write: I write because 
we lived together, because I was one amongst them, a shadow 
amongst their shadows, a body close to their bodies. I write 
because they left in me their indelible mark, whose trace is 
writing. Their memory is dead in writing; writing is the memory 
of their death and the assertion of my life.104 
 
Writing becomes an intransitive, object-less verb: its materiality (rather than 
its contents) matters.  The word itself is read by Burgelin as the key that links 
W to his past and that of his parents. 
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The very tracing of the letter, the material act of writing are 
linked without mediation to the physical existence of his 
parents. Metaphor of their disappearance, proof of their 
existence, writing becomes the thread that, beyond their death, 
links their life and his own life. There is no page blackened by 
him that does not refer to the blank of their disappearance.105 
 
Every single word we have read and will read is made to stand for the whole 
— and also for Perec himself and for his parents. This new frame for the 
writing (which frames all words) makes the reader look upwards, towards the 
hand that has produced the letters we have been reading and its very physical 
origin in other hands — which the reader will not be able to see. The gap is 
still there: the hand is alone. The parents can only be seen because of the trace 
they have left in the writing hand. The hand, however, can only trace itself. If 
it ‘presences’ them (as Chambers remarked), it does so as a void. When read 
in relation to the debate on the book’s genre and its value as a testimony, this 
passage makes the squabbles about genre redundant or petty. However, in 
doing so, the whole is sacrificed. When all words are figures they also become 
indistinct (like the four components in the fake chiasmus). If we look up, we 
cannot look down. Seeing the hand involves the unseeing and obliteration of 
the words themselves. This coda becomes the maelstrom where the rest of the 
book sinks and disappears. 
Or not — it does go on, of course. Although the passage reads like the 
definitive final authorial comment of the book, it is located but one quarter 
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through the book, sandwiched between two crucial fictional chapters: 
Chapter Seven (who had prophetically ended with the account of the sinking 
of the Sylvandre) and Chapter Nine. This chapter starts with the narrator — 
who is aware that the story cannot end with the sinking — asking Apfelstahl 
‘And then?’.106 Fiction and memoir seem to be talking to each other, and the 
fiction “saves” the memoir: in continuing the story of W beyond the sinking 
of the yacht he also continues his own story beyond its sinking. We may ask, 
like the narrator, if and how and why it is meant to continue, but still we 
continue.   
Although not for very long: soon after, the story soon sinks itself and 
takes the memoir down with it. The last chapter of the memoir (which 
concludes with the memory of Perec’s last moments together with his mother) 
ends with a parachute jump which critics have read as the text’s performance 
of its own rescue by an unlocking of the trauma of his separation from his 
mother. Eleanor Kaufman reads the fall as the ‘key to deciphering the 
memory of the trauma’, a positive experience related to the affirmation of his 
survival. 107 Lejeune, however, reads the farewell scene as the screen memory, 
an artificial retrospective creation. For Lejeune, the parachute jump is the 
origin of the memory: ‘The “deciphering” of the memory takes place at a time 
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which might really be the time when it was “ciphered”’. 108  Memory and 
epiphany might be simultaneous, like Perec’s main text and footnotes. 
However, perhaps what is particularly intriguing about this episode is 
the way it propels the reader to pore obsessively about certain motifs (the 
theme of suspension and wounds) to the neglect of others, such as the motif 
of the gift and the motif of books (a framed book, a comic book). The comic 
book is the gift from his mother, perhaps given to distract the little boy, to 
make their separation less painful for him. The passage’s obsessive 
description of the figure of the parachuting Chaplin perhaps proves that the 
mother was successful in her attempt to distract her son. The recovered 
parachute jump is only a repetition of this separation. 
Regarding this point, it is important to bear in mind again how the 
memoir continues in the fiction. The enigma of the missing deaf-mute hinges 
on two possible explanations: he wasn’t in the yacht because he escaped or 
because he was abandoned. The narrator then asks Apfelstahl ‘Does that 
make any difference?’.109 Apfelstahl replies ‘I don’t know’.110 Question and 
answer articulate the unspoken, painful enigma at the heart of the previous 
episode (was he abandoned or did he escape?) but also renders it petty: a 
frame which distracts the reader from the gap ahead, from the cut that splits 
the narrative and which forcibly and terribly pulled apart the hand of the 
                                                          
108
 Lejeune, La mémoire, pp. 84-85. 
109
 Perec, W, p. 87. 
110
 Perec, W, p. 87. 
 
240 
 
mother from that of the child. That cut (the cut of the ‘axe’ of History) should 
not be allowed to go on unseen. We have not advanced from the start, but then 
perhaps we shouldn’t. 
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A game of “running battleships”: Part Two of W or the Memory 
of Childhood 
 
Part One’s performance of its own sinking did not really answer the question 
about the appropriateness of applying games models to W: both parts ‘bear 
off’ their pieces, but none of them wins. The ellipsis might be read as the 
conclusion of the game, but also as its interruption. And then, after the cut, 
everything changes and begins again — and a new games motif makes its 
appearance, creating yet another disjunction. The new game might be playing 
against backgammon — and might thus provide a completely different model 
for the text.  The question must remain unanswered until the battle is fought. 
 Despite our reservations about applying a competition/rivalry model 
to W, the text seems to constantly thrusting the motif back at us. The second 
board-game self-referential model is itself a battle game: a game that Bellos 
translates as ‘running battleships’ (‘bataille navale mouvant’).111 The game is 
first introduced in Chapter Seventeen. Perec mentioned how his second 
cousin, Henri, was once playing it ‘furiously’ with another relative.112 Perec 
asked Henri to teach him the game, but he refused because he considered him 
too young. The game reappears in Chapter Thirty-one: Perec manages at last 
to convince Henri, and the two children proceed to prepare with great care a 
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chequered board and some ship tokens. Just as they are about to start playing, 
Henri all of a sudden flies into a rage and breaks ‘those precious boards to 
pieces’.113 Even the frame of the game involves a battle about a battle game 
which is itself fighting against another game. 
As it was the case with the backgammon, the reader is soon 
enthusiastically searching for correspondences. This game — unlike its rival 
— has attracted some critical attention: Chambers reads it as 
 
[A]n allegory of reading as an  experience of the shattering of 
stability and the withdrawal of support that occur when 
arbitrary violence intervenes to reveal the fragility and 
undependability of  what had until then been certainties.[...] 
Henri turns out [...]to be [...] one final agent of History. 114 
 
Chambers also points out the allegorical importance not just of Henri’s 
destruction of the checkerboard but also of the game itself. It is not the usual 
variety of the game, which would invoke an ultimately solvable model of 
reading, the “sinking” of the book’s meaning. It is an obscure ‘running’ 
(‘mouvant’) variant of the game, which for Chambers would be far more 
‘challenging’ (and open to cheating, we may add). 
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Chambers also reads the variant, and Perec’s dashed hopes of 
mastering it, as another figure of the instability of the text’s meanings: the 
story reveals how 
 
The point of interpretive finality where the text would hold firm 
[...] becomes a vanishing point. And what we are left to 
acknowledge [...] is that crucial disappearance itself: the 
evidence of the catastrophe in a residual dazzle of shifting 
patterns, relations and reflections; the sign of a disaster that 
itself cannot be named, nor explained, or even known, but of 
which only our thwarted reading constituted some kind of 
baffled acknowledgement.115 
 
Chambers’s interpretation of the ‘running battleships’ game does not differ 
significantly from the reading that we have made of the ‘I write’ maelstrom, 
or even of the backgammon board.  The games might not be fighting but 
propping each other, providing another frame to the frame — and perhaps 
signalling the void and the silence through (or despite) their vertiginous 
regression. 
 Despite the redundant character of this second frame, there are still 
good reasons for using it as a ‘guiding spirit’ for the second part of W. 
Although the games mirror each other, ‘running battleships’ completes 
backgammon: it makes explicit the “broken” nature of that allegory, which 
the backgammon left suspended until the ellipsis confirmed it. At this point, 
the reader knows the story is broken: the story of Henri only serves to 
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highlight what the ellipsis had already made present. And yet it might 
provide a useful angle with which to approach the undeniable differences 
between Part One and Part Two, both in terms of its narrative structure and 
its use (and reuse) of mise en abyme. 
With the exception of Lejeune and Burgelin, there has hardly been 
much attention dedicated to the remarkable narrative differences between the 
two parts, beyond the generic shift of the fiction.116 Those differences are 
sharply brought into focus by the contrast between the two self-reflexive 
games motifs.  Unlike in backgammon, in the game of battleships (stable or 
not) the players cannot see each other’s pieces: there is a physical barrier 
which cannot be surmounted. The barrier that separates the two narratives is 
here made explicit: there is no attempt at creating the illusion that they might 
be talking to each other. Of course, there might be the odd sinking of each 
other’s ships, but even this figural model for the relation between the fiction 
and the memoir emphasises destruction rather than collaboration: it depicts 
the process of deciphering as aggression. But our ships are moving — and any 
(lucky or strategic) guess might never really be able to hit its target. 
As the analysis of Part One, this section will also proceed in a similar 
fashion: it starts by an analysis of the contrasting temporal structures and 
moves then to consider mise en abyme. As in Part One, the foci tend to segue 
into one another and becomes at times difficult to tell apart — perhaps 
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because here they are also mirroring each other. The similarities become quite 
apparent in the case of the ‘temporal curiosity’ described in the introduction: 
the fabula becomes unsettled, like the moving ships of the board. As to the 
mise en abymes, what characterises their use in Part Two is perhaps the sheer 
abundance of them: self-referential motifs blossom in the form of digressive 
inventories, such as the one about the letters. This new style of mise en abyme 
(deliberately dispersed, perhaps less claustrophobic) contrasts to the style of 
the motifs of Part One, which Part Two does not abandon. The analysis of 
these two approaches to self-referentiality (and the shocking and poignant 
character the antitheses and parallelisms they draw) will be put in relation to 
the W’s ‘I write’ coda as a way of approaching again the text’s generic 
definition and its ethical dimension. 
 
Moving targets: achrony and polychrony in the temporal structure of Part 
Two 
 
Using the game of running battleships as a guiding spirit to the temporal 
structure of Part Two  might offer us a rather neat figure for the memoir’s 
moving (or running) fabula, but it fails to account for both the temporal 
arrangement of great part of the memoir and of the fiction itself. The game 
also implies a certain resemblance between the structure (or the grid) of the 
two parts: this is perceptible in some parts (particularly the beginning) but not 
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in others. Of course, the game is never explained to the reader (as it wasn’t 
explained to Perec himself). Not only was the grid shredded into pieces, but 
‘running battleships’ is only a half-allegory or a fragmented allegory: the 
reader has to piece together this variant from various elements of the familiar 
“stable” game. Its unknown rules can only be imagined or guessed, but never 
“sunk”. 
 This section, like the one about Part One, will also proceed along 
generic lines, but keeping an eye all the time for any sideways communication 
(the ‘parler à cote’ that Lejeune talked about) between them.117 Before we start, 
it might be a good idea to gather together the threads of Part One, particularly 
in relation to the book’s macro-structure and its subsequent generic 
definition.  Part One could be said to signal the fabula of the autobiography as 
the master-structure, although it proposes different temporal arrangements 
for its components: the story of W could either precede the autobiography, or 
be its contemporary. The reader faces the same disjunction at the start of part 
two: the story could be read as a true beginning or as a continuation of a 
supplement. The story itself, however, will refuse to be anchored or 
connected to the autobiographical “frame” and to define itself as a 
subordinate supplement: both narratives will be, after all, equally 
supplementary. 
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The difficulty of anchoring the two parts of the fiction is particularly 
acute in the new beginning of Part Two after the ellipsis. It starts again with a 
fiction, creating a chiasmus pattern. The fiction starts by suggesting a possible 
connection to the first part, a connection which is nonetheless quickly 
dismantled. Part One opened with ‘For years I have put off telling the tale of 
my voyage to W’. Part Two starts ‘Far away, at the other end of the earth, 
there is an island told of. Its name is W’.118 The reappearance of W signals it as 
the beginning of the promised ‘tale’ of his adventures. There is no ‘I’ 
anymore, but “Winckler” had warned us he would adopt the ‘cold, impassive 
tone of the ethnologist’.119 The narrative soon starts to provide ‘cold’ data 
about the island, but when the narrator has to describe the origins of the 
colony, his style becomes dubitative and conjectural. But there is a further 
stylistic transformation to come: when the society and ideals of W are 
described, the ethnologist becomes an apologist. Cold inventories turn into 
rhetorical enumerations, adjectives are always superlative. There are indeed 
two ways of interpreting this shocking turn: either the tale is either been 
narrated by someone else (who might not be impartial) or our narrator has 
become an ironic observer who uses the rhetoric of triumphalism in a tongue-
in-cheek manner. 
However, perhaps the most unsettling aspect of this opening is its 
temporal framing. In the French original, the tale starts in the conditional (‘Il y 
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aurait’, which Bellos tries to convey by his ‘told of’), as if the island was 
nothing but a hypothesis.120 The narrator quickly switches to the present tense 
of the ethnological report, although the use of ‘today’ marks it as a real 
present rather than a historical one, which would contradict the narrator’s 
assertion that he wrote the story years after his stay in W. Perec’s use of tenses 
problematizes the model of retrospective testimony of the first part of the 
fiction: a testimony can change depending from when it is narrated. The 
narrative conflates in one ambiguous temporal standpoint (a present which is 
and isn’t historical) an array of reactions to W (detachment, blind admiration, 
ironic detachment, moral disgust) which would usually be narrated in a linear 
fashion, if the narrative followed the confessional model to which the first 
part conformed to. 
The floating moral position of the narrator cannot really be anchored 
throughout the progress of the story. “Progress”, however, is not the right 
word here: the fiction is no longer organized around cliff-hanger endings or 
narrative suspense. And yet the story has a secret — that of W itself, the 
horrors of its society and ideals and their historical referent.  The narrator is 
not always open about what some of the competitions entail, and withholds 
information from the reader — as his narrative of the Atlantiads (the most 
savage of all the events in the W competitive calendar) demonstrates. Before 
the event is described in detail, the narrator only refers to it in either a neutral 
fashion or through tantalising clues: the Atlantiads are ‘quite a special sort of 
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race’. 121 The agenda of the narrator is difficult to fathom: he might wish to 
prepare the reader to accept the Atlantiad as the “best” and most sport-like 
way to conceive children. But it is also possible that he is mocking the 
perverted logic of totalitarian discourse and propaganda, leading the reader 
to believe it, only to shock them even more at what they have come to accept. 
Or maybe, at this point, he may have repented from his initial enthusiasm, 
and decided to reveal what lies behind W’s facade. 
 Critics have tended to consider the narrator of W solely as a 
mouthpiece for the official ideology of the island. Burgelin notes that he uses 
‘moralising clichés’ and ‘rationalising techniques’ to ‘makes us enter, from the 
inside, into the W system’.122 If he is a mouthpiece, it is not clear if he is a 
willing or an unwilling one, or if he starts by being willing and then changes 
his mind. The indeterminate position of the narrator within a 
temporal/ethical spectrum is never distinctly resolved, even at the harrowing 
conclusion. As the story advances, the historical referent of W — the 
concentration camps — is revealed to the reader.  We learn that the athletes 
salute the authorities by lifting their arm and that they wear striped uniforms. 
Of course, those details only have significance in relation to the historical 
context of the narrative: the narrator, however, is repulsed by the cruelty 
inherent in the W system itself. 
                                                          
121
 Perec, W, p 100. The biggest clue is of course, the name given to the winners, Casanova. The name departs 
from the other naming conventions of W, who use the name of the first winner. Although the first “winner” of the 
Atlantiads might have been called Casanova, it is likely that the name was chosen for its association with 
unbridled masculinity and sexual prowess. It is an example of how W’s laws (and Perec) cheat in order to achieve 
certain effects. 
122
 Burgelin, p. 160. 
 
250 
 
The narrative loses here its cool ethnological calmness and becomes 
febrile and (self) accusatory. The syntax and style become those of an 
unravelling mind, full of exclamation marks and enumerations. The climax is 
the chilling inventory of commands and orders, its syntax (chillingly, 
horribly) reminiscent of a machine-gun: 
 
Run in a circle, lie down flat, crawl, get up, start running. Stand 
still, to attention, for hours, for days, for days and nights. Flat 
on your stomach! On your feet! Get dressed! Get undressed! Get 
dressed! Get undressed! Run! Jump! Crawl! On your knees!123 
 
The narrator is here adopting the discourse of the oppressors, but his diction 
and syntax suggests that he is trying to present those words from the point of 
view of the athletes, whose life is structured as a succession of repeated 
imperatives. At this point the reader cannot help looking out of the enclosure 
of W, or rather looking up: what we discover is the stasis and circularity of life 
in W (and of the book itself) is owed to a machine-gun pointing at the 
author’s hand — or rather at other absent hands. The last imperative suggests 
a horror worse than running around in circles, a horror that can only be 
suggested or framed (but not represented) by those circles: the murder of his 
mother, his aunt and his two grandfathers. 
 The passage explicitly makes the story of W into a frame for the absent 
and the ‘unsayable’. This reading, however, is not the result of the narrator’s 
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repentance: the passage is as ambiguous as the start, but it presents its 
undecidability in a more heightened and explicit fashion. It is by no means 
the moment when the narrative becomes a confession: even after this passage, 
the secret his exposé reveals is not the suffering of the athletes, but the 
mediocrity of their athletic performances (the record of the 100 metres is 
23”4).124 He is not dismayed by competition and its rules but by how W’s 
rulers have departed from fair-play and have thus betrayed the Olympic 
spirit. His moral position is still unfathomable: this might be a final ironic 
riposte, or the nadir of a deranged ideologue. The narrative starts and ends 
with a disjunction which is both temporal and moral: an exposé of the 
unsettled nature of the ‘ships’ of the confessional self and its moral positions. 
It exposes how inadequate it might be to apply autobiographical or 
confessional models to the whole of W or to search for origins within its 
discourses: they obscure what is really absent, what it cannot be represented. 
The conclusion of the tale of W, which introduced a second temporal 
cleft to the fictional arm, is itself another frame used to expose the dangers of 
narrative reconstruction, linearity, or the search for origins. The conclusion 
might be a ‘stitching’ of the parable to its historical reference (although this 
process is present throughout the whole story, but as absence), and even a 
‘stitch’ to the first part of the fiction. Certain similarities between the opening 
paragraph of Part One and the concluding one of Part Two might lead a 
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reader to believe that its narrator has been finally ‘sunk’: it might have been 
Winckler all along, he might have witnessed W at its “peak” and at its fall. 
This connection encourages readers to conjecture as the narrator did himself 
at the start: perhaps “Winckler” is connected to fall of this civilisation. The 
ellipsis might hide a comforting, cause-and-effect tale of heroism free from the 
snares of figuration and self-referentiality. Or rather not: W breaks up and is 
shredded (like the battleships grids) because W is also shredded; and it is in 
the cut where the traces of the absent are revealed. The conclusion does not 
solve the gap: it repeats it. 
 The narrative of W again echoes the tension between conjunction and 
disjunction, and emphasises (but not in an exclusive fashion) the ethical 
dimension of this tension. Something is at stake in the shredding of the game 
and of W but it not easy to discern what. It could be argued that the cut makes 
narrative structure itself (and its cause-and-effect model, its invitation to 
reconstruct a fabula) ethically dubious: narrative distorts and suppresses 
absence. But then we may wonder whether writing can exist outside of 
narrative (‘I write: I write’) or whether it is stuck in its frames, or whether 
those frames (even narrative ones) can also make the traces of the absent 
present. Perhaps a second frame, that of the second part of the autobiography 
is required here. Perhaps not. 
 This second part of the autobiography starts, like the fiction, with a 
promise of continuity — or, as Burgelin aptly puts it, ‘under the sign of “from 
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this point on”’ (‘désormais’ in French). 125 The rest of the opening sentence, 
however, soon ruptures it: ‘From this point on, there are memories — fleeting, 
persistent, trivial, burdensome — but there is nothing that binds them 
together’.126 The opening refers back to the opening of Part One, and signals 
Chapter Thirteen as the actual beginning of the book as an autobiography, as 
a book of childhood memories (his memories started at thirteen, likewise).127 
Although this new start might be read as a confirmation of the existence of a 
secret fabula behind the reconstructed fabula the readers have immediate 
access to (in which the memories of part one follow those of part two), the 
insistence on the fragmentary, non-narrative quality of those memories 
(compared to the ‘unjoined-up’ calligraphy style he used until he was 
seventeen) dashes the readers’ hopes for reconstruction — in the manner of 
an irate cousin Henri.128 
The fragmentary nature of the second part (and the impossibility of 
putting it back together again) is also highlighted by a pronominal change: 
the autobiographical ‘je’ mutates into a generic ‘on’ (Bellos translates it as 
‘you’, but ‘on’ also means ‘one’ or ‘us’, a neuter mode of selfhood). Linear 
chronology becomes a ghostly, dubious prop: the temporal model here is one 
of a cyclical, indistinct temporality — like the time of W. 
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[T]hese memories are scraps of life snatched from the void.[...] 
Nothing to anchor them or to hold them down[...]No sequence 
in time, except as I have reconstructed it arbitrarily over the 
years: time went by. They were seasons. There was skiing and 
haymaking. No beginning, no end. There was no past, and for 
very many years there was no future either; things simply went 
on. You were there.129 
 
 
The passage is Perec’s longest and most harrowing attempt at Bartlebian self-
erasure: Allan Astro reads it as a sign that the memoir has become an allegory 
of ‘the typical case of a refugee child during the war’, although this erasure 
goes beyond a movement from the particular to the general.130 
And yet it ends — the self reappears at the end of the chapter, but as a 
kind of conditional ghost (‘I would have liked to help my mother clear the 
dinner from the kitchen table’).131 They are negative memories of a different 
sort, feeble but moving attempts at resurrecting the dead through substitute 
fictions, an echo perhaps of his games with toy soldiers as heroic avatars of 
his father. After this false start, however, memories start appearing in the 
semblance of chronological order, but the operation of reconstruction is 
starkly revealed to be artificial, prop-like, unable to thread and stitch his self 
back together again — perhaps because that operation has something dubious 
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about it, as we saw when we tried to ‘stitch’ of the narrator of the Olympic 
nightmare with “Winckler”. 
The ‘running’, elusive character of the book’s fabula is starkly 
“performed” for the reader in the episode mentioned in the introduction, the 
story about the cowboy shirts. In this case, calling it a ‘curiosity’ seems 
inappropriate: it is not curious but clearly torturous. The cowboy shirts 
episode demonstrates how W cannot to be contained in the fabula/sjuzhet 
model: the reader is faced with two moving battleships which cannot be 
pinned down or sunk. The Christmas scene could be placed in 1942 or 1943, 
the photograph in 1943 or 1944.132 
An immediate reaction to this puzzle is to read the ‘running’ variant of 
battleships in the light of the static one: perhaps they only seem to be moving. 
The two episodes might have a fixed position, but they are narrated in the 
wrong order.  A Freudian ‘user’s manual’ to ‘running battleships’ becomes 
here particularly tempting. Although the chronological loop has — to my 
knowledge — remained unnoticed, the Xmas scene hasn’t. Anne Roche 
painstakingly dissects it through a Freudian lens as an example of a ‘screen 
memory’.  Her analysis, however, does not start in a psychoanalytic key: she 
starts simply by comparing it to Perec’s other memories, finding it strikingly 
different. Indeed, the Xmas scene is the only instance in which Perec writes 
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about memory as Nabokov sometimes does: as a moment of vision in which 
the barrier between present and past is pulled down. 
 
I think the whole scene has lodged and been frozen in my 
mind : a petrified image, unchangeable, which I can recall 
physically, down to the feeling of my hands clenched round the 
uprights, down to the cold metal pressing against my forehead 
when I leaned against the handrail.133 
 
We may ask ourselves whether this quasi-epiphanic style of memory is a 
prompt to read this scene as an affirmation of the referential potential of 
autobiography: the past is finally anchored. 
Roche is nonetheless doubtful, and on several accounts. For her the 
episode has the air of being ‘a model school essay’, a cliché — the homework 
Perec dreamed to be able to write in the sequence that closes Chapter 
Thirteen.134  Roche points out how the memory is not ‘about a particular 
Christmas, but about all the Christmas of the war, or rather a child’s idea of 
Christmas’. 135  If we apply her idea to the temporal quandary, we could 
consider that the episode does not belong to the fabula of Perec’s life: it might 
be achronic — an emblem, a symbol. But a symbol of what? It could be 
autobiography itself (or its most clichéd variants), but Roche decides instead 
to read it as a screen memory which conceals the world of W, the camps, and 
the trauma of losing his mother. The present (the itchy shirts given to him by 
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his aunt) is ‘linked to the universe that has killed his mother, even if the child 
is not conscious of it’: as she points out, the shirts are a disappointment not 
because they are shirts or itchy but because ‘they are not a present from his 
mother’.136 
  Staying in this Freudian key, but moving to the chronological riddle, 
we could tweak Roche’s conclusion to prove that the Christmas scene is not so 
much a ‘screen memory’ but a ‘displaced’ memory. The photograph is 
probably the out-of-sequence element in the series, and the sequence might be 
distorted to bring attention to a pattern of substitution and absences: the visit 
from his aunt recorded in the photograph was another non-visit from his 
mother. Perec might have realised that his mother would not come back in 
1944, after his frustration with too many visits from the “wrong” women. He 
might have realised then that the most unambiguous sign of her terrible fate 
were those two “wrong” chequered shirts.137 Perec might be playing here with 
narrative order to point out at the fabula behind the fabula: the Christmas scene 
comes after the photograph because it was remembered after the photograph, 
and read in relation to it. The photograph is really a frame. 
 Using Roche’s analysis of the Christmas night might thus allow us to 
settle the ‘running’ fabula, but this stability is nonetheless short-lived. The 
account Perec gives of his memories of his aunt’s visit to the school hints that, 
even if the photograph might have allowed him to read the Christmas scene, 
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it has not solved it or healed it, even up to the present day. The visit from the 
aunt becomes 
A revelation of a basic “truth” (henceforth only strange women 
will come unto you; you will seek them for ever and for ever 
reject them; they will not be yours, you will not be theirs, for you 
will be able only to hold them at arm’s length...) the intricacies of 
which I don’t think I have quite unravelled yet.138 
 
And perhaps neither have we. In this extraordinary sentence the parenthesis 
interrupts and separates the ‘revelation’ from the ‘unravelling’: the centre 
here is a whirlpool-like plaint of utter loneliness and dispossession extending 
beyond the borders of the book. The revelation is unsettled and unsettling, 
never-ending, torturous. Even if the tangled-up chronology is unravelled it 
only leads to further knots: perhaps it should not be unravelled, as seeing 
only the frame (Freudian, symbolic) can make us unsee the void. 
Bearing this in mind, perhaps the most useful narratological model to 
read this episode is David Herman’s concept of ‘polychrony’. Polychronous 
texts resist being smoothed out into fabula and sjuzhet, and W is particularly 
stubborn about this point. Perec is very sure of both dates, and that the shirt is 
the same shirt: the illogical nature of his arrangements cannot and should not 
be smoothed out by doubting Perec’s words and asking Bellos or Freud for 
help. The story should not be read in a mimetic or referential key, but as a 
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figure: an attempt to question to the linear arrangement of the fabula — and 
what that linear arrangement excludes. 
The purpose of the loop is to highlight the textual loop itself, its 
constant repetition.  Herman has described polychrony as a distinctly ethical 
narrative choice, a mode of questioning the ‘hyperlinearization of history’ 
which totalitarian ideologies impose. 139  For him, polychronous narratives 
either 
 
[W]arn against the danger of pursuing impossible totalities, 
wholly exhaustive stories, seamless and fully surveyable chains 
of cause and effects [or they might] suggest that history itself 
may not be structured according to prototypical narrative 
schemata.140 
 
Again, the question asked by the riddle of the shirts resembles the 
question posed by the fall of W. Herman’s account of polychrony highlights 
what is at stake in its answer: reconstructing a fabula might be nothing but a 
prop, providing only temporary support. In the case of the story of W, linking 
its three threads together might be even an affront.  The figural character of 
temporal structure has already been suggested by Part One: Part Two makes 
it explicit, echoing time and time again the painful presence of the author’s 
hand, and the absence it traces. It is another frame, and one that should not be 
unmade into a line. Or an X. Or a W. 
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Games and grids: mise en abyme in Part Two 
 
It should have become evident by now that any ramble we might undertake 
in any of the directions suggested by W tends to lead readers back to where 
they started. The temporal loop was an echo of the game of “running 
battleships” — and it was equally unplayable. A survey of the mise en abyme 
devices of Part Two might be a good point to return to our initial concerns 
about games motifs: the analysis of both mise en abymes has proved them to be 
twinned frames — but only if we read them as a whole, not just as games but 
as broken games or broken allegories. We may wonder if the game on its own 
is a distortion of W, maybe even a dangerous one. But such a reading would 
involve reading against the frame, playing against it: a strategy which all the 
frames frown upon. The reader has to be snared and has to lose, and has to 
lose in order to win. The game is played so that it can destroy itself. 
The purpose of another collection of mise en abymes might seem initially 
rather futile, although it is also irresistible. In Part Two, motifs are 
dexterously plaited together: the pattern of the cowboy shirts is the pattern of 
the battleships grid, and that of the frame. Once seen, grids and squares turn 
up everywhere. 141 Another collection of motifs may only contribute to the 
sense of paralysis, which — as our reading of the temporal loop showed — 
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might be the only thing we could or should do.  Any return to games or grids 
only leads to further repetition. 
Or maybe not: for all their obsessive repetitiveness, there are certain 
nuances to Perec’s self-referential motifs which do not deserve to be entirely 
brushed off, or left unpurchased. There might be, after all, curiosities amongst 
the curiosities. After all, Part Two introduces another memorial style to W, a 
style reminiscent of his other autobiography, Je me souviens.142  The meagre and 
lean anecdotes of his childhood become at times springboards for what we 
could be described as ‘digressive litanies’— the overflow or the spillage of 
memory. In the first instance, the memory of an old man chopping wood first 
generates a small parenthetical digression on the significance of collarless 
shirts and later a more expansive one on the letter X (as the instrument he 
uses to place the logs is called an X). Further litanies concern litanies 
themselves, skiing, his confusion of left and right and his memories of 
Dumas’ Twenty Years After and other literary favourites. 
The fact that there is a litany about litanies should warn us against 
reading these digressions as a true or more natural approach to 
autobiography, or time, or even — as Burgelin remarks — as a ‘link to his 
father and family’, a sign of his attachment to a collective ‘tradition of 
technical knowledge’.143 Litanies are another example of Perec’s ‘figures of 
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figuration’: all of them are repetitive and obsessive, gathering together 
examples until the elastic snaps and we return to where we started, to the 
beginning of the digression. One of the litanies, however, seems deliberately 
more awkward than the rest, harder to fit into a symmetrical frame: that 
concerning Perec’s confusion of left and right.  Perec, trying to explain to 
himself the reasons for a sleighing accident (which might have been 
completely invented), explains it as ‘one of my favourite examples of my 
“frustrated left-handedness”’ which — he elaborates — has left him unable to 
tell left from right. 144  This digression will also allow us to consider the 
square/grid motif from a different perspective. 
As Chambers and Magné have pointed out, the Hebrew letter of 
Perec’s first memory is another square, albeit an unclosed one — it has a little 
gap in the left hand bottom corner.145  Neither of them, however, read this gap 
as an anomaly or as a digression from the whole. The position of the gap in 
the letter has been interpreted by different critics as a way of separating this 
figure from the rest, and thus as a form rescuing the text (and the reader) from 
interpretive and generic paralysis. For Magné, both the digression about left 
and right and the letter allow Perec to ‘anchor’ writing to his Jewish identity 
(Hebrew and Yiddish are written from left to right): the monotonous self-
referentiality conceals autobiographical reference and testimony. 146  Andy 
Leak and Kirsty Guneratne also read Perec’s “frustrated left-handedness” as a 
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kind of anchor: the text’s “laterality” is read as a symptom of trauma and a 
connection to the mother.147 Guneratne even relates it to the left-hand side 
position of the ellipsis: rather than a site of ‘perpetual disorientation’, the 
inclination to the left of the ellipsis proves that in the text still ‘remains’ ‘a 
fundamental orientation.’148 
We should be nonetheless wary of reading this tilting as a form of 
choice — particularly as a choice that liberates the reader from the whirligigs 
of figuration. What the text’s structure of “framing frames” has shown is that 
the ellipsis is not just present in page 61, but that it is everywhere—even in the 
gaps between letters and words. ‘Left’ and ‘right’ are floating, meaningless 
signifiers for someone who cannot anchor the word to a particular position: 
the left side might be a link to the mother, a sign of oppression or the site of a 
trauma, but then so is the right side.  There is no transcendent or unique 
meaning to any side: they are undistinguishable. 
Perhaps we should return at this point to our original suspicions about 
the games motif: for all the exact quality of all its echoes, there still remained 
awkward loose ends unable to be fitted into any model. Our other qualm also 
concerned the model of confrontation it imposed on the text, the idea that its 
parts might be split into winning and losing teams. However, the most 
unsettling feature of this mise en abyme is that it leads the reader to compare 
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those self-referential motifs with the other games of the book, those of the 
island of W. 
As most critics of the book have pointed out, Perec uses the Olympic 
ideal of the island as a rather transparent allegory of Nazi ideology.149 Critics 
interested in the ludic dimension of Perec’s work have reconciled this 
apparent discrepancy by pointing out the differences between play and sport: 
Warren Motte, for instance, remarks how Perec made a distinction between 
sport, games of chance and games of skill.150 There are no games of skill in W, 
he points out, only sport and games of chance (the athletes also play dices 
between themselves).151 For Motte, those games of chance reflect ‘the arbitrary 
nature of life in W’, whilst sport reflects ‘the real cruelty of the society of W, 
revealed in its essence’.152 But his division between different modes of play is 
oversimplified: games such as backgammon or battleships combine both 
chance and skill. 
A more interesting approach is that of Kimberly Bohman-Kalaja, who 
reads the story of W as ‘a corruption of Play’.153 For her the autobiography 
presents 
 
The struggle between the strict regulations of W’s Olympian 
society versus the structural innovations of the text which tells 
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 See, for example, Burgelin, p. 156. 
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the story – conventions versus textual resistance, Sport versus 
Play.154 
 
The form and content of W, however, cannot be pulled out from each other as 
neatly as Bohman-Kalaja does: the ‘structural innovations’ are themselves 
‘strict regulations’. Unlike Je me souviens (which is a better example of a free, 
loose text) the text does not ever digress from its form, not even when it 
digresses. Play and games are not restricted to the fiction. Even the model of 
sport proposed by W is wildly divergent from ordinary sport: their Olympic 
Games are a distorted and perverted version of the real ones, a dystopian 
parody. Individual achievement is suppressed in favour of the excitement of 
competition. The Authorities do not play fair: they are cheating and 
manipulating the games in order to achieve maximum control over their 
participants. Sport and play cannot be reduced to a simple binary opposition: 
sport is play’s twin as much as its enemy. The real enemy might be W itself. 
 However, even the binary opposition between W and the rest of the 
book is not as easy to sustain as it seems. Astro reads the story of W not as an 
allegory (in the De Manian sense), but as a symbol: for him ‘the representation 
of Auschwitz as a barbaric sports camp approaches a symbolic mode’, as 
Perec ‘portrays how we cannot achieve a stable distance from Auschwitz, ever 
present’.155 And yet this interpretation — laudable as it is — ignores that 
stable, symbolic figuration is impossible in W, even on the island itself. The 
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description of W’s geography — full of detail of no particular ideological 
bearing — could in fact be read as a dark, even parodic mise en abyme of the 
whole, particularly of its reception: the reader, like the athletes, goes round 
the book clockwise and anti-clockwise, creating competitions between the 
different sections. Those competitions are organised in a strict hierarchy; the 
same as the one the reader attempts to impose when he or she puts together 
the pieces of the text. 
This mise en abyme might be another warning against the dangers of 
reconstruction, which only bring to the fore what really separates W from the 
games of the island: the games of the book should always be played for a 
draw. Although a draw suspends and breaks the game, the alternative, a 
victory, is worse. Perhaps the importance of Perec’s use of competition as a 
figural model in the story of the island is the way it allows the reader to 
escape from its insidious snares. The story of the island does not say anything 
different or anything more about W, or about history: it is not a better or a 
worse testimony than ‘I write: I write’. A draw. 
At this point, it might seem rather pointless to include another game 
and another grid in our inventory, and yet there is another one that should 
not be left out. The penultimate chapter of the memoir (like the first chapter of 
the fiction) ends in a game: although this time is not a game that Perec has 
created or played (or not played) himself. At the end of his account of a visit 
to an exhibition about the concentration camps, he mentions that he 
remembers two things, ‘the photographs of the walls of the gas chambers 
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showing scratch marks made by the victims’ fingernails, and a set of 
chessmen made from bits of bread’. 156  The chess pieces allow another 
dimension of play and games to come to the fore: games can be an act of 
resistance and defiance. David Gascoigne points out that the game offers ‘a 
symbolic catharsis for those whose lives are imperilled’.157 Here — Gascoigne 
remarks — ‘the figuration of the game is placed at the locus of the greatest 
pain and loss in his life’.158 The book might finally, right at the end, provide a 
mirror-image of itself which allows the reader to rescue it from figurative 
stasis, and anchor it firmly to its historical referent. And yet this game is a 
trace rather than a presence: its lack of board signals poignant the cut that 
brought it into being. W, in a way, provides a board for this game but it does 
not complete it or play it. The games chosen as figures of W have to be 
different, only to make the chess game stand apart. Those frames (like the 
leather frame) point at the absence of the players who moulded the pieces, 
brutally removed from a game that can only testify for that removal, for the 
cut, for the hole. 
 
We had ended the introduction by wondering whether the frame that we had 
purchased would be able to contain the hole of indeterminacy of W and its 
‘or’. Our passage has merely demonstrated that the frame was itself a hole, an 
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‘or’: it was empty when we purchased it, after all. The obsessive and 
repetitive nature of W’s figuration is, like the frame itself, much more 
valuable than its price. W and the frame expose — perhaps like no other of 
our curiosities — the dangers of overlooking, skipping or solving the 
whirligigs of figuration. Reading W requires the critic to ‘bear off’ any of the 
binary oppositions that give structure to their approaches: 
autobiography/fiction, fabula/sjuzhet, presence/absence.  The hegemonic 
structure that generic definition in particular imposes on the text is exposed 
as dubious and problematic: their relation is not that of competition, or 
collaboration or symbiosis. There is no relation because there is no pair to be 
compared, and there shouldn’t be. 
Repetition is a risk and a weakness of any analysis which discards 
those structures, but it is perhaps a worthy risk. Even the search for novelties 
and discoveries, for what remained “unpurchased” has to be undertaken 
under no illusion that it will reveal anything new but a further example of the 
frame. And yet the astounding variety and depth of W’s frames deserves 
careful and obsessive consideration. The text’s dismantling of narrative and 
linearity through its use of a disjunctive, floating, polychronous temporality 
invites the reader to consider what is at stake their reading: any hierarchical 
reconstruction forgets something, and W is a text which insistently does not 
allow the reader to forget — hence its obsessive repetitions. Mise en abyme is 
here emptied of any assumption to illuminate the whole: it escapes its borders 
and becomes the whole text. 
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It is because of it that W becomes a testimony to the absent: not because 
any of its parts says more than the rest, but because everything says the same: 
‘I write’. If the absent are made present, as Chambers claims, is not as 
anything other than absence itself. Speaking of his autobiographical work, 
Perec remarked whatever it is that it sought ‘isn’t the tragic event like when 
the violins start up! It has to remain buried the whole time!’.159 ‘It’ cannot be 
dug out: although any of the treasure-marking Xs that we come across could 
be the multiplication sign that makes a positive out of two negatives, it could 
also be the sign of ‘the mathematical unknown’, an algebraic enigma which 
Perec does not give us enough information to solve.160 Or the ‘sign of ablation’ 
in neurophysiology. 161 Or a frame. 
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Chapter Four 
The wooden Hindu aide-de-camp: Javier Marías’s Dark Back 
of Time (1998) 
 
...and that Hindu aide-de-camp made of painted wood 
that I’ve just brought home with some hesitation, that 
figurine will also outlast me, possibly. 
Javier Marías, Dark Back of Time
1
 
 
 
And so to our last curiosity. Compared to our other “samples”, Marías’s wooden 
Hindu aide-de-camp differs from the octopus-lamp and the picture frame in the fact 
that it is immediately recognisable as a curiosity. The figurine is the closing element 
in a 34 line-long inventory, in which the narrator of Dark Back of Time enumerates the 
objects in his room — a jacket, books, several family heirlooms and our wooden 
soldier. The thread connecting the disparate components of the list is the traditional 
motif of the memento mori:  Elide Pittarello points out that objects are used here ‘to 
talk about death metonymically: of his own death through the death of others’.2 The 
conclusion of the list seems to confirm this interpretation, and yet the very last word 
(‘possibly’) introduces a discordant note: why wouldn’t the toy soldier outlast him? If 
it is not a memento mori, then what is it? 
The soldier is also singled out of the other elements in the inventory by being 
a recent acquisition: he has ‘just’ brought it home, and ‘with some hesitation’.3 The 
start of the narrative coincides with the purchase of the figurine, and we may 
                                                          
1
 Marías, Dark, p. 11 with some modifications. 
2
 Elide Pittarello, ‘Haciendo tiempo con las cosas’, in Cuadernos de narrativa: Javier Marías (see Andrés-Suárez, above), pp. 
17-48 (p. 47). 
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wonder whether he is not also embarking on his tale with similar apprehension. Is 
there a secret behind it? The narrator has previously claimed the elements in the 
story he has started to tell will be ‘entirely capricious, determined by chance’, they 
will ‘have no reason [...] to constitute an argument or a plot or answer to some 
hidden harmony’.4 The uncanny presence of the figure seems to contradict this 
statement; although it is also perfectly possible that the purchase of the aide-de-
camp and the start of the narrative are just coincidences, and that we might have 
mistakenly transformed a completely ordinary object into some kind of ominous 
curiosity.5 Perhaps the most interesting part of this mystery (or pseudo-mystery) is 
the way that its dilemma is dismantled right after being proposed. We cannot find 
out which of the two readings is right: just after the narrator has demonstrated the 
exciting games we could play with his newly purchased toy, he snatches it away 
from our hands. The figurine disappears from the narrative after this point, never to 
return. 
The authorial commentary will also explicitly forbid us from creating stories 
out of the book’s random elements. This dictum resembles a self-definition, although 
perhaps not a generic one: it may be better understood in relation to the 
narrative/anti-narrative debates. The narrator is rejecting what Ricoeur called 
emplotment: in fact, his stand is reminiscent of the anti-narrative model of selfhood 
and narrative advanced by Galen Strawson.6 The narrator, however, cannot be said 
to commit wholly to one or the other model, despite the authoritative air of the self-
                                                          
4
 Marías, Dark, p. 9. 
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definition. The wooden soldier is readable as both ‘story’ and ‘episode’: it stands for 
the debate itself rather than one or other position. 
Genre, however, has not been completely left out of the self-definition. The 
narrator mentions that the book’s episodes have no plot to connect them — ‘[u]nlike 
those of truly fictional novels’.7  Does that mean that Dark Back of Time should be 
defined as non-fictional, as an autobiography, as a mirror of the random and 
contingent quality of real life? This is precisely what Alexis Grohmann argues when 
he insists that the book ‘attempts [...] to capture the breath of life, it tries not to 
deform it and to create the effect of the real’. Its form is that of life itself: ‘not 
rounded, [...] irregular — and ultimately errant’.8 
Grohmann’s phrase ‘the effect of the real’ recalls Barthes’s reality effect, 
although he reads the unmotivated and “unrounded” quality of the text as a sign of 
its unadulterated “real” nature. Barthes, on the other hand, advocated that such 
seemingly unmotivated details signify no reality at all, but only its idea: 
 
[W]hen these details are reputed to denote the real directly, all that they 
do [...] is signify it [...] [They] say nothing but this: we are the real; it is the 
category of “the real” [and not its contingent contents] which is then 
signified.9 
 
 
Hence, our soldier could be read as a “pure” representation of the reality of the 
narrator’s room or as an empty signifier of the book’s ultimately sham “reality”.  But 
the curiosity cannot be reduced to any of those interpretations: in fact, it also stands 
                                                          
7
 Marías, Dark, p. 9. 
8
 Grohmann, Literatura, p. 92. 
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 Roland Barthes, The Rustle of Language, trans. by Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), p. 148. 
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for the book’s emphatic anti-realist and meta-discursive character and its embracing 
of the legendary and the outlandish — of the fictional, of the story. The figurine is 
used to hedge and qualify the authority of the definition: it enables the narrator to 
construct a child-like persona for himself in contrast to the gravitas of the definition 
and the memento mori motif.10 Ultimately, the toy cannot be seen as a sign of neither 
fictionality nor its opposite but only as an emblem of generic undecidability — a mise 
en abyme of the text’s ambiguity. 
 
Our curiosity thus articulates in a succinct (but suggestive) manner some of 
the issues at stake in the critical debates around the generic definition of 
autobiography — particularly the relation between narrative, contingency and genre. 
It also highlights the self-contradictory, hesitant and unreliable quality of the 
narrative voice, who (to complicate things) happens to be called Javier Marías, to 
have the very same family and friends and to have written the very same books as 
his maker. Even narrative errancy and digression — which Grohmann read as the 
true narrative form of life and reality — can also be read as something artificial, a 
strategy to delay a story (or stories) which the narrator cannot bring himself to tell: 
perhaps  because — as a paranoid reader might deduct— they might too horrible. 
The temporal structure of the text (the indefinite location of the coronation 
within the szujhet discussed in the introduction) also belies the seemingly 
unmotivated and “pure” quality of the narrator’s digressions. Digression creates a 
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 As Gareth Wood points out, the motif of the relic is an explicit echo of Thomas Browne’s Hydriotaphia, which Marías 
translated. See Gareth Wood, Javier Marías’s Debt to Translation: Sterne, Browne, Nabokov (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), pp. 166-169. 
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hidden network of ‘matches’ underneath the text’s scattered surface. The fabula they 
conceal or defer is, however, deliberately elusive. The reader wonders whether the 
book’s secret is just the make-believe coronation of King Xavier or whether there is 
another story behind the story — perhaps the one triggered or suggested by the toy 
soldier. 
Dark Back of Time will thus allow us to explore some of the narrative devices 
that we observed in the two previous examples (mise en abyme, digression, temporal 
indeterminacy) — and their relation to generic definition — from a different 
perspective. In the introduction, I observed that this text is more openly zany and 
“curious” than the other two. For instance, its meta-discursive dimension is far 
bossier in tone. But (like in Speak, Memory or W) its self-reading is by no means 
unified and coherent. Concentrated examples of mise en abyme coexist alongside 
dispersed and self-contradictory ones. Meta-discursive passages do not unfold 
through argument and conjunctions but through a lethargic comma-fuelled syntax 
where different arguments imperceptibly sabotage each other. 
The particular interest of Dark Back of Time for our study does not merely lie in 
its overt self-awareness (and how this feature affects its use of mise en abyme), but 
also in its different take on some of the other narrative structures we have observed 
in our previous two examples. Dark Back of Time (like W) is structured in different 
narrative levels: it includes several embedded stories (including two lengthy 
biographical interludes), as well as extensive quotes and references to All Souls (one 
of Marías’s novels). Unlike in W — where the two levels remained distinct and 
separate, simply mirroring or even propping each other — the narrative levels of 
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Dark Back of Time behave far more anarchically, even to the point of mingling on 
several occasions. Dark Back of Time thus curiously combines mise en abyme with 
another unsettling technique, metalepsis, which we had not yet observed in any of 
our examples. Despite their differences (as pointed by Dorrit Cohn), both techniques 
share some of its ultimate effects: according to Cohn, both stir up ‘in the reader a 
feeling of disarray, a kind of anxiety or vertigo’.11 This chapter investigates the 
consequences of that particular combination for the generic (in)definition of the text. 
Another intriguing novelty of Dark Back of Time (the ultimate consequence, 
perhaps, of its combination of metalepsis and mise en abyme) is its explicit concern 
with the relation between autobiography, writing, reference and death. Pittarello 
observed that Marías used objects to talk about death metonymically; however, the 
model of reference established here is far from transparent — the book’s rather 
mysterious conclusion should in fact be read in relation to De Man’s interpretation 
of Wordsworth’s epitaphs, particularly his linking of the question of referentiality, 
figurative language and death.12 
 
The chapter, however, will start at the usual revolving door entrance: the first 
section examines the question of the book’s generic definition and its rather 
paradoxical generic tag, the false/fake novel. Despite my qualms about the 
borderline metaphor, this section makes use of liminal tropes to explore issues of 
genre and self-definition. The reason for this U-turn is that Dark Back of Time itself 
makes use of these figures, although it does not wholeheartedly embrace them: in 
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12
 See note 2 in this chapter. 
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fact, the book plays with and teases the stable model of knowledge and genre they 
have come to represent. In particularly, this section explores Marías’s use of 
metalepsis as a way of disturbing the book’s generic stability. The second section 
looks at liminality and genre from a temporal-narrative point of view by exploring  
how the book’s use of polychrony (the curious and uncertain location of the 
coronation), temporal indeterminacy and mise en abyme disrupts what Grohmann 
saw as the ‘natural’ (and hence autobiographical and referential) quality of the 
book’s digressive structure. The final part returns to the “secret” story implied by the 
wooden aide-de-camp to try to make sense of the book’s curious final twist. In 
particular, it tries to determine how the conclusion brings together metalepsis, 
digression and mise en abyme in order to explore the relation between genre, 
reference, figuration and death. 
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A return to the borderline: the goal-line of genre in Dark Back of Time 
 
 
Szentkuthy’s goal: undecidability and indecision in Dark Back of Time 
 
Our enthralled contemplation of the wooden soldier has demonstrated that the 
definitional task promises to be as dizzying in Dark Back of Time as it was with our 
previous examples. The “story” of the figurine and its purchase could be read as a 
mise en abyme of the definitional whirligig, a mirror of the undecidable nature of the 
text’s genre. Considering this, it might seem rather foolish to use anything else as the 
guiding trope of our analysis of generic definition in Dark Back of Time, and yet one is 
tempted to return to the borderline, if only for contrast.  Although tropological 
curiosities (such as the paradoxical tag of the book, “false novel”) are one of the 
book’s main figural motifs, the book is also structured through a series of liminal 
metaphors which will also be used as generic definitions. This section will try to 
examine the contrast and interplay between these two figurative models — and their 
relation to genre. 
 I will, however, start this exploration of liminality and genre in Dark Back of 
Time on a tangent (digression is contagious). ‘In Uncertain Time’ (‘En el tiempo 
indeciso’, literally, ‘In Indecisive Time’) is a short story composed three years before 
our ‘false novel’ in which we can find one of Marías’s more striking examples of a 
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liminal metaphor.13 Of course, it was not intended to be a comment on a book which 
at the time had not even been written; but the metaphor illustrates similar concerns 
to those developed years later in Dark Back of Time. The metaphor in question is that 
of the goal-line. At the heart of this seemingly slight (even melodramatic) tale lies a 
memorable goal scored by the protagonist of the story: Szentkuthy, a promising 
Hungarian striker (and namesake of the avant-garde novelist) signed by a top 
Madrid club. 
Szentkuthy’s goal was the match-winner in a European Cup quarter-final 
game.  He got the ball in a counter-attack, dribbled past the remaining defenders and 
the goalkeeper and ran with the ball towards the empty goal. At this point, 
shockingly, he decided not to shoot but rather stopped the ball just before the goal-
line for a few seconds before letting it roll slowly across. The unnamed first-person 
narrator of the story (who met the striker a couple of times), reflecting on the goal, 
concludes that 
 
It was only a second but I don’t think a single one of those spectators 
will ever forget it. It pointed out the gulf between what is unavoidable 
and what has not been avoided, between what is still future and what 
is already past, between “might be” and “was”, a palpable transition 
which we only very rarely witness.[...] He has thwarted imminence, 
and it was not so much that he had stopped time as that he had set a 
mark on it and made it uncertain.[...] Szentkuthy’s will was, at the very 
least, vacillating, as if he wanted to emphasize that nothing is 
inevitable: it’s going to be a goal, but look, it could just as easily not 
be.14 
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Javier Marías, When I Was Mortal, trans. by Margaret Jull Costa (London: Harvill, 1999), pp. 143-156. 
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Marías, When, p. 152. 
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Szentkuthy’s rather implausible goal becomes a metaphor for what Marías calls 
‘uncertain’ or indecisive time, the moment of transition between what will probably 
happen and what eventually happens, when all outcomes are revealed as contingent. 
In delaying the inevitable, he makes both the goal and non-goal present and 
simultaneous, before the inevitable takes place. And it is the dawdling, the delay 
which makes the frontier discernible. Going back from this game to Dark Back of Time 
and genre, our wooden toy could be compared to the striker’s delay in the goal-line: 
it is also saying that he could be a story, but he might just as easily not be. 
The difference, however, between the striker and the narrator of Dark Back of 
Time’s is that Szentkuthy scores. But is it possible for our narrator to remain in the 
goal-line of generic definition? De Man thought not — perhaps our narrator also 
ends up scoring and deciding after all his dawdling. In a 2006 interview to the Paris 
Review Marías mentioned that his ‘natural state’ was that of ‘Indecision — but it 
doesn’t mean I never decide. It means I take my time’. 15   Indecision is here 
paradoxically defined as a delayed decision, perhaps because indecision is also a 
form of decision. Although Marías’s opinions should not be read as those of his 
characters, this aphorism could be read in relation to both Szentkuthy’s goal and to 
Dark Back of Time — perhaps as a way to approach the narrator’s ambiguous errancy. 
Digression was read by Grohmann as a more natural and “real” narrative style, but 
it might in fact resemble Szentkuthy’s goal more than he thinks: it might be read as 
the procrastination of a duty. 
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 Sarah Fay, ‘Javier Marías: The Art of Fiction, n 109’, Paris Review, 179 (Winter 2006), online version 
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However, we should nonetheless refrain from making hasty associations: 
there is a twist to Szentkuthy’s story and goal which is particularly (if undeliberately) 
relevant for our discussion of the genre and the narrative structure of Dark Back of 
Time. ‘In Uncertain Time’ concludes with the narrator’s account of Szentkuthy’s 
death: our protagonist, we learn, was shot dead by his wife in revenge for his many 
infidelities ( he told the narrator in one of their encounters that he used to celebrate 
his goals by “scoring” in the colloquial, sexual sense of the word).  The conclusion 
exploits the goal’s metaphorical potential: the narrator reads the murder in the light 
of the victim’s most famous goal, and wonders whether the player´s wife did not 
hesitate for a moment before shooting him just as her husband had done before 
scoring. 
 
Perhaps there was a second when imminence was thwarted and time 
was marked and became uncertain, and during which Szentkuthy 
clearly saw the dividing line and the normally invisible wall that 
separates life and death, the only “might be” and the only “was” that 
count. These are sometimes at the mercy of the most trivial things, of 
two feeble fingers that have grown tired of slipping into a pocket or 
tugging at a sleeve, or of the sole of a boot.16 
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Marías, When, p. 156. I have taken the liberty of changing Jull Costa’s translation of the last sentence.   She changes 
Marías’s full-stop after ‘count’ into a comma and translates the end of the last sentence as ‘ these are sometimes controlled 
by the most trivial things, by two feeble fingers that have grown tired of slipping into a pocket or tugging at a sleeve, tired 
of being beneath the sole of a boot’. This translation, whilst grammatically correct seems to deprive the ending of its 
mystery and ambiguity.  The original reads ‘A veces están en el poder de las cosas más nimias, de unos dedos sin fuerza que 
se han cansado de buscar un bolsillo y tirar de una manga, o de la suela de una bota’. See Marías, Cuando fui mortal 
(Barcelona: Debolsillo, 2006), p. 156. The problems is that the last clause (‘de la suela de una bota’) could be both 
complement ‘controlled by’ and’ tired of’. The Spanish ‘de’ is used alongside both verbs, but that is not the case in English 
and the translator needs to choose between one meaning or the other. Jull Costa nonetheless makes her choice rather too 
unambiguous. 
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The liminal territory here is the goal-line that separates life and death, but, in 
an ironic role-reversal, Szentkuthy becomes the spectator rather than the goal-scorer. 
The interest of the tale’s conclusion for our study lies not in its ironic nature or its 
pseudo-Othellian melodrama, but rather in how it relates to the narrative/anti-
narrative debates: and in particular to the problematic retrospective and teleological 
model of knowledge that narrative imposes on discordant elements. The narrator’s 
final words might be hinting at a cause-and-effect relation between goal and death, 
as each goal (and sexual conquest) brought Szentkuthy one step closer to his death. 
But the final words also suggest that what led to the player’s downfall was not his 
womanising but his most famous goal — the very last words mysteriously suggest 
that the player’s (hubristic?) dawdling on the goal line might have caused his end. 
His end might have been at the mercy of the sole of his boot in that particular 
European Cup game. 
This reading proposes a different sort of narrative model: one based on 
irrational, superstitious and wholly unexplainable reversed causalities in which 
events are neither linked by teleological, cause-and-effect structures nor left 
unconnected and dispersed. This model relies on what Marías himself has called ‘an 
exaggerated associative faculty, a hypertrophy of our capacity to see links and 
relations between all things’.17 The allure of association does not lie in its denial of 
causality but in its muted potential to contain all causalities, including reverse and 
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Marías, Literatura y Fantasma, pp. 392-393. An excellent overview of this idea in Marías’ narrative can be found in 
Grohmann’s study Coming into One’s Own, particularly his chapters on All Souls and Tomorrow in the Battle Think on Me. 
See Alexis Grohmann, Coming into One’s Own: The Novelistic Development of Javier Marías (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), pp. 
153-167 and pp. 247-282.  Alan Marriott formulates this idea by referring to how horror stories (such as those of his 
admired Arthur Machen) rely on ‘horrifying other halves’, on the matching of two unconnected elements. See Marías, All 
Souls, trans. by Margaret Jull Costa (London: Harvill,1992), pp. 84-85. 
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irrational ones. This is in fact the reading path suggested by the toy soldier: an 
uncanny association between the absurdly wary purchase of a figurine and a loosely 
structured book without a plot. Continuing with the associations, we are reminded 
of Todorov’s theory of the fantastic, based on the reader’s unsolvable hesitation 
between natural and supernatural explanations. 18  Marías’s theory of narrative 
association could be said to free the reader from the ordeal of having to make a 
decision about the figurine — and ultimately about the book’s genre. However, this 
approach weakens when one associates it to Genette’s dilemma about how to read 
the bumblebee episode and — particularly — to De Man’s rebuke: it is impossible to 
remain ‘within an undecidable situation’. 19 Szentkuthy could not have stayed in the 
goal-line. 
Should we thus infer from our rather forced association of ‘In Uncertain Time’ 
to the problematic generic definition of Dark Back of Time’s that the latter also “scores” 
generically after all its dawdling and  indecision? Perhaps not — although football 
and sport make excellent allegories of life and time, Steven Connor has pointed out 
that there are important differences between them: 
 
Unlike 'real life', which, despite its upright reputation, is plainly a 
treacherous fogbank of delusions and deceptions, vanities and 
velleities, sport is the forcing into being of a condition in which it is 
impossible to deny what is really happening. 20 
 
 
                                                          
18
See Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. by Richard Howard (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1975). 
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 De Man, ‘Autobiography’, I, pp. 264-274 (p. 266). 
20
 Steven Connor, A Philosophy of Sport (London: Reaktion Books, 2011), p. 175. 
 
283 
 
There are no football allegories in Dark Back of Time: in fact, ‘a treacherous fogbank of 
delusions and deceptions’ is a surprisingly accurate description of the book, a work 
in which ‘what is really happening’ can be easily mistaken or denied. 
Could we thus infer from Connor’s distinction that because Dark Back of Time 
cannot be represented through a sporting allegory, it must be “real life”? And yet, 
when it comes to the book’s genre (and its temporal structure), the allegory of the 
goal-line is not as forced and inadequate as it immediately seemed. Dark Back of Time 
— as we will see — does make a choice about the problem of reference. Although the 
definition as a ‘not truly fictional’ text hinted at the autobiographical or referential 
character of the text, its opening is rather close to De Man’s arguments about 
autobiography’s generic status and the problem of reference. The next section 
examines the opening of Dark Back of Time and its relation to the debate on the 
referential status of autobiography as a way of re-examining the aptness of the goal-
line metaphor (and all its liminal siblings) as a critical tool with which to approach a 
curious goal and a curious book. 
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‘Still never’: the opening of Dark Back of Time and the question of reference 
 
The opening two sentences of Dark Back of Time — which occupy a page and a half, 
and which  have been the focus of much critical attention — have unavoidably been 
read as the book’s most explicit (and perhaps least equivocal) engagement with the 
question of its genre and its referential status. Pittarello describes it as a 
‘metadiscursive opening’ and a hermeneutical key (or ‘instruction manual’) to the 
text.21  It is possible to read this opening as a kind of generic goal (or decision) which 
articulates unambiguously a rejection of the possibility of reference:  we should 
nonetheless bear in mind that the passage’s syntactical convolutions, sprawling 
structure and argumentative self-contradictions might not leave any certainties — 
even negative ones — unscathed. 
I will proceed to look at this sentence in detail. Speaking of convolutions and 
sprawl, Guillermo Cabrera Infante’s rather felicitous punning description of Dark 
Back of Time is particularly apt for this opening sentence. For him, the book is ‘in a 
permanent comma’. He also observes (in a second pun) that the punctuation sign is 
nonetheless also used with ‘well-thought comical effects’.22 The comic coma state of 
the opening can be discerned, for instance, in the narrator’s use of rhetorical 
prolepsis. This device has been described by Mark Currie as the anticipation of ‘an 
objection, or a resistance, from the reader to the strategies through which it 
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 Pittarello, ‘Negra Espalda: Instrucciones de uso’, in Foro hispánico 20: El pensamiento literario de Javier Marías, ed. by 
Maarten Steenmeijer( Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001), pp. 125-134 ( p. 125). 
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 See Cabrera Infante, ‘¡Ave Marías!’, not paginated. 
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constructs the world or advances its perspectives’. 23  The narrator’s rejection of 
reference is actually triggered by a rhetorical prolepsis gone awry. 
  
I believe I’ve still never mistaken fiction for reality, though I have 
mixed them together more than once, as everyone does, not only 
novelists or writers but everyone who has recounted anything since 
the time we know began, and no one in that known time has done 
anything but tell and tell, or prepare or ponder a tale, or plot one. 
Anyone can relate an anecdote about something that happened, and 
the simple fact of saying it already distorts and twists it, language can’t 
reproduce events and shouldn’t attempt to, and that, I imagine, is why 
during some trials ― the trials in movies, anyway, the ones I know 
best ― the implicated parties are asked to perform a material or 
physical reconstruction of what happened, repeating the gestures, the 
movements, the envenomed steps they took, the way they thrust the 
knife to become the accused, they are asked to simulate seizing the 
weapon once again and delivering the blow to someone who, because 
of it, ceased to be and is no more, or rather to empty air, because it isn’t 
enough for them to say it, to tell the story impassively and as precisely 
as possible, it must be seen, and an imitation, a representation or 
staging is required, though now without the knife in hand and without 
the body  ― sack of flour, sack of flesh ― to drive it into, this time in 
cool detachment and without racking up another crime and adding 
another victim to the list, but only as pretense and memory, because 
what they can never reproduce is the time gone by or lost, nor they can 
revive the dead who are lost within that time and gone.24 
 
 
The narrator thus starts by arguing for the ontological separation of reality 
and fiction, and — to try to demonstrate this point — embarks on a comma-ridden 
(and rather comical) ‘rhetorical prolepsis’ in which he ends up agreeing with the 
foretold objection. His defensive device becomes an own goal. This idiosyncratic 
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 Mark Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory, 2
nd
 edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), p. 153. 
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 Marías, Dark, p.7. I have taken the liberty of changing the translator’s semi-colon after “accused” back to a comma as in 
the Spanish original. 
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generic definition thus moves from epistemological certainty into a thorough 
questioning and undoing of its initial argument. 
This reading, however, is not unanimous: David K. Herzberger, for instance, 
sees no ambiguity or contradiction at all in the passage 
 
[T]he narrator [...] seems to stand firmly on the ground of common 
sense (and tradition) when he asserts one world that is real and 
another that is make-believe, each always distinguishable from the 
other.25   
 
Samuel Amago, on the other hand, considers the passage as a statement of generic 
indeterminacy: for him, the opening is   
 
[A]n example of how [...] the narrator is interested most in creating a 
sense of indeterminacy. Indeed, if the narrator were truly interested in 
making a confident assertion that fiction and reality occupy two 
separate ontological fields, certainly he might have been less equivocal 
in his choice of words [...]. The accumulation of adverbs that surround 
the main verb “confundir” [to confuse] ― no [not], todavía [still], and 
nunca [never] ― serve to do exactly that; to confound and perhaps 
confuse the reader.26 
 
Amago’s analysis rightly points out the importance of the adverbs in the seemingly 
certain opening statement.  In particular, the narrator’s conjunction of ‘still’ and 
‘never’ effective sabotages the sentence’s logic, and thus its value as an argument 
and a definition. The sentence is semantically incoherent: ‘still’ and ‘never’ 
contradict and undermine each other’s meaning. 27  ‘Still’ threatens to blow and 
shatter the narrator’s certainty, and its threat is soon fulfilled: he has never confused 
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 David K. Herzberger, A Companion to Javier Marías (Woodbridge: Tamesis, 2011), p. 121. 
26
 Samuel Amago, True Lies: Narrative Self-Consciousness in the Contemporary Spanish Novel (Lewisburg: Bucknell 
University Press, 2006), p. 132. 
27
 Later on, the narrator repeats the sentence and makes it aware he says ‘deliberately incorrectly’. See Marías, Dark, p. 63. 
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fiction and reality but the example that he will use to illustrate the impossibility of 
language to reproduce reality comes from fiction, from trial films. 
  However, this distinction might be considered irrelevant in relation to the rest 
of the argument. Rather than indeterminacy, the narrator is denying the possibility 
of reference: the problem of the boundary between fiction and reality is subsumed 
into an examination of language itself. The film trial is actually the metaphor of a 
metaphor.28 Pittarello has rightly pointed out that in the opening paragraphs, ‘the 
narrator tackles the ontological question par excellence of all Western tradition’, 
reaching ‘the gloomy conclusion that it is impossible to preserve experience through 
language’.29 It does not matter if the trial is fictional: even a real trial would equally 
become fictional when told. 
What Pittarello and other critics fail to observe in this passage is that even the 
metaphor of the trial (a deranged and murderous version of the ‘rambling 
comparison’) even dismantles itself in its attempt to signify the absence of reference. 
Ostensibly, the metaphor is used to point out our general suspicion against language: 
because language is unreliable, judges or lawyers may ask a defendant not to tell 
what happened but to represent the crime, to stab the victim again, now into the air. 
But is that really what a judge would or should do? For we may ask ourselves 
whether the defendant’s dramatic reconstruction would be any more truthful than 
his word: the defendant’s words (and, by extension, gestures) are assumed to be 
unreliable or insufficient to establish the truth. A judge is not expected to make a 
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 Marías, Dark, p. 8. 
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 Pittarello, ‘Negra espalda’, pp. 125-134 (p. 126). 
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decision solely on the basis of testimony, be it visual or linguistic. The trope moves 
further and further away from a stable meaning as it develops. 
In fact, we could read the passage as a performance (a performance about a 
performance) that proves the narrator’s scepticism about language: not only is he 
affirming we cannot tell what happened through language, he is also showing how 
we cannot tell that we cannot tell. The narrator’s words speak for him, and speak 
more than he does, adding unwelcome layers of complexity to his point. The 
murderer here might be no other than the example itself, who betrays the narrator 
and stabs him in the back. If the narrator is here trying to offer a defence against the 
“autobiography” goal (disguised as a proleptic objection), he is doubly successful at 
it, exposing himself as fictional and unreliable. 
However, despite my previous insistence on how this passage is an 
unequivocal generic goal for figuration and the impossibility of reference — a 
“golden goal” at that, the goal that concludes the match as soon as it is scored — the 
‘performance’ reading is far from unassailable. The trial example is adequate enough, 
although it might be better applied to a witness rather than to a defendant. The 
narrator might be using the murder trial example not as a joke, but with the opposite 
intention: in order to emphasise how tragic, even deadly, the problem of language 
might end up being (the end of the sentence is elegiac and melancholic).  This is the 
way Pittarello reads it, for instance: she remarks that Marías’s ‘approach is extreme, 
a matter of life and death’.30 The impossibility of reference is not just comical but also 
coma-like and deadly. 
                                                          
30
 Pittarello, ‘Negra Espalda’, pp. 125-134 (p.126). 
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Alongside this dimension, the trial metaphor is also used to explore the 
ethical consequences of the impossibility of reference and the aporias of testimony. 
This topic is explicitly discussed in a later reprise of the judiciary motifs. The 
narrator reflects on the epistemological conundrum of testimony in relation to his 
own family history (a history which is here identical to that of Javier Marías himself) 
and to the larger context of totalitarianism and the Franco regime. 
 
[I]t is impossible to demonstrate that you have not done something or 
committed some crime if the opposite is presumed, from the start, to 
be the case, a thing all dictators know very well. To go no further than 
Spain itself, that was the judicial policy of the Franco regime.31 
 
 
The narrator introduces a specific historical context into a metaphor that before 
stayed within the realm of purely abstract considerations about language and genre. 
The testimony of a defendant should not be immediately disbelieved out of hand, as 
the justice system might not be fair or impartial. As an example, the narrator uses the 
story of his father: a supporter of the Republic and democracy during the Civil War,  
he was falsely accused by a friend of charges such as writing for Pravda and being 
the Spanish companion of Dr Hewlett Johnson, the Red Dean of Canterbury.32 The 
narrator tells us how his father was put in prison, and only escaped being executed 
‘due to luck and my mother’s tenacity’.33 
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 Marías, Dark, p. 24. 
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 The Red Dean, Dr Hewlett Johnson, was a Communist activist, propagandist and Dean of Canterbury Cathedral. There is a 
recent biography of him by John Butler. See John R. Butler, The Red Dean: The Public and Private Faces of Hewlett Johnson 
(London: Scala, 2011). 
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However, as in the trial example, language gets out of control even here: as 
Gareth Wood points out, the story of his father’s betrayal is narrated in a quasi-
Shandean manner.  Even whilst providing a testimony of a historical injustice, the 
narrator still digresses: he is distracted by the figure of the Dean, and narcissistically 
interprets the false accusation not merely as something that could have cost his 
father his life but also as something that would have prevented his own existence.34 
The reader might wish to question whether this peculiar testimony is hindered by its 
shambolic, childlike execution ― whether the story survives its telling. Wood thinks 
that it does: for him the tone here ‘is more nuanced than Sterne’s’, particularly as the 
digressions turn into what Wood describes as ‘a disillusioned account of the modern 
world’s overanxiety to bury the past’.35 
Despite his nonchalance, the narrator does wish to provide here a testimony 
for the bravery and suffering of his parents under the Franco regime — he may wish 
to be believed.36 Herzberger has pointed out that the book’s testimonial passages 
provide 
 
[A] powerful sentimental component to Negra that would seem to 
betray any notion that it can be viewed within postmodernism as a 
work of fiction that struggles to represent anything beyond its own 
construction.37 
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 Gareth Wood, p. 126. 
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 Gareth Wood, p.126. 
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 Pozuelo Yvancos discusses the fictionalisation of the Julian Marías denunciation and trial in Marías’ next novel, Your Face 
Tomorrow, arguing that Marías divorces truth from reference. See Pozuelo Yvancos, pp. 109-114. 
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The importance of this dimension somehow belies the text’s strong stance on the 
impossibility of referentiality and language — the passage on the father and the Red 
Dean, however, also demonstrates how no testimony is ever neutral. 
 Despite what Herzberger argues, the text’s paradoxical stance is particularly 
postmodernist: Linda Hutcheon argues that ‘Postmodernism does not so much 
erode our ‘sense of history’ and reference, [...] as erode our sure sense of what both 
history and reference meant’.38 The book’s most explicit engagement with Spain’s 
recent history (a made-up conversation between mercenary pilot Hugh Oloff De Wet 
and Franco) proposes an explicitly fictional and conjectural approach to testimony 
which perhaps exposes totalitarian ideology in a more effective way than the story of 
the father. After all, the narrator also mentions how ‘“To tell what happened” is 
inconceivable and futile, or possible only as invention’. 39  Only perhaps: this 
“personal” and testimonial branch of the trial metaphor needs to be read in 
conjunction to the book’s other, and far more frivolous, testimonial duties (which the 
next section discusses) as another demonstration of paradox and even perhaps of 
indecision — even if it is impossible. It might not have been a goal, after all. 
Our perhaps over-certain identification of the narrator’s argument with a De Manian 
approach to autobiography and reference needs to be qualified not only by the text’s 
exploration of the ethical and ideological consequences of such an argument, but 
also by the text’s performance of its own argumentative instability. Pozuelo Yvancos 
rightly points out the book ‘is no less of a novel because of its reflexive dimension. It 
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 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction (London: Routledge, 1988), 
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 Marías, Dark, p. 9. 
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isn’t an essay; or a critical or philosophical treatise’.40 The trial re-enactment aptly 
illustrates how Marías uses philosophical arguments novelistically and turns them 
into imperfect allegories of themselves. 
 
 
‘An internal pocket larger than the whole’: Dark Back of Time as a generic marker 
 
 
If there is any certainty at all to be extracted from the opening of Dark Back of Time is 
that readers should not take the narrator’s lucubrations at face value. This aspect is 
even more evident when we consider the book’s other testimonial duty — ostensibly, 
the main reason for its existence. This other duty (in contrast to the one performed in 
the passages about his family) is deliberately frivolous. It is explained in the 
paragraph which follows the narrator’s comically unsuccessful rhetorical prolepsis: 
there, the narrator returns to his first thesis (that fiction and reality are ontologically 
distinct) in order to declare once and for all to his jury of readers that he does not 
confuse reality and fiction — particularly his own reality and his own fictions. 
 
In this pages I’m going to place myself on the side of those who have 
sometimes claimed to be telling what really happened or pretended to 
succeed in doing so, I’m going to tell what happened, or was 
ascertained, or simply known ― what happened in my experience or in 
my fabulation or to my knowledge or perhaps all of it is only 
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consciousness that never ceases ― as a result of the composition and 
circulation of a novel, a work of fiction.41 
 
 
The generic definition is an even more blatant example of how the ‘autobiography’ 
goal cannot be scored. The beginning of the sentence purportedly proclaims Dark 
Back of Time to be a testimony, a referential narrative, but as the definition advances 
— closely marked by every single comma and adverb — it becomes seriously injured. 
The only stable generic tag turns out to be not that of Dark Back of Time itself but that 
of a previous book, All Souls, which can defined — with disarming ease — as a novel. 
  We should nonetheless not become too overenthusiastic in our application of 
sporting allegories. This passage also introduces a new aspect to generic definition 
which ‘either/or’ liminal metaphors such as the goal-line failed to take into account.  
What we find here is a definition within a definition: because one book is defined as 
a novel the other becomes an autobiography, and viceversa. Definition is here 
trapped in a mirror game of supplements which actually destabilises any defining 
trait.  Dark Back of Time is itself the generic definition of another text: genres are not 
separate realms to be crossed and uncrossed at ease (or scored and saved) but may 
actually be contained within each other. 
As the generic tag of All Souls, Dark Back of Time makes explicit the paradoxes 
of generic identification that Derrida explored in ‘The Law of Genre’. Before moving 
into that comparison, it might be a good idea to offer a brief introduction to the 
“source” of our curiosity. Published in 1989, the novel narrated the two-year stay in 
                                                          
41
 Marías, Dark, p. 9. Again I have “corrected” Esther Allen, as she again rebels against Marías crazed syntax and 
punctuation, and adds an extra dash after “my knowledge” to separate the last clause. 
 
294 
 
Oxford of an unnamed Spanish lecturer in translation. The protagonist’s 
namelessness and some biographical coincidences (highlighted by the original 
paratext) led many readers to consider it an autobiography in disguise: a misreading 
which Dark Back of Time ostensibly seeks to correct.42  So is the book a ‘novel’ tag 
which — as Derrida pointed out — cannot belong to the genre it denominates? Does 
that make it a non-novel? Or an autobiography?  Or is this novel-tag really a novel?  
These deductions, however, seem to forget how Derrida insisted on the partial 
character of generic belonging. His vision of the generic mark also blurs the frontiers 
between binary distinctions such as inside/outside or part/whole in which much 
discussion of genre relies on.  In fact, Derrida’s reconfiguration of the paradoxical 
dimensions of the generic tag seems particularly fitting to Dark Back of Time:  it is an 
internal pocket of the previous text that becomes larger than its container. 
The nature of supplementarity and its relation to the digression’s potential for 
semantic dispersal can be observed through Dark Back of Time’s shambolic 
performance of its generic tagging duties. A particularly comical example is the 
narrator’s attempt to prove that one (but only one) of the characters in All Souls (Will, 
the senile time-travelling porter of the Institutio Tayloriana) had a real-life — but 
non-senile — model: one Walter Thomas, known as Tom, of whom we are even 
offered a photograph. The function of Tom and Will is to operate as a tag within the 
tag: the real character that demonstrates the fictional nature of the rest of the cast, 
narrator included. 
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This exception, however, will end up un-defining the other characters and 
their ontological status.  The real model and its fictional copy are soon fused and 
separated. See, for example, the narrator’s account of the death of Tom (the model), 
which soon turns into an elegy for Will (the copy) — who had not even died in All 
Souls. The death of the model also kills his fictional counterpart, as if one could no 
longer live once one of them had disappeared. This is a curious reversal of the cliché 
of immortality through fiction: here reality and mortality intrude in the world of the 
novel and kill one of the characters.43 But then can a ghostly creature like Will die 
again? That is the paradoxical core of the Tom/Will dilemma: if he seeks to prove 
that there were some true elements in All Souls he needs to renounce to Will’s life, 
but at the same time, he is aware that he cannot kill him in All Souls, as the former 
cannot be changed or rewritten.44 He is to remain undead for eternity no matter how 
much he kills him now to prove his point. Even the photograph becomes equivocal: 
the old man’s face becomes opaque, a flickering mask which the reader can turn into 
Will or Tom at will — or even perhaps suspect of not being any of them at all. 
There is, however, an underlying punch-line to this dizzying non-tag: Will 
(whom he seeks to point out as “real”) is perhaps the most evidently fictional or 
metaphorical character in All Souls: a symbol of Oxford itself, or even a mise en abyme 
of All Souls. It is thus difficult to see why a ghost is picked out amongst the other 
characters to be “real” and to tag the rest of the cast as fictional creatures: it might be 
a way of showing how the narrator comically falls into the same traps as his 
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misreaders or a particularly sophisticated argument for the metaphorical, ghostly 
character of language. There is no reason why metaphorical or allegorical characters 
cannot be as real as “real” ones (or real cities, like Oxford itself) because they are 
both equally figural. 
The passage demonstrates the problematic nature of binary models of genre 
such as the goal-line and the frontier: Dark Back of Time marks All Souls as both 
fictional and autobiographical, mirroring its own equally paradoxical self-tagging. 
And at the same time, it only manages to turn them both into figures of figures and 
fictions of fictions. It is very revealing, however, that even after the (deliberate) 
tagging fiasco of the Tom/Will section, the narrator keeps on insisting on his 
attempt to separate both texts. He even brings back the judicial metaphors of the 
beginning, perhaps to provide a little authoritative sheen to his rather futile task: 
 
I could state and declare, as I’ve often done and am now doing again, 
that almost all of [All Souls] was invented, [...] that none of the 
characters had a counterpart in anyone who exists or once existed [...] 
Though in fact there is no reason to believe anything I state or declare, 
even if there does exist a credulous and unjustifiable tendency to 
believe the statements authors make about their own books.45 
  
 
This declaration, however, only confirms the reader’s initial suspicious about the 
narrator’s unreliability. He casts himself in the role of the defendant, but he is only 
the victim of a harmless misreading. The legitimacy and authority of his tagging 
operation is undone: he might be far closer to the accuser than the accused, whose 
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testimony is regularly (and unfairly) seen as more reliable. Karen Berg mentions that 
‘[a]uthorial intrusions of this nature stand out of place in conventional nonfiction 
and undermine the reader’s implicit trust.’46He is in fact declaring that he is a liar — 
the paradox of paradoxes which completely unsettles any remaining certainty, and 
which returns us to the whirligigs of figuration.47 
 
 
Reivax and the ‘false novel’: the generic markers of Dark Back of Time 
 
 
What to do, then, about the genre of Dark Back of Time?   Perhaps this is a good 
moment to abandon the frontier and the goal-line and return to some of our other 
metaphors. It may not come as a surprise that Dark Back of Time has also tended to be 
defined as a hybrid. Pittarello, for instance, claims that the text ‘is not included in 
any known literary genre and at the same time participates of all of them’.48  Of 
course, we could regard all our meandering attempts at description as futile and 
unnecessary, as the text already has two generic tags — and two extremely curious 
ones at that, highlighting the figural and paradoxical character of the definitional act 
(as the other definitions also did).   
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One of them would not be immediately considered as a curiosity, particularly 
if read by Lejeune. Our narrator mentions at the start that he happens to be called 
Javier Marías: 
 
This novel, entitled Todas las Almas [...] lent itself to the identification of 
its nameless narrator with its named author, Javier Marías, also author 
of the present narrative in which narrator and author do coincide and I 
no longer know if there is one of us or two, at least while I’m writing.49 
 
However, this mark of the autobiographical pact, the trait that distinguished 
autobiography from the first-person novel is here used in a playful and paradoxical 
way, reminiscent of its model — ‘The Laughing Cow’ box.  However, any reading 
which takes the name as a generic marker needs to bear in mind that it might be 
actually used not as a tag but as a figure of definition — as a mise en abyme, in other 
words. For instance, the narrator tells us at one point that Javier is not actually his 
first name: it is Xavier, spelt with an X (as in the Catalan or French version of the 
name). In a charming ironic twist, Xavier will eventually become his regal name 
when he becomes King of Redonda — the other monarchs used Spanish versions of 
their English names for their title (MP Shiel was King Felipe; John Gawsworth, King 
Juan) so he has to use a foreign version of his name. His true name is also his make-
believe name. 
But there is more: at one point the narrator explains that when he learnt to 
write as a child (because he was left-handed) he used to write it backwards, that is, 
as REIVAX. When this original reversed name (the original of the original) is read in 
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the right direction, the first three letters sound like the word ‘rey’, King.50 His name 
becomes a pseudo-prophecy of his fate and a mise en abyme of Dark Back of Time: 
REIVAX is the novel itself in reverse order, its wondrous final revelation hidden at 
the beginning (like the story of the toy soldier?). Of course, this is perhaps only a 
freaky coincidence not to be taken seriously (or else anyone called Javier or Xavier 
would be claiming their rightful kingdoms) — but so was the soldier, and perhaps 
the book itself. 
  The transformation of the sober proper name into a curiosity can be compared 
in its paradoxical nature to the book’s other generic tag, that of the ‘falsa novela’ 
(translatable as either ‘false’ or ‘fake’ novel). 51  The tag could be read as an 
acknowledgement of the fictional nature of autobiography in its supplementary role, 
although it also seems to announce in its flagrant self-contradiction the 
absent/present quality of the generic tag. This paradoxical moniker is, after all, a 
sort of squared generic tag: the mark of a mark, the supplement of a supplement, 
and could be thus read as an exaggerated mirror-image of the book-cum-mark. 
 The term is never actually used within the book (it appears in the blurb, in 
inverted commas), although it is not extra-authorial: Marías frequently uses it to 
refer to the book, alternating it with “novel”.  The term itself is not Marías’s own 
creation: as Grohmann first noticed, the expression was used by Spanish avant-garde 
writer Ramón Gómez de la Serna to refer to a series of parodic novellas published 
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 Rather than resembling Charles Kinbote at this point, the narrator resembles Shade’s daughter, Hazel Shade, who also 
used to twist words, calling ‘spiders’ ‘redips’. See Nabokov, Pale Fire (London: Penguin, 1991), p.39. 
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Both are correct: ‘false novel’ is more common, but Gareth Wood translates it as ‘fake novel’ in his monograph. See 
Gareth Wood, p. 105. 
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between 1923 and 1927.52   The expression also appears in André Breton’s First 
Surrealist Manifesto (1924), which includes a sub-section on ‘How to write false 
novels’.53  Both Gómez de la Serna and Breton’s ‘false novels’ are false because they 
pretend to be realist novels in order to undermine them. Dark Back of Time, however, 
is not false because it is pretending to be an ordinary novel. Although it is 
pretending to be something, it not easy to tell what it fakes. 
Perhaps the usual (and logical) model of seeking illustrious ancestors and 
origins as explanations for the curious is not the best approach to the ‘false novel’ —
an associative approach (in the manner of Alan Marriott, the narrative guru of All 
Souls ) might be perhaps more effective.  In one of the tag’s first appearances in print 
(in a diary-style article called ’Diario de Zurich’), Marías uses ‘falsa’ as a kind of 
afterthought: he first refers to Dark Back of Time as a novel, but a few sentences later 
he calls it ‘the novel or false novel’.54 Rather than an echo of Gómez de la Serna or of 
Breton, it is possible that he might be quoting himself — or rather one of his 
characters, the protagonist of All Souls. This narrator uses 'falsa' in relation to Muriel, 
a local girl from suburban Oxford he once picked up in a nightclub for a one-night 
stand: the girl is constantly referred throughout the novel by the pseudo-epic epithet 
of ‘the false fat girl from Wychwood Forest’. 55    
The reason for this rather crude appellation is that the narrator had chosen 
Muriel as his partner for the night because she was the least chubby amongst the 
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 See Grohmann, Literatura, p. 25. 
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 André Breton, Manifeste du surréalisme.Poisson soluble (Paris: Éditions du Sagittaire, 1924), pp. 50-51. 
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 See Marías, Aquella, p. 357. 
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 I have amended Jull Costa’s translation here. She translates ‘falsa gorda ‘ by ‘not-so-plump girl’ which is far less odd. See 
Marías,All Souls, p. 199 and Todas las Almas (Madrid: Santillana, 2002), p. 279. 
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group of permed, mini-skirted locals at the nightclub. He nonetheless took the girl 
home and slept with her, but not without regrets; as he could not help thinking of 
other women throughout their sexual encounter. The appellation ‘false fat girl’ 
seems to enable the narrator to save face and allows his masculine vanity to remain 
unscathed: she wasn’t really fat, he does not sleep with unattractive girls. However, 
the adjective only exposes his neuroses even more: he cannot help seeing the girl as 
fat and undesirable and himself as a shallower or more callous man than he might 
acknowledge to himself. 
 The association of Muriel with the ‘false novel’ tag perhaps shows that  
Marías similarly singles out Dark Back of Time as less of a novel than his other novels, 
but — like Muriel herself — still a novel no matter how much he convinces himself 
to the contrary. The tag might be read as a sort of self-deceit against the evident 
“novelness” of the book, which the author might be unwilling to fully recognise. The 
possibility of a character influencing its author seems quite in keeping with the jokey 
topsy-turvy spirit of the book, although again (like the Gómez de la Serna/Breton 
reference) might be no more than an unconscious echo. 
 The two curious generic tags of Dark Back Of Time thus only reveal different 
perspectives (literally in the case of ‘Reivax’) on the book’s contradictory nature we 
had observed in the opening, or in its tagging of All Souls.  If we return to the idea of 
the book’s necessary generic decision, they could all be read as figures of the 
whirligig of definition, as a way of reflecting its dizzying ball-like movements rather 
than as a way of stopping them, indecisively, over the goal-line.  After all, even 
Szentkuthy’s goal was a ‘false goal’ in several ways. For instance, it was a false 
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because it was also its opposite, a non-goal, the missed opportunity. But its “false” 
quality can also be identified in the striker’s impossible (and implausible) 
transgression of the inexorably linear character of football and its goal-oriented logic 
(as non-reversible as time itself). As an allegory of time and narrative it seems 
deliberately ill-matching, distanced and dispersed, like that of the bumblebee and 
Charlus — or the trial, or the example of Will and Tom. 
An intriguing consequence of this particular association is that if Dark Back of 
Time is itself a figure of figuration (the ball rather than the goal of autobiographical 
definition), it might also be a deliberately “false” one: a performance of this very 
failure to score. This is the concern and the question at the heart of the concluding 
section of our survey of the problem of genre in Dark Back of Time: if it is a figuration 
rather than a novel, an autobiography or a false novel, then how does it perform its 
revolutions?  Again, I will focus here on the text’s use of mise en abyme, which, as we 
discussed earlier, is here coupled with another destabilising, ontologically disturbing 
device not present in ‘In Uncertain Time’: metalepsis. 
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The Three Caballeros and the King’s interpreter: mise en abyme, metalepsis and 
figuration in Dark Back of Time 
 
 
Figuration, as we have seen in the “stabbing” (or rather back-stabbing) example, 
operates in Dark Back of Time at a double level: it is both content and form; it is 
explained and performed. As it was the case in Speak, Memory, mise en abyme in Dark 
Back of Time will be used both as a device to mirror this instability and as a further 
example of the instability itself. Let us consider our premise in relation to the 
example identified previously, the Xavier/Reivax play. The name and its reverse 
could be read as mirroring two different generic definitions. In one of them, 
unproblematic signs of “reality” (Xavier) and of “fiction” (Reivax) succeed each 
other without any confusion. But both versions of the name can also be read as being 
equally “real” and equally “fictional” and ultimately undistinguishable: they are 
ultimately signs of figural realms which cannot be pinned to any particular meaning.   
The power balance between these two readings, however, is not even — as 
demonstrated as the narrator’s final metamorphosis of his name. When our narrator 
finally tells us his secret, he introduces a new variant: ‘since July 6, 1997 I have been 
the fourth of these kings, King Xavier or still King X as I write this’.56 The X could be 
read as a mise en abyme within the mise en abyme: the X “marks the spot” (Treasure 
Island-style) of the narrator’s original birth identity. Its treasure is that, at least whilst 
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he is being written, he has no identity; he is unknowable and divorced from any 
external referent.57 His treasure is his lack of treasure. 
 The interplay between Xavier/Reivax and X reveals a flaw in our ball-like 
reading of Dark Back of Time. The play between the two versions of the name (and its 
condensation in the form of the letter X) could be used as argument for the text’s 
undecidability, which would not be articulated around the choice between a 
referential and a fictional reading but between two different fictional readings. The 
problem with this approach is that it contradicts our reading of the mise en abymes as 
allegories of figuration.  If Xavier/Reivax or the X are unequivocal mirrors (that is, 
symbols) of undecidability, then we cannot really claim that they perform the 
whirligigs of figuration as an allegory would do: they seem to lead us to a conclusion 
— albeit a negative one. If we return to Dällenbach’s categories, we could thus ask 
ourselves whether our examples of mise en abyme are not examples of the 
“programmatic loop” or the redundant “coda”, imposing an unambiguously 
ambiguous reading of the text. We may wonder whether the device stabilises 
meaning and calms readerly anxieties or if it is — as Cohn pointed — the source 
itself of that discomfort. 
This is the concern which justifies a further exploration of other examples of 
mise en abyme in Dark Back of Time, particularly as they intertwine with another 
unsettling device, metalepsis. Defined by Genette as ’any intrusion by the 
extradiegetic narrator or narratee into the diegetic universe (or by diegetic characters 
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 Amélie Florenchie reads the X as a sign of the narrator’s disintegrating identity, and as reference to Kakfa’s K.  See 
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into a metadiegetic universe, etc) or the inverse’, it is employed, as Fludernik has 
noted, to destroy ‘one’s impression that the narrated world is real’.58 
Despite certain points in contact, metalepsis and mise en abyme present the 
relation between the different narrative levels of a text in different ways. Metalepsis 
is a transgression of the different ontological levels of the diegesis; mise en abyme 
creates those levels or mirrors them.  Metalepsis is always a boisterous illusion-
breaker, perhaps because — as Cohn points out — it ‘occurs in sudden and 
surprising isolation’.59Mise en abyme is subtler and less obviously shocking, reflecting 
the failures of figuration without shattering them. That might be the reason why 
metalepsis is far less frequent in postmodern autobiographies: whilst mise en abyme 
extends and disperses the question of the relation between figuration and reference 
ad infinitum, metalepsis immediately alerts the reader that the seemingly safe 
revolving door is a vertigo-inducing whirligig. 
The combination of these two techniques in Dark Back of Time, however, might 
not solely be explained through the text’s questioning of referentiality. Currie has 
pointed out that metalepses are not only employed as instruments to destabilise the 
illusion of reference — as ‘adventures in impossibility’— but also as ‘scenarios for 
the exploration of ontological hierarchies’.60  They should also be read in relation to 
the text’s exploration of narrative power and reliability. A peculiar feature of the 
text’s use of metalepsis is that the device (like his coronation) is approached warily 
and even fearfully by our narrator. Indeed, the first instances of the device are not 
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 See Gérard Genette, Narrative Discourse: an Essay in Method (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 234-235 and 
Monika Fludernik, An Introduction to Narratology (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 100. 
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 Cohn, ‘Metalepsis’, 105-113 (p. 110). 
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“true” metalepses but hypothetical ones, timidly emphasizing the unsettling 
undertones of the narrative.61 
This hint forms the rapidly-beating heart of one of the book’s most playful 
episodes, involving the narrator’s former boss at Oxford, the head of the Sub-Faculty 
of Spanish, Ian Michael. He is one of the first people to read All Souls and sends our 
narrator a letter showing his appreciation for the novel. The banal surface of this 
anecdote is quickly disturbed when our narrator shockingly remarks that he read 
this letter ‘in horror and mortification’.62 The shock does not come from any critical 
harshness in the part of Michael, but rather from the fact that his former boss (who 
has assured him that he did not think All Souls a roman à clef) decides to update our 
narrator about his former colleagues by referring to them by the names of their 
supposed fictional alter-egos. The most disturbing part of the letter is Michael’s 
nonchalant remark that he bumped into Clare Bayes (the lover of the narrator in All 
Souls) the other day. A horrified “Marías” mentions that there was never a real-life 
model for this character. Michael’s misidentification sends the narrator into a spiral 
of panic and shame: due to his novel, there might be now a woman in Oxford being 
suspected of adultery with a Spanish colleague. As he explains, he has become ‘both 
her Cassio and her Iago, the false lover and the man who incited suspicion, not with 
my whisperings but with my writings, though without warning or foreseeing it’.63 
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 To clarify, the mise en abyme I refer here is of the simple duplication kind, and the metalepsis is of ontological kind, in 
which characters move between different diegetic levels. As Dorrit Cohn points out, Dallenbach’s aporetic mise en abymes 
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Southworth’s fake death or the episode with the booksellers, pp. 172-132. 
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Many critics read this exchange as an indictment of naive “autobiographical” 
readings (in line with other examples such as the bookshop owners who saw 
themselves represented in the Alabaster couple in All Souls, to the point of wanting 
to play them in the film version of the book).64 However, we may also wonder 
whether it is really Michael who is being naive or stubborn here. No critic has 
pointed out that what the former boss is doing in his letter is to have a laugh at the 
expense of the narrator’s paranoia. The letter might be no more than a joke that the 
narrator misunderstands and blows to tragic proportions (and Othello of all 
tragedies). He might think he has become both Cassio and Iago, but the 
Shakesperean character he most resembles might be actually Malvolio.65 
The ambiguity of the episode does not end there, as the conclusion creates a 
doubt about how much our narrator is actually “in the joke”. Michael has been 
previously characterised by the narrator as a hypochondriac, as he believed he had 
caught eczema from the radiation left in the carpet by the previous owner of his flat. 
At the end of their exchange, he asks whether this ‘atomic carpet [...] is it still giving 
off radioactivity, or is it just shooting up X-rays to unmask you’. 66 The exchange 
suggests that “Marías” might have realised it was all a joke and has finally 
unmasked Michael. But the use of that particular word, ‘unmask’, suggests yet 
another interpretation to the exchange: that behind Ian Michael’s mask is none other 
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 See Pozuelo Yvancos, p. 89 for another reading of Michael’s reaction. 
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 The Shakespearean connection is also made explicit by the fact that the letter is dated on the 23 April, St George’s Day, 
Shakespeare’s birthday and the anniversary of his death, as well as that of Cervantes (according to tradition). Let us 
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than “Marías” himself (or rather Marías), who has orchestrated this exchange in 
order to prove that perhaps only another fiction can make All Souls fictional. 
However, despite the playful suggestion that Clare Bayes might have 
abandoned All Souls, this is nothing more than a suggestion: the worlds of All Souls 
and Dark Back of Time remain separate, no matter how much Michael (and the 
narrator) wish to meld them. Metalepsis is presented as both ‘horrifying’ and 
desirable. This metaleptic wish is articulated and expressed not by the narrator 
himself but through the use of mise en abyme. As well as the play between the level of 
All Souls and Dark Back of Time (a hypothetic metalepsis), there is also a third 
narrative level in the episode, a mirror-image of its concerns and its ambiguity.  This 
example of mise en abyme inserts not one but two narratives into the main story. 
At one point, the narrator tell us (seemingly for no particular reason) that 
when he received the letter he was watching a film on TV, which he cannot recall if it 
was the Disney cartoon/live-action extravaganza The Three Caballeros or a Ricardo 
Montalban/Lana Turner MGM musical entitled Latin Lovers. He only remembers 
that ‘incongruous sambas were sounding in my ears as I deciphered the letter’.67Like 
many other elements in this book, the films are nonetheless not as anecdotic as they 
seem at first glance: in fact, both are vehicles for narrative irony and mirror images 
of the book’s descent into fictionalisation. In other words, they are tantalising but 
unreachable glimpses of metaleptic bliss.   
For instance, Michael’s misreading of All Souls (or the narrator’s misreading 
of his deliberate misreading) might have transformed our bumbling hero into a 
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dashing Montalban-like figure, the clichéd “Latin Lover” of the title, conqueror of 
voluptuous foreign blondes.68  However, the note of adolescent wish-fulfilment in 
this mirroring is undone by the possibility that he might have been watching The 
Three Caballeros, and that his fictional mirror-image might actually be Donald Duck. 
The Disney film indeed offers rich intertextual pickings for the reader: like Dark Back 
of Time, it is a portmanteau film made up of separate sketches with Donald as a 
common protagonist. But even more intriguingly, it is structured around a series of 
metaleptic crossings: for instance, in one episode Donald is given a book about Bahia 
as a birthday present, from which the cartoon parrot Jose Carioca leaps out. Carioca 
then subsequently proceeds to shrink Donald and both jump together into the book, 
where, in a cartoon version of Brazil, Donald dances and falls hopelessly in love with 
a life-and-flesh woman. The world of the film, in which cartoons and actors (who 
paradoxically live inside books) interact with each other in equal footing, echoes the 
play and interaction between make-believe “real” people like “Javier Marías” and 
“Ian Michael” and fictional fictions like Clare Bayes or Will the porter. 
The narrator points out the mirror-like nature of the episode explicitly: he 
mentions that he could see his face reflected on the TV screen, as if he was inside the 
film. The narrator “solves” his hesitation about which film he was watching by 
simply blending them, and thus breaking imperceptibly an ontological barrier: he 
comically remarks that ‘it is entirely impossible to see oneself blush against a 
backdrop of Carioca and Montalban, Donald Duck and Lana Turner’, as if they were 
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all together in the screen.69 Both films laugh at the tragedy he has spun out of his 
friend’s mischievous misreading and invite him to go along with the metaleptic joke, 
dismantling any of the little authority or reality that remained in him.70 
Regarding the question of generic in/definition and its relation to mise en 
abyme and metalepsis, the mirror-image here goes much further in its illusion-
breaking duties (and undermining of referentiality) than the diegetic situation it 
mirrors, which is merely ambiguous. The scene offers a readerly dilemma within 
another readerly dilemma, offering different interpretative approaches. The choice 
between Latin Lovers and The Three Caballeros (between a straightforward clichéd 
narrative and a metaleptic fantasy) is heavily inclined towards the latter: the 
narrator’s blending of the two films extends the magical trans-dimensional crossings 
of the Disney film even beyond its own ontological limits.  If The Three Caballeros is 
the true mirror of the Michael/Marías scene, then it tilts the interpretation of the 
readerly dilemma in the primary narrative level (the choice between reading the 
episode as an authorial correction or reading it as a joke) towards the ‘joke’ reading, 
undermining the narrator’s authority over his own texts.  The mise en abyme subtly 
disturbs the apparent purpose of the episode (another correction of another naive 
reading), hinting at the impossible nature of generic definition and highlighting the 
narrator’s paranoia. 
As we previously mentioned, metalepsis in Dark Back of Time moves from 
being merely hypothetical towards its actual realisation. The narrator’s hints of a 
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possible metaleptic crossing affect the temporal dynamics in the text: the text might 
not necessarily be wandering aimlessly and destroying itself in the process, it might 
be dawdling with a purpose — he may seek to delay the metalepsis hinted by the 
mise en abyme. Readers — turned into nerve-wracked spectators of Szentkuthy in the 
quarter-final game — can see the goal coming but are not sure of when it will 
happen. That goal (unlike the coronation, perhaps) is not a trivial matter: once the 
ontological barriers are broken down, there can no longer be any hesitation about the 
generic definition of the text and about the narrator’s authority over his own text.   
This does necessarily mean that hesitation comes to an end: the ‘goal’ — in the light 
of later events — becomes the source rather than the end point of yet more readerly 
enigmas. 
Let us consider that goal (or perhaps goals) in some more detail.71  It takes 
place in the now familiar setting of an inventory (the best place to hide an unsettling 
element): a list of the reactions of the narrator’s friends to his coronation. In this list 
of friends and acquaintances — and their sceptical, amused or astonished responses 
to his news — we also find listed the opinions of one Ruibérriz de Torres. Regular 
Marías readers might remember him as a character in Tomorrow in the Battle Think on 
Me or the novella Bad Nature.72 Although it is possible that this Ruibérriz might be a 
real-life person that appears under his fictional moniker, the metaleptic reading is far 
too irresistible to be dispelled by common-sense objections.  Of all of Marías’s 
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characters, Ruibérriz is indeed the most apt to comment on regal matters: not only 
does he occasionally ghost-writes speeches for the King of Spain, but he was also 
once employed as an interpreter for not just any king but for The King ― Elvis 
Presley.   
Ironically, Ruibérriz’s reaction to the coronation of his friend/creator is the 
most sceptical: 
 
[I]n Ruibérriz [...] the incredulity was mingled with a sarcasm that 
couldn’t quite banish his curiosity, at least not to the point of telling 
me to shut up and stop bothering him with this nonsense.73 
 
Ruibérriz’s intervention is perhaps the final punch-line of the book, and the pinnacle 
of the authorial self-mocking. Despite the aura of authority with which he had tried 
to divest his narrative, the narrator may have delayed his momentous news because 
he feared being disbelieved. And he is: and the most sceptic person in his audience is 
precisely one of his fictions, and one with a particularly shadowy and 
supplementary existence that resembles those of the doomed poets and adventurers 
the narrator is so enthralled by: probably a more deserving Redondan king than the 
author himself (although there is, unfortunately, no metaleptic coup d’état). 
Ruibérriz’s intervention is thus clearly used as way of disturbing and unsettling the 
authority of the narrator. It reverses the magical charms of metalepsis that The Three 
Caballeros exaggerated: rather than seducing fictional women, the narrator gets slyly 
laughed at by a character more dashing, more adventurous and much better 
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connected than himself. 74  Although metalepsis enhances the book’s rejection of 
figuration, it may not necessarily make it unambiguous. 
As we have mentioned, the rejection of a possible referential reading of the 
story (and the change from indecision to suspense) can also be read as creating 
another dilemma which, unlike the one revolving around the referential status of the 
text, cannot really be solved. The goal is an inadequate metaphor because it solely 
emphasises the positive consequences of the transgression of boundaries: like the 
metaphor of the curiosity, it underplays its more unsettling aspects.  Metalepsis in 
Dark Back of Time is either a joke that can be easily dismissed and forgotten after its 
punch-line or something else more disturbing (like the unmentioned threat of the 
figurine), a calamity for both narrator and reader. If the digressions of Dark Back of 
Time are motivated by the narrator’s desire to procrastinate a narrative duty, the 
question for the reader is how much this dawdling is motivated simply by mere 
playfulness or by fear and apprehension. 
This is indeed the question that hangs over the ascension to the throne of 
Redonda: the goal of Dark Back of Time, the invasion of fiction to end all the invasions 
of fictions. And yet it is a strange metalepsis: Redonda, unlike Ruibérriz, is not 
Marías’s creation. But it isn’t “real”, either. The obvious meta-discursive resonances 
of the legend mean that it has been inevitably read as the figure for the book itself, 
and its genre. Isabel Cuñado, for instance, has pointed out that ‘the island is 
identified with literature, with an ontologically autonomous space’: it ‘allegorises a 
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hybrid space that questions traditional distinctions between reality and fiction’. 75 
Cuñado perhaps turns the island into a too simple and obvious a symbol of fiction 
itself (which it is, up to a point), again resorting to a metaphor (the hybrid) which the 
narrative itself questions. 
The most valuable part of her reading is perhaps her comparison between 
Redonda and the fabled Ínsula Barataria in Don Quixote (Marías even refers to 
Redonda as an ‘ínsula’ at one point, using Don Quixote’s archaism).  Their parallels 
are not solely based on the two islands’ purportedly symbolic dimension, but on the 
fact that both are (or might be) nothing more than practical jokes: the crown of 
Redonda, like Barataria, might also be the “gift” of a reader (less cruel than the Duke 
and the Duchess, perhaps) wishing to “reward” (or to play with) a favourite fictional 
character.76 As we mentioned in the introduction, the narrator becomes the King of 
Redonda after the previous king, Jon Wynne-Tyson —  the successor of doomed poet 
John Gawsworth, who kept Shiel’s joke alive — abdicated in his favour. The narrator 
does not wholly reveal the reasons for this abdication and instead decides to mystify 
the reader by suggesting (but not revealing) a more colourful story to his access to 
the throne. But the secret behind his inheritance might be nothing more than another 
misreading of All Souls. 
The protagonist of that novel became obsessed with Gawsworth and 
convinced himself he might ‘be’ him one day (that is, equally doomed). King Juan 
might have mistaken the desire of the creature for that of its creator, and decides to 
grant it — like the Duke and the Duchess did, although perhaps with less dubious 
                                                          
75
 Cuñado, p. 55. 
76
 Cuñado, p. 56. 
 
315 
 
intentions.  The parallels with Don Quixote turn the unambiguous symbol of fiction 
and figuration into something more ambiguous, belying the assumption that the 
island stabilises the book’s meaning: like Sancho himself, he might lose all power 
over his fate (and his readers) at the moment when he is granted the symbol of the 
power that he so sorely desired. His metaleptic crossing does not really fix one 
reading for the book (say, as a celebration of fiction) but leaves the author/narrator 
entirely at the mercy of his readers, and their more or less fevered imaginations.  No 
wonder he might wish to delay the scoring of that particular story. 
 
This leads us back to where we started — to Szentkuthy’s goal and its 
unforeseen and unexplainable consequences.  As an allegory of the generic 
definition of Dark Back of Time, it seems to tease the reader into discovering more and 
more unexpected correspondences which are, in their turn, consistently dismantled. 
We finished our analysis of the generic markers of Dark Back of Time (the 
‘declaration’, the name, the ‘false novel’ tag) trapped in a paradoxical argument: 
those markers seemed to perform and reflect the problems of figuration and the 
whirligigs of generic definition by creating endless repetitions of the question. 
However, at the same time, they seemed to stop those whirligigs by insisting on the 
figural character of the whole. They were the ball and the striker. The introduction of 
metalepsis tilted the book towards a definite fictional (or rather figural) reading, 
emphasising the inevitable and unavoidable character of that decision/goal. And yet, 
metalepsis did not close the reading of the text at all: although ostensibly a 
humorous strategy to disempower the narrator (separating him even more from his 
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namesake), it also makes explicit the self-destructive potential of that operation, 
revealing the more unsettling aspects of narrative and figuration. 
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Marking Time: on procrastination, digression, figuration and death 
 
 
‘[I]t was not so much that he had stopped time as that he had set a mark on it and 
made it uncertain’, the narrator of ‘In Uncertain Time’ philosophically muses about 
Szentkuthy’s goal. But what is involved in setting a mark on time? And did the goal 
really do that? Our problems with the interpretation of the phrase are in fact the 
result of a translation quandary. The Spanish original (‘lo marcó y lo volvió indeciso’) 
uses the polysemic verb ‘marcar’: it can be translated as ‘setting a mark’, although in 
a football context, it usually has the meaning either of ‘scoring’ a goal or ‘marking’ 
an opponent (that is, ‘keeping close and so hampering’ a rival, a sense that the 
English ‘mark’ also covers).77 In Spanish, the verb paradoxically describes the actions 
of both defenders and strikers: although the ambiguity can be dispelled simply by 
considering the verb’s object (goal or player). 
In the case of Szentkuthy, the word is used in the ‘marking’ sense, which 
creates a charming (and ironic) role reversal: the striker becomes a defender against 
Time, and manages to stop its advance towards the goal, even if only temporarily 
(and perhaps fatally). Our analyses of metalepsis in the text have emphasised the 
parallels between our narrator and Szentkuthy: both will “score” in a similarly 
dawdling manner, and in doing so slow down and ‘mark’ Time. The concern of this 
second part is not only to discern how such a ‘marking’ might take place, but also its 
effects and its consequences for generic definition. And, ultimately, it may seek to 
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explain why: whether out narrator dawdles out of arrogance like Szentkuthy, or 
whether he does (perhaps like Szentkuthy, too) out of fear. 
 This is the dilemma around which the second part of this chapter is 
articulated. Rather than being a banal question, it will allow us to explore the more 
unsettling consequences of the problem of generic definition, particularly the text’s 
self-conscious performance of its figurative character. The chapter starts with a more 
in-depth look at its ‘temporal curiosity’: its indeterminate, polychronous sjuzhet. That 
indeterminacy (and the digressive structure it generates) has tended either to be 
ignored; or — when acknowledged — to be naturalised as some form of transparent 
representation of contingency and chance. This narrative structure (like metalepsis 
before it) is mirrored by a series of increasingly complex mise en abymes. 
The analysis of the mirror-games between the different examples and the 
main narrative level will unsettle the “natural” appearance of the book’s digressions, 
and will reveal instead their figurative, allegorical and dispersed dimensions.  The 
second part of this section examines the more disturbing aspects of the text’s 
narrative procrastination, particularly in relation to its conclusion. Here the narrator 
seemingly (and suddenly) reveals a possible secret behind his secret: this revelation, 
however, will paradoxically turn the possibility of a single interpretative “goal” into 
something chimerical — and perhaps even undesirable. 
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‘Do not linger or delay’: digression, procrastination, narrative and genre 
 
‘Do not linger or delay’: these were the instructions once given to the protagonist 
and narrator of Your Face Tomorrow, Jacques Deza, by his enigmatic boss, MI6 agent 
Bertram Tupra.78 It might not come as a surprise that he disobeyed him, and that 
launched at that point into a 70 page-long account (complete with digressions about 
women’s legs and country-and-western songs) of an event — a frenzied search in the 
lavatories of a nightclub — which only took minutes to happen in real time. This 
scene is the most transparent and self-conscious example of Marías’s aesthetics of 
narrative procrastination, of which Dark Back of Time constitutes a less overt but 
equally poignant example. What sets the latter apart from the aforementioned 
digression in Your Face Tomorrow is that it is not immediately evident what the 
narrator of Dark Back of Time is delaying through his digressions, although — as our 
examination of metalepsis has shown — it may perhaps be guessed. 
Whatever we conjecture will nonetheless go against the express wishes of the 
narrator. The declaration of intent which follows the trial example (examined in the 
introduction) was explicitly anti-narrative, highlighting not only the absence of a 
plot, but even of an ending: 
 
I don’t believe this is a story, though, not knowing how it ends, I may 
be mistaken. I do know that the beginning of this tale lies outside it, in 
a novel I wrote some time ago [...].Its ending must also lie outside it, 
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and will surely coincide with my own, some years from now, or so I 
hope.79 
 
 
The narrator initially presents the book as a collection of random anecdotes (like The 
Three Caballeros), a structureless structure which sets the book apart from ‘truly 
fictional novels’: the book is not a novel because it does not conform to the pattern of 
a ‘true’ novel, that is, one with a cause-and-effect plot. 
The book’s apparent lack of cohesion has been the constant focus of most 
critical approaches to the book, which have either approached it in negative terms 
(Manuel Alberca thinks that the book cannot avoid ‘an impression of gratuity and 
banality’) or its opposite: 80  as Grohmann advocates, the book might be an example 
of a freer or more “real” or “natural” mode of writing, autobiographical in form if 
not in content. 
 
Not only does it lack a plot [...] but also an author and a story [...] Dark 
Back does not create a story but rather a tissue of unordered secondary 
stories, linked by chance [...]. It also lacks an author, if we understood 
the author as the agent that consciously imposes an order, who puts 
the narrative under the control of a main plot which is structured and 
rounded.81 
 
 
Even Grohmann himself seems at one point uneasy with his own arguments: 
digression only ‘seems more natural, because its naturalness is really the product of 
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artifice’.82 Unfortunately, the rest of his analysis continues to make grand claims 
about the novel as a philosophical statement proving ‘the activities of chance, the 
supremacy of the contingent’.83 The narrative statement of intent nonetheless undoes 
and affirms authorial intention: there is no author except for the author who is 
telling the reader that there isn’t an author, and is dissuading us from reading the 
book’s ‘natural’ form suspiciously. But ultimately, both the reading that seeks 
intentionality to the book’s randomness and one that doesn’t are equally authorial. 
Grohmann also seems to misconstrue here an important feature of digressive 
writing and even of narrative itself. As Ross Chambers has pointed, digression is not 
an anomalous, anti-narrative device: ‘a story coheres dramatically, then, only under 
the constraint of being dilatory, of not taking the shortest path [...] between its 
opening and its conclusion´.84 Errancy is not the sole defining feature of digressive 
writing: according to Chambers, it is equally defined by ‘its failure to detach itself 
completely from a linearity from which it departs only to return in its due course’.85 
Our narrator, as we have seen regarding his use of metalepsis and the story of his 
coronation, is always fully aware of what he is straying from, and equally aware of 
his need to return to it. 
After all, rather than a structureless report on the activities of chance, the 
narrative of Dark Back of Time is reminiscent of a joke: a very long and particularly 
straying one, with the coronation as its punch-line. Simon Critchley’s description of 
their temporal structure seems tailor-made for our text: 
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Jokes involve a shared knowledge of two temporal dimensions: 
duration and the instant [...] In being told a joke, we undergo a 
particular experience of duration through repetition and digression, of 
time being literally stretched out like an elastic band. We know the 
elastic will snap [...] and we find the anticipation rather pleasurable. It 
snaps with the punchline, which is a sudden acceleration of time, 
where the digressive stretching of the joke suddenly contracts into a 
heightened experience of the instant. [...] Viewed temporally, 
humorous pleasure would seem to be produced by the disjunction 
between duration and instant, where we experience with renewed 
intensity both the slow passing of time and its sheer evanescence.86 
 
 
Critchley’s account of the temporality of jokes could in fact be used as an 
explanation of what ‘marking’ time might entail: a slowing down of the striker 
(duration) followed by a whip-like release from the defender and a goal (instant).   
This process, however, is not as curious as the comparison to Szentkuthy’s 
goal makes it seem.  Jokes are in fact heightened examples of the dynamics of story-
telling, which Dark Back of Time distorts, but from which it does not stray. The 
punch-line of  Dark Back of Time is hyperbolically evanescent (like its metalepses) — 
to the point that it has led its ‘story’ or ‘plot’ to be regularly ignored or dismissed all 
together by some critics.87 Similarly, the digressions of Dark Back of Time are also 
exaggeratedly so, emphasising the gulf between punch-line and digression. The 
question, of course, is how much that straying is the result of “pure” chance or a 
manoeuvre to make the punch-line even more evanescent. After all, what it reveals 
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not only confirms the inescapable character of the whirligigs of figurations — it also 
completely undoes any semblance of authority for our (non) author. 
 
The book’s temporal structure (of which a brief outline was offered in the 
introduction, and which I will shortly examine) makes explicit to the reader (not very 
explicit, though) the ‘emplotted’ and configured character of our narrative — closer 
to Ricouer’s model than the narrator’s initial protestations made it seem. Dark Back of 
Time, from its title onwards, announces itself as what Ricoeur denominated a novel 
(false or not) ‘about Time’; and indeed the narrator’s musings on time (and its 
philosophical background) have attracted much critical attention.88 But, as it was the 
case in relation to the problem of reference, the book is not a philosophical treatise. 
Currie has pointed out that the difference between philosophy and fiction lies in the 
fact ‘the narrative fiction is fundamentally capable of being constative and 
performative at the same time’ (hence, he concludes, all novels are tales about time, 
performances of time).89  And, as he points out, performance and theory might go 
hand in hand — or they might not.90 
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Unsurprisingly, the book’s temporal declaration of intent is as contradictory 
and ambiguous as its generic one. At first it seems explicitly anti-narrative, and even 
anti-temporal. His compares his voice to 
 
[T]hat fickle and unpredictable voice we all know, the voice of time 
when it has not yet gone by or been lost and perhaps for that reason is 
not even time, perhaps time is only what has already happened and can 
be told or so it appears, and thus is the only one that is ambiguous. 
That voice we hear is always fictitious, I believe, and perhaps mine will 
be too, in these pages.91 
 
 
This rather convoluted and obfuscated argument, which develops in a (seemingly) 
semi-improvised manner, demonstrates the narrative bent of the narrator’s 
philosophy of time and offers an intriguing connection between temporality, genre 
and undecidability. The narrator compares here two ideas of time. One of them isn’t 
time because it hasn’t passed yet (because it is ‘marked’, perhaps?) and he 
assimilates the form of his book to it (which would make it a ‘fiction’, then). There is 
another time that is time proper, which is narratable, and — because of that — 
ambiguous. In narrative terms, the first “time” would correspond to a sort of pure 
duration (to an endless joke without punch-line), while the second “time” 
corresponds to a complete narrative with beginning, middle and end. 
What we have here is a rather odd separation of fiction and narrative: he 
proposes an idea of “fictional time” which is separated from narrative time — a non-
narrative that has non-time, or unpassed time as its referent (perhaps to be identified 
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with pure digression). But the narrative structure of the book is far from pure: it has 
a punch-line, something has happened and what has happened not only determines 
the digressive structure of the story, but makes that digression impure and 
ambiguous. What is unclear here is whether the narrator is rejecting or embracing 
ambiguity (and hence, figuration and narrative), and proposing instead a model of 
fiction which, in contrast, might not be ambiguous. Of course, the main problem 
with the narrator’s argument (which his narrative performance contradicts) is that 
non-time and time, “fiction” (in the narrator’s sense) and narrative not only cannot 
be separated from each other, but are dependent on one another for their definition. 
We all ‘know’ the voice of non-time because of narrative. 
Compared to the generic definition, what we have here is another 
dismantling of oppositions and frontiers: if the ontological frontier between reality 
and fiction was dismantled by figuration, is that equally the case with that of 
time/narrative and non-time/non-narrative (“fiction”)? The question this paragraph 
raises in relation to figuration is whether narrative should simply be defined in a 
Ricoeurian manner, a ‘synthesis of the heterogeneous’ (of the non-narrative) or 
rather if the narrator’s identification of ambiguity as the corollary of narrative creates 
a less-conclusive model which is also temporal, but in a De Manian rather than in a 
Ricoeurian way. 
The rest of this section will seek to interpret the narrator’s temporal 
philosophy (and its relation to figuration) in relation to the text’s temporal 
performances. I say performances because as well as the procrastinating digression-
punch-line structure of the text (and its indeterminate sjuzhet), the text also offers a 
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series of reflections of this structure which multiply its enigma without offering a 
particular “handle” for the reader. 
 
 
 
The moving goal-line: fabula, szujhet and indeterminacy in the narrator’s 
temporal performance 
 
 
 
In the introduction, I described the narrative structure of Dark Back of Time as having 
an indeterminate sjuzhet and a determinate (if basic) fabula. This tension was the 
result of a particular narrative choice which so far has only been remarked upon by 
Gareth Wood. Most of Marías’s first-person narratives (such as ‘In Uncertain Time’ 
and many others) follow the temporal model of the confession — his narrators tell 
their stories from an unidentified point from which they recall past events in a more 
or less orderly fashion. The past self is filtered through the consciousness of the 
present self. In Dark Back of Time, the moment of writing is dramatised and played 
out to the reader (as if it was a diary), which gives the impression that events are 
recorded as they happened, rather than being interpreted in retrospect. 
 Wood identifies this feature as a specific reference to the narrative practices 
of Tristram Shandy: as he points out, ‘following Tristram’s example, Marías refers to 
one particular day on which he is writing.’ 92 He refers here to the date the narrator 
mentions to highlight the temporal gap between a date inscribed in an old book and 
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his own time (‘today, November 8 1997’). The completion of the book is dated 
‘March 1998’, and this — Wood explains — allows us ‘to catch a glimpse of writing 
as also the passage of time’.93 This evidence could be read as a confirmation of the 
book’s temporal (and generic) declaration of intent:  the book as a diary-style, 
unplanned, improvised work-in-progress, which according to Pittarello exemplifies 
‘in its anecdotal errancy the passage of a human being through the world’.94 Not 
only there is a stable fabula and sjuzhet, but they are also mirror images of each other. 
But then — as we discussed in the introduction, and as Wood also notices — 
the narrator also decides to give us the date of his coronation many pages later: ‘July 
6 1997’.95 This means that when he wrote the previous date, he already knew he was 
the king. The dates confirm up to a point the thesis of the introduction (that he did 
not know the end of his story when he started it) but also belie it, showing that the 
narrator knew at some point and spent months avoiding his royal duties (like a sort 
of make-believe Prince Hal). The narrative of the coronation (like his use of 
metalepsis) is structured as a build-up of hints, which become unequivocal in the 
opening paragraph of the section which includes the November date:   
 
I have become what Shiel and Gawsworth once were, or so it appears, 
and it seems incredible that I wasn’t afraid of this and accepted it […] 
It’s hard to resist the chance to perpetuate a legend.96 
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The narrator’s use of dating creates an imperceptible breach in the book between his 
life as plain (or rather Prince) Javier to his reign as King Xavier (the fabula of the book) 
— a boundary of which the reader is made aware but which isn’t dramatized, and 
which cannot be located in the sjuzhet. The book is structured as a goal scored in 
slow-motion, but a goal that the reader does not witness and only becomes aware of 
after it has been scored. The narrator might have stopped time and narrative at one 
point, but we cannot tell when. ‘Marking’ Time might be impossible, chimerical, a 
fiction. 
 This structure also makes impossible for the reader to discern when his 
digressions go from being spontaneous and unmotivated to be exercises in 
procrastination. Even in a second reading the mystery remains: the re-reader may 
surmise with a fair degree of certitude that the line might not have been crossed in 
the beginning and knows for sure it has been crossed in the end (from the ‘hint’) but 
the interregnum between them remains ambiguous. The dilemma could not be 
cleared by surmising that this fabula might be the mirror of a real-life timeline — as if 
the hesitation could be solved by asking Javier Marías himself. The book’s fabula 
does not have an external referent which precedes or mirrors Dark Back of Time.  As 
Richard Walsh explains, 
 
fabula is not independent of any sjuzhet—it is entirely dependent upon 
it, it is nothing other than the permutation and assimilation of sjuzhet 
into an ongoing interpretative version.97   
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It is, in other words, the supplement of a figuration, its interpretation. And in this 
case, the reading it enables is an ambiguous one, a polychronous one (to use 
Herman’s term): one that cannot be explained as the representation of a ‘natural’ 
temporal experience, but as a mirror-image of figuration itself. 
  Read in relation to the book’s constative approach to time, the indeterminate 
temporal structure of Dark Back of Time could be said to question the narrator’s 
distinction between non-time (or ‘marked’ Time) and narrative time by making the 
former present and absent at the same time: the reader knows the goal is there, but is 
not sure where. Several critics have made a connection between digression and non-
time, although without perceiving its elusive nature. For Grohmann, digression 
enables the narrative to ‘create’ this dimension, and offers Marías’s own words as 
evidence for this: 
 
In a novel [...] it is possible to make existent the time that either does 
not exist in life, or goes unnoticed because it does not wait and goes too 
quickly. One of the reasons I write books is to explore this existent and 
non-existent time, when the most important things take place without 
us realising.98 
  
 
These words, however, are too paradoxical to justify a ‘natural’ reading of the book’s 
temporal structure as the reflection of a temporal experience.  Pozuelo Yvancos 
justifies such a similar reading by appealing to the ‘the presentness of the 
ennunciative voice’. 99  But the narrator is neither ‘present’ nor a ‘voice’: he is 
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explicitly removed and distanced from his experiences. The ‘exploration’ of non-time 
might not involve its creation nor its identification, but merely an acknowledgement 
of its impossible ‘presence’, akin to that of meaning and reference itself. 
 However, even when the temporal structure has been acknowledged, it 
has not been read as posing a contradiction to the narrator’s stance on time, or as an 
embracing of narrative or ambiguity. For Wood the revelation does not make the 
book any less spontaneous and diary-like or less premeditated. Because the narrator 
ends his story by promising a continuation (and Wood believes him), he surmises 
that 
 
He needed time to reflect on what had just happened and to allow 
further events to unfold before he could further incorporate them into 
the world of the novel. It would at least explain why he leaves this coup 
de théâtre to the penultimate chapter and provides little in the way of 
details of his ascension.100 
 
 
He reads the coronation as the reason the book remains seemingly unfinished and 
half-told: it is a last minute surprise. 101 Wood forgets here that the narrator has had 
more than enough time to react and savour his crown, and the half-told story of his 
ascent to the throne is a conscious stylistic choice (in line with other brief or 
unfinished stories in the book) rather than a panicked reaction. 
However, perhaps the strongest evidence for our reading of the temporal 
structure of Dark Back of Time as a goal-less goal (a goal missed by the spectator, but 
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not by the striker) is the way this figure for figuration is itself mirrored by a series of 
mise en abymes. For reasons of space, the next section will solely concentrate on one 
example in which the text’s temporal and hermeneutical indeterminacy and the 
quandary of the uncertain location of the moving goal-line are reflected and 
refracted at the same time. 
 
 
‘Put out the light, and then put out the light’:  turning off mise en abyme 
 
 
 
 The indeterminate sjuzhet of Dark Back of Time has — unsurprisingly — made 
particularly difficult to splice the text in stable parts. From the point of view of the 
narrator, the book has a “pure” errant phase, a “covert” procrastinating phase and 
an “overt” procrastinating one. From that of the reader, it is divided into an 
“innocent” phase, a “suspicious” one and finally a “post-Edenic” one. Those 
frontiers do not coincide; they are either utterly unknowable in the case of the 
narrator (there might have never been a pure phase, for all we know) or unstable, in 
the case of the reader (as they are moved in each reading).   
This instability ironically contrasts with the fact that Dark Back of Time could be 
divided into three separate parts or movements, separated by a refrain or leitmotif.  
The piece could be described as having a concerto structure: the first movement is 
largely humorous and playful in tone (an allegro), whilst the second one is largely 
melancholic and earnest (an adagio) and the third returns to the fun of the beginning 
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and gathers up all its motifs.102 This seemingly solid tripartite structure might have 
been used to stabilise its counterpart: we may wonder whether the leitmotif is 
synchronised with some other event — perhaps with the narrator’s coronation, the 
absent goal. 
This reading becomes even more tempting in the light of the content of this 
refrain. At this point, the narrator returns to his meditations on passing and ‘marked’ 
time, perhaps as a way to talk about his personal experiences with some distance.103 
However, the refrain is more than a mere philosophical interlude: it is also 
performative, a mirror-image of the narrative, another mise en abyme. Its purpose, as 
we will shortly see, is to give rise to the impression that we are witnessing ‘marked’ 
Time; only to quickly reveal its illusory character and the inevitable distortion or 
refraction inherent to the mise en abyme device. 
Like the match-theme of Speak, Memory, this example of the mirror-image (a 
diegetic one) is also based around a light/illumination trope. The mise en abyme starts 
his life as a metaphor used to illustrate the narrator’s musings on Conrad’s concept 
of ‘the shadow-line’, the frontier between youth and maturity. This turns into a more 
general discussion about death and temporal frontiers, illustrated by a rambling 
simile in which what he calls ‘respectful time’ is compared to a streetlamp: 
 
[W]e sometimes think there are no borders or abrupt stops or brutal 
cuts, that endings and beginnings are never marked out with the 
dividing line that, at other times, however, we think we see in 
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retrospect; and that belief is deceptive too, because neither the one or 
the other exists, or only as an enormous exception: not the sure, clean 
slice [...] not the juxtaposition or welter of confused and 
indistinguishable days ― there are always forgotten patches and 
blotted out periods, I know them, to help us see the illusory limits. It’s 
all more mysterious than that, more like an artificial prolongation, 
attenuating and inert, of what has already ceased, a ceremonial 
resistance to yielding or to marking the beginning of what is to come, 
like the streetlamps that stay lit for a while when day has already 
dawned in the great cities and towns and train stations and empty 
village depots, and they stand there still, blinking and upright in the 
face of the natural light that advances to make them superfluous.104 
 
 
The narrator returns to the division between ‘marked’ time and moving time 
(here split between its episodic and narrative dimension). Between those polarities 
stands ‘respectful time’, represented by the still-lit streetlamps.105 He then teasingly 
relates these conflicting versions of temporality to the problem of frontiers and limits. 
This luminal metaphor of liminality is read by Pittarello as an illustration of ‘the 
fluid nature of time’ and the event as a ‘deliberate rupture of the temporal 
continuum’.106  Wood, on the other hand, believes the passage is not denying the 
existence of those limits (he calls them ‘shifts’), but rather he is arguing against a 
teleological reading of them: the existence of those changes should not be ‘confused 
with coherence or narrative’. 107   Wood’s argument struggles to reconcile the 
narrator’s apparent belief in a temporal flux with his embracing of narrative 
boundaries and events. Calling those boundaries ‘shifts’ (as if they were more 
loosely traced) does not make them less boundary-like, or less narrative —  and his 
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ready identification of narrative with coherence (rather than ambiguity) over-
simplifies the text’s stance on the question. 
The narrator is aware of the illusory character of temporal limits, but he is not 
rejecting those illusions outright. The streetlamps do not represent a rejection of 
narrative or borderlines, same as Szentkuthy’s goal was not a rejection of goals. Time 
would not need to be polite if there was no narrative to apologise for. Again the 
narrator’s argument cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the text and its 
performance. The book is structured around one of those uncertain boundaries: a 
boundary that, however, should not be charged with any intrinsic significance. The 
ontological status of this limit is not denied but simply made paradoxical: the 
narrative structure allows for it to be seen and unseen. What the narrator advocates 
here might not necessarily the rejection of narrative but rather the acceptance in bad 
faith of narrative concordance as the ultimate truth rather than as an ambiguous and 
unreadable form of figuration. 
  The theoretical dimension of the metaphor of the streetlamps could be thus 
said to reflect the narrative structure of the whole without settling the sjuzhet. It is an 
ironic mirror of the reader’s predicament: what we have read and what we are about 
to read is only the ‘artificial prolongation’ of an event that has already taken place. 
The quote above, however, is only the beginning of the simile. As it develops, 
readers are teased by the possibility that what they are reading is not a reflection on 
change (or of a change), but is the change itself. At one point, the transition from 
electric light to natural light is compared to a battle for regal succession, with the 
streetlamps as defeated kings (‘These electric lights [...] make as if not to perceive the 
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conclusion of their reign’) and natural daylight as a kindly victor that lets them 
pretend they are still kings.108 Is the narrator referring to his secret? Does he know? 
And knowing, does he decide to allow his unknowing self to pretend nothing had 
happened?  The passage might be a covert confession: an admission and defence of 
procrastination and delay as a narrative and even an existential strategy. The 
streetlamps, in their royal disguise, might be the ‘light’ that fixes the book’s sjuzhet 
and its meaning. 
It might not come as a surprise that the promise of stability and knowledge is 
soon defeated by yet another army — or rather by a general. As well as being 
compared to a battle, the streetlamps motif is also interwoven with Othello’s bedside 
monologue (which the narrator had first quoted in the Ian Michael episode). The 
monologue could be read as another mirror-image of the narrator’s tendency to 
defer duties (Othello is also trying to delay what for him is the unavoidable murder 
of Desdemona). The narrator, however, does not recall the whole monologue, but 
only one particular line: ‘Put out the light, and then put out the light’.109 The usual 
interpretation of that line is that the first ‘light’ refers to the candle Othello carries 
and the second one to Desdemona’s life — the rest of the monologue goes on to 
compare one to the other. However, because the narrator lingers on this line rather 
than reading ahead, he is able to give it a novel interpretation: for him, Othello refers 
to the candle (and Desdemona) in both instances.110 
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The new reading twists the line’s meaning to make it fit the narrator’s 
purposes (whatever those are). For him, the repetition is a sign either of Othello’s 
indecision or of his mock-indecision, which allows him some momentary relief and 
an ‘artificial prolongation’ of his love for Desdemona before he puts an end to it. 
This ingenious interpretation nonetheless relies for its effectiveness on the arbitrary 
boundary that the narrator’s reading has drawn on the play: interpretation, after all, 
relies on such capricious line drawings. The interruption of a text also rewrites it. 
The reference to Othello can be read as further evidence of the narrator’s 
covert confession and as an ironic dismantling of that reading, which (like the 
narrator’s own reading of Othello) relies on an arbitrarily drawn endings. It is 
because he decides later on to confess openly that he has been procrastinating that 
we read Othello’s words as a secret admission. However, that meaning was only 
generated because the monologue was interrupted and Dark Back of Time wasn’t. 
Even the significance we invest in the streetlamps, our description of them as the leit 
motif of the book, only arises from their uninterrupted character: they would not be 
so if they were not repeated. They are a refrain and a meta-refrain, a self-conscious 
reflection on the technique. 
 However, perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the Othello line is its self-
conscious performance of its content: Othello is not only putting out his candle or 
Desdemona’s life, he is also turning off the symbolic, illuminating, confessional 
character of the mise en abyme — its apparent coincidence in time with the boundary 
it reflects. The line reintroduces ambiguity and distance into the mise en abyme and 
returns (re)readers to the puzzled position in which they first found themselves.   
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And the streetlamps will not only be put out once but twice. In their second 
appearance — just after the moving semblance of  his brother Julianín, who died 
aged three, and whom the narrator never met — they are divested with yet another 
meaning. 
They become non-time, timeless time, an ideal (perhaps impossible) form of 
memory which would involve the complete preservation of the past. 
 
I don’t know if in fact anything is really over or lost, at times I have the 
feeling that all our yesterdays are throbbing beneath the earth, refusing 
to disappear entirely, the enormous cumulation of the known and the 
unknown, stories told and stories silenced, recorded events or events 
that were never told and had no witnesses or were hidden [...] Yet we 
may wonder whether [...] what has been goes on indefinitely for the 
simple reason it has been, even if it only as part of the incessant, 
frenetic sum total of deeds and words whose tally no one takes the 
trouble to keep.111 
 
 
The streetlamps exemplify a kind of secular plea for immortality: ‘Nothing is over [...] 
there is nothing that does not resemble the slow relay of lights I see from my 
window’.112  Paradoxically, the fleeting lights are now incongruous metaphors of 
permanence: the divorce between trope and content is painfully obvious here, and 
becomes tragic rather than ironic, as it follows an earnest attempt to remember a 
child which left only faint traces in the world. 
It is perhaps the unsustainable and fleeting character of this comparison that 
makes the narrator change the metaphor’s referent as the refrain moves to its 
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conclusion: the lights (now forever on) go from representing the survival of 
everything to just representing fiction. 
 
 
[I]n fiction it can never be said “It’s over now, there, there, it’s all 
over”, not even as consolation or subterfuge, because nothing has 
really happened, silly, and in the territory that is not truth’s everything 
goes on happening forever and ever, and there the light is not put out 
now or later, and perhaps it is never put out.113 
 
 
The association of non-time and fiction in this paragraph will be emphatically 
reprised pages later, in the section which explains the metaphor that gives the book 
its title, the ‘negra espalda del tiempo’ (an idiosyncratic translation of a line from The 
Tempest, ‘the dark backwards and abysm of time’). The trope tries to gather together 
the ‘fickle’ voice of unpassed time, non-time and fiction. The narrator describes it as 
giving a name to 
 
[T]he time that has not existed, the time that does not await us and 
therefore does not happen, or happens only in a sphere that isn’t 
precisely temporal, a sphere in which  writing, or perhaps only fiction, 
may — who knows — be found.114 
 
 
Grohmann sees the narrator’s digressive style as a way of accessing this (non) 
temporal dimension, which — as he rightly observes — encompasses both the past 
and the dead and the future and the possible. This is also the dimension of fiction 
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and of metalepsis: it is, the narrator suggest, the dimension in which he has been 
crowned King of Redonda. Grohmann affirms at one point that Marías’s writing is 
based on ‘setting of beings and objects in an atemporal perspective’— a reading 
which could be justified by the ‘dark back of time’.115  The metaphor looks like a 
hermeneutic key (it is the title, after all), and seems to stabilises the book generically, 
hermeneutically and temporally. 
 It is, of course, only a sham key: the hysterical exhaustiveness of the 
inventory, combined with a characteristically hesitant tone (that ‘who knows’) 
unsettle its meaning. His words are disguising a confession, a narrative — the 
inevitable temporal character of fiction and the source of its ambiguity: indeed, the 
definition of narrative as ambiguity is repeated here, now overtly presented not as 
his own idea, but that of Spanish novelist Juan Benet. Pamela Shuggi has described 
the ‘dark back’ as ‘the literary manifestation of the philosophical aporia of time’: it is 
(as Szentkuthy’s goal also was), but it is also the manifestation of another aporia, 
that of figuration and meaning.116 The ‘dark back of time’, which would seemingly 
settle this second meaning of the streetlamps as the meaning, is another equivocal 
and allegorical mise en abyme. 
 
The deliberately self-contradictory conclusion should thus be read as a 
heartfelt admission of defeat and impermanence. The permanence of fiction is after 
all very different to that of immortality, either secular or religious: it is distorted, 
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inconclusive and fleeting rather than solid and permanent. Fiction has been 
previously presented as only conferring a rather fragile and life-like form of 
immortality. The narrator is unreliable here, but not in a selfish way. His focus 
moves from the self to the Other (the whole of the “second part” does, in a way), but 
emotion and earnestness are insufficient to fix meaning and stop the whirligig. As it 
was the case with Othello, the second putting out of the light (the murder of 
Desdemona) is tragic and painful. 
Another aspect to bear in mind when we read the second appearance of the 
lights is that, at this point, the re-reader knows: the narrator has already confessed 
(the first-time reader has to wait until the ‘dark back of time’ section, falsely 
imposing its version of time into this paragraph). Now that the reader knows there 
has been a goal, now that the mise en abyme has been resolutely turned off, the 
narrator nostalgically longs for the turned on lights — perhaps for his uncrowned 
past and whatever it may have come to represent. And yet he might not be talking 
about himself, for a change. Or he might be, after all. There is another element to the 
lights and this passage — which will be examined in the concluding part of this 
section — without which we should not approach not only the streetlamps but the 
whole ‘plot’ of Dark Back of Time. 
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‘The only way to disrupt time is to die and emerge from it’: time, death and 
figuration in Dark Back of Time 
 
 
And so we move to the end (in more than one sense) — to what I referred in the 
introduction as the final twist and the “secret” of Dark Back of Time. That was, of 
course, an exaggeration: the twist might neither be a twist, nor a surprise nor a secret, 
although it is of great importance to the interpretation of the text. It brings sharply 
into focus a dimension that been previously only dealt with in enigmatic but 
carelessly discarded aphorisms such as the one in the title — a comment on a 
seemingly irrelevant anecdote about a ship steward who accidentally fell off a 
transatlantic ship — or indirectly, through the two playful biographies inserted in 
the main narrative, concerning two “real-life” toy-soldiers, the obscure writers — 
and officers — Wilfrid Ewart and Hugh Oloff De Wet.117 
I am referring to death, which in the aphorism of the title is categorically 
defined as ‘the only’ way to disturb time — instead of writing, or of fiction or of 
digression.  The biographies (which I will not be able to discuss in detail) are 
themselves reflections on writing and death: Ewart’s life is narrated through and by 
his death; whilst the biography of De Wet  is narrated backwards, as if he had not 
died at all (ironically, his best-known book is the harrowing POW memoir The Valley 
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of the Shadow). 118  These biographical experiments offer contrasting takes on the 
question of narrative, death and fiction, without offering a stable approach to it. 
 The relation between narrative and death, however, is both explicitly and 
surreptitiously presented in the concluding two paragraphs of the text. In order to 
understand this “twist”, we need first of all to acquaint ourselves with another mise 
en abyme, which started as a kind of supplement of the metaphor of the streetlamps, 
a sort of second refrain. This mise en abyme concerns a woman and a man which 
initially seem to be standing for all the early-morning witnesses of the streetlamps 
(which also include our insomniac narrator). These blank examples are quickly 
transformed into fictional characters, creating a micro-novel (of the melodramatic 
kind) within the novel. 
Both man and woman — the narrator speculates — have just left a sleeping 
lover in bed at home and are heading to work. Both seem to be in liminal stages in 
their love affairs: the woman at the beginning of one (she has just had a one-night 
stand with a younger lover), the man at the end (he has a younger wife/mistress he 
suspects only loves him because of his money). As a mise en abyme of the 
indeterminate sjuzhet, woman and man represent a beginning and an end, and thus 
reflecting, without solving, the reader’s plight.   
Woman and man also make a second appearance in the next refrain; their 
story advancing in chronological fashion towards what we now guess will be an 
unhappy ending. The woman’s one-night stand has become a soul-sapping 
relationship, which has left her in a state of paralysis and indecision. The man, in its 
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turn, has foolishly incurred big gambling debts in his quest for more money for his 
indifferent mistress/wife, and we learn that he has 48 hours to pay them back. And 
he owes money, of all people, to a group of bullfighters and their managers, who 
will be pretty ruthless with him if he does not pay (the narrator assures us, as if it 
was common knowledge). 119  The second instalment looks at the borderlines of 
events and routines in a pleasingly symmetrical fashion: one event has turned into 
routine; the other routine has morphed into an event, or rather the event. If they are 
still reflecting the hidden coronation (now revealed), they mirror it as either a dull 
and mind-numbing process, or as the omen of an approaching catastrophe. 
What happens in the third instalment of the story is, however, both 
inconclusive and unexpected. The stories of the woman and the man do not seem to 
have advanced much: she is still clinging to the young man, he is still alive and in 
debt. Perhaps — we surmise — not much time has passed between both refrains: 
less than two days, say. The narrator only mentions that the gambling man ‘hasn’t 
yet been given the knifing he thought he was certain to get, sooner or later’.120 The 
fabula of the inserted narrative is polychronous: the two last instalments follow each 
other but we don’t know how closely, their chronology cannot be reconstructed. We 
will not be told anything else about the characters: the purpose of this refrain is not 
to advance the story but rather to rewrite it metaleptically. 
The narrator, for instance, speculates that the woman might be a descendant 
of M.P. Shiel (he married a Spanish girl) — she might be the legitimate heiress to the 
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kingdom and the whole story nothing more than a punch-line to the punch-line.121 
What he does with the man, however, is far more intriguing. In the opening section 
of Dark Back of Time, the narrator had described his own facial features, which ‘can 
bring luck or misfortune’: 
 
the eyes verging on Oriental and the mouth as if sketched on with a 
pencil—“beaky lip, beaky lip”— the chin almost cleft, the broad hands, 
a cigarette in the left one.122 
 
 
At the end of the third refrain, he proceeds to describe the facial features of the 
gambling man: ‘His eyes look almost Oriental and his lips as if sketched on with a 
pencil...’.123 The man has his face. The reflexive character of the mise en abyme is made 
explicit, although there is something else to this twist than mere mirroring: a threat 
of metalepsis which is interrupted, and left unresolved by the end of the narrative. 
Grohmann hesitates between reading the gambling man as the doppelgänger of 
the narrator or as a potential “Marías”, ‘one that was never made actual but whom 
the narrator could have been in a parallel conjectural life’ (he plumps for the second, 
which would mean the metaleptic barrier is not trespassed).124 The other critic that 
has repaired on it, Amélie Florenchie, reads it as the climax of the progressive 
blurring of the identity and name of the narrator.125 And whilst both readings are 
pertinent, they fail to take into consideration the fact that the gambling man is not 
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just fictional (as the narrator also is) but also that he is about to die at any given 
moment, he is about to be ‘fixed’ and removed from time (‘Everything is a still a 
question of time, and the knifing fixes it’).126 If there was to be a metalepsis, our 
narrator might be murdered. 
This identification opens a myriad of suggestive (but inconclusive) associative 
readings. Wilfrid Ewart, for instance, was also killed by chance whilst looking out of 
a balcony: the toy-soldier might have fatally connected their fates. A comparison to 
Pale Fire also offers intriguing avenues. ‘Pale Fire’ (the poem) ends with John Shade’s 
assurance that ‘I/Shall wake at six tomorrow, on July/The twenty-second’: he gets 
killed shortly after writing that line by a madman who believed him to be his former 
neighbour, whom he resembled.127  The narrator concludes his tale by assuring his 
readers that the end of his story ‘may never be put into writing because it will 
coincide with my own, some years from now, or so I hope. Or it may also survive 
me’.128 Why the two ‘or’? The first one is reasonable (a superstitious cliché), but the 
second one isn’t: is he proposing that his ending will survive him because it will be 
written? Does that mean that the end of Dark Back of Time is his literal end? 
The next paragraph of the conclusion, which returns to the streetlamps 
metaphor, makes this survival explicit, but it also makes it unnerving and eerie. The 
paragraph starts with the narrator looking up rather than down at the passengers —
in that brief moment, the bus turns up and takes away his characters. And then he 
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looks back at the lights, still on ‘until the sleepy hand of some council employee [...] 
puts out the light and then puts it out’.129  That was the end of the first refrain (which 
would add a pleasing symmetry to the book), but the narrator adds something else: 
‘And even then the passengers are still there, and even then the light has not been 
put out’.130 He seems to be saying that even after the lights are put out, they are still 
on, and so are his two made-up passengers. He might be wistfully confirming how 
fiction can make things survive, an echo of the note in which the second refrain 
ended. But it is not only the light that stays; it is also the gambling man — that is, the 
possibility of a metaleptic extinction which cannot be wished away. The narrator 
might not want to let go of his story, but in letting the story survive he ‘fixes’ himself, 
he ‘marks’ himself as a man with only two days to live, or even less. We don’t know. 
He might be already dead: the metaleptic murder might have already taken place. 
He might be a ghost, left incongruously on, lingering, delaying — like the 
streetlamps. 
 
I am fully aware that the last interpretation over-reads what might be 
nothing more than an insignificant element. Even if we see it (and cannot unsee it) 
it might not need to be explained as a metalepsis, or the ‘secret’ the Redonda story 
is screening: the presence of other metalepses or other secrets is not enough 
evidence to prove that this one is also one. And yet the gambling man is a dying 
man, and death and writing had been explicitly linked by the narrator. Perhaps the 
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best way to approach this enigma is to return to the whirligig, to the problem of 
figuration — to the beginning, to the trial of a knife-wielding murderer. Death is in 
fact used here not just in a literal way but also in a figural one, as another allegory 
of figuration. 
Let us consider again the narrator’s assertion that his end ‘may survive him’. 
Before then (although he acknowledges that his narrative is about to end), he 
confidently insists that his voice will go on. But then he wavers. We can interpret it 
as a confession of his ghostly nature, which would explain how his written end 
would survive him. But we are being too literal here, perhaps. Ghosts and death are 
not the referent of the story, they cannot stop the whirligig. J Hillis Miller (in a 
reading of ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’) points out that word ‘death’ performs 
what De Man called ‘the defacement of mind’: 
 
the word death indicates a blind spot within knowledge [...] Death  is an 
area of the mind that cannot be humanized [...] This place cannot ever 
be faced and named directly [...] any displaced name for [...] covers over 
what it names as much as it reveals it.131 
 
 
The narrator’s death is a figure for this process. No matter how much he claims to 
the contrary, the narrator is not a voice who can decide when to speak or not: he is 
not speaking, he is the words and he cannot go.  As De Man remarks at the end of 
‘Autobiography as De-Facement’, 
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Language [...] is not the thing itself but [...] the picture of thing, and, as 
such, it is silent [...] Language, as trope, is always privative [...]Death is 
a displaced name for a linguistic predicament.132 
 
 
The narrator ends his story ‘fixed’ in this predicament. The story of the 
narrator’s metaleptic death can be read as another displacement, another mise 
en abyme of the whirligig of figuration in which the narrative is permanently 
stuck.   
 
 
We are thus inevitably led back to the beginning, to the toy soldier and to the 
other lens through which we have read Dark Back of Time, Szentkuthy’s goal. 
Although the ambiguity of the toy-soldier seemed to contradict the whiff of 
certainty of the ‘goal’ metaphor and its apparent embracement of stable 
liminal metaphors, both had more in common than it seemed. The text’s self-
definition as a figuration (and the subversion of the conventionally stable 
generic tags performed as a consequence of that goal) only seemed conclusive 
at first: like Szentkuthy’s goal, it only let loose a chain of associations and 
mirror images which share the inconclusive, mysterious, even ominous air of 
the wooden aide-de-camp. 
The text’s use of metalepsis, temporal indeterminacy and mise en abyme (the 
three techniques closely related to each other), as exemplified by the dilemmas 
around the Crown of Redonda, mirrored the text’s vertigo-inducing spinning 
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— sometimes in a light mood (in the text’s thorough dismantling of narrative 
authority), sometimes in a darker and elegiac one, in which the impermanence 
and the permanence of writing and meaning is both a source of woe (in the 
second refrain) and a source of worry (in the final one). The toy soldier may 
have outlasted our narrator, like his ending — or yet it may not. Both might 
leave at the same time, both might remain forever: they are at the mercy of 
those who decide to play with them instead of leaving them gathering dust in 
a shelf. 
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On playing and not playing patience: a conclusion 
 
I can play patience for hours instead of writing W. 
Georges Perec, manuscript source, as quoted and 
translated by David Bellos in Georges Perec: A Life in 
Words (first published in Phillippe Lejeune, La Memoire 
et l’oblique )
1 
 
Playing patience or writing W: in May 1970 (as Lejeune recounts in his study of the 
book) Perec found himself in that particular quandary.  At that point, he was 
halfway through the serial publication of the novella in La Quinzaine Litteraire: 
Lejeune mentions that at the time he was probably working on what became 
Chapter Thirty in the 1975 book, the horrific account of childhood in the island. No 
wonder he sought solace and relief in a game that has been the temptation of 
procrastinators for years.  Perec’s dilemma, however, is something more than a 
curious anecdote about the difficulties he faced in composing W. His choice has 
surprising resonances with some of the quandaries writers and readers face when 
confronting autobiography. Perec must have stopped playing patience at one point, 
or else W would not have been completed. The book he produced was, however, 
curiously indebted to the game: it could be described a shuffled pack to be patiently 
sorted by the reader. However, W also demonstrates that at some point he might 
have renounced to the comforts of the card game.2 
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One cannot help to read the choice between playing and not playing as an 
allegory of the relation between the generic definition of autobiography and the 
nature of figuration: it might indeed allow to gather together the issues explored not 
only in our reading of W itself, but also of our other curiosities. We could compare 
the traditional definition of autobiography to the game: both aspire to restore the 
shuffled self to its original linear order in the box. Or — if we adopt Gusdorf’s 
approach or that of the performativist critics — autobiography should perhaps not 
be identified with the ordered pack, but rather with the game itself: a reflection of 
the players’ successes and failures in putting themselves back together again, and in 
which failed games are as revealing as successful ones. Even if our three curiosities 
are all failed games, they could still be defined as autobiographies. 
As we pointed out in Chapter One, the game can also be read an allegory of 
reading — not just of autobiographies but of all narratives. Readers also rearrange 
the sjuzhet into its original fabula: they could do it more or less successfully 
(especially in indeterminate or curious narratives), but they still doggedly attempt to 
reconstruct it. If that game cannot be solved, a new one is started. Here the allegory 
starts to become inadequate, and does not match any definition of autobiography. 
Pragmatic definitions of autobiography such as Lejeune’s do not fit in the patience 
allegory: for Lejeune, what defines the genre is not the possibility or impossibility of 
restoration but a convention, an agreement, a coincident name. 
 However, as De Man pointed out, the pact was but a displaced whirligig. 
Lejeune’s “solution” has only given rise to more games of patience, such as 
Doubrovsky’s automotive child. Patience should perhaps be compared to De Man’s 
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figure of the whirligig of figuration: the unsolved game is not a satisfactory 
conclusion or a stable definition, but the excuse for another attempt, and another 
failure — to be continued up to infinity, if the player is particularly unlucky. The 
games of patience involved in writing or reading autobiography — as De Man 
insisted — are always inconclusive, the springboard for another game. 
In the light of these approximate allegories, the texts we have been examining 
could be playing and not playing patience. They refuse to play because they question 
the end of the game, the idea that the pack could or should be restored to its 
‘original’ state: a process which closes writing, and replaces the game with a box. 
And, as we have seen in W, it matters that one can write ‘I write’ and that the game 
does not come to a halt. Their disruptions and distortions of narrative structure and 
their play with mise en abyme remind the reader that the life of autobiography (as 
writing) resides in its potential for generating more games, and more procrastination 
— and more patience, in the two senses of the word. The choice between writing and 
playing patience might not really be a choice at all. 
As with allegories and all figures, it is at the moment when correspondence 
fails and the figure stabs its author in the back when a paradoxical insight (a 
negative one) is achieved. Or not.  Returning to the curiosity, its value of the 
curiosity does not reside on its ability to rename autobiography, or make it new, or 
to make it static. It is perhaps only a reminder that the problematic nature of 
figuration De Man described in ‘Autobiography as De-Facement’ cannot be put 
away in a drawer or replaced by shinier alternatives. It is always there, in mundane 
objects like frames or in garish or outlandish finds like an eight-legged lamp or a 
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wooden figurine. They are worth collecting, even if the only thing one can do is pore 
over them obsessively and list them. 
The problem of such an approach is that it does not lend itself well to 
conclusions. A reasonable way of dealing with that obstacle might be to simply 
sweep the filings our sharpening analyses have given rise to and put them in a little 
pile together. In Speak, Memory, for instance, we found a seemingly hieratic and static 
text (with an apparently well-defined genre and a robust structure, like the lamp) 
being pulled down and rebuilt time and again by mise en abyme figures and 
indeterminate temporalities, and thus kept alive and floating in the process. In W or 
the Memory of Childhood, the humble empty frame (like a patience game started over 
and over again) made explicit the testimonial and ethical dimensions of renouncing 
closure and restoration. In Dark Back of Time, the figurine/aide was the trigger of an 
increasingly unsettling succession of mise en abymes and metaleptic disturbances 
which brought into focus the paradoxical nature of the ‘life’ at the heart of 
autobiography. Once gathered, the filings seem perhaps repetitive and worthless, 
and one throws them away, with the uncomfortable feeling there will be more of 
them in the future, and that there will be not be any different. Or — in a last-minute 
figure swap — one finds in the previously unsuccessful game of patience the much 
sought-for excuse to reshuffle the pack and start another game. 
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